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The end of the Second World War saw a retreat from empire and a period of decolonisation. 
During this time Britain’s military became embroiled in a series of protracted 
counterinsurgency campaigns. Counterinsurgency engendered a different set of concerns 
and stresses than the previous world war, not least that operations took place under a set of 
Emergency Regulations that purported to control the use of force. The longest running of 
these campaigns was in Malaya where a State of Emergency was declared in 1948 and did 
not officially end until 1960. Using the Malayan Emergency as a case study, this thesis will 
investigate the immediate and long-term psychological impact of participation in Britain’s 
postwar counterinsurgency campaigns on its service personnel. In order to understand 
impact, this thesis will employ two main concepts: resilience and psychopathology. It will 
suggest that morale was an earlier analogue of resilience. It will argue that training, which 
privileged the use of force, was used to instil morale in service personnel and that regimental 
culture reinforced and sustained morale while on operations. This thesis will then go on to 
look at when resilience, or morale, gave way to breakdowns. Within the history of military 
psychiatry, the psychopathological conditions seen during war were largely thought of in 
terms of predisposition or weakness. This would change in the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War, with the creation of the diagnostic category, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. PTSD 
shifted the emphasis away from predisposition toward the traumatic event and reduced the 
stigma surrounding mental illness. At the time of the Malayan Emergency, however, service 
personnel were subject to a culture that expected resilience. Finally, then, this thesis, will 
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Note on Language 
 
The place names of Malaya were transliterated in a variety of ways according to the different 
languages and dialects of the people who inhabited the country. The spelling of place names 
has also changed over time. This thesis will use the most common spelling of place names 
between 1940 and 1960. So, Johore instead of the modern Johor and Negri Sembilan instead 
of Negeri Sembilan. Chinese names will also be transliterated as they were at the time, hence, 

































i. Research Questions 
 
The recent, much publicised case of Sergeant Alexander Blackman, who came to be known 
as Marine A, has led to renewed concern over the limits of force employed by British Armed 
Forces in the counterinsurgency role. While deployed to Afghanistan in 2011, Blackman 
killed a severely wounded insurgent following a firefight and was later convicted of murder. 
His senior officer, Colonel Oliver Lee spoke against Blackman, saying he was part of a unit 
that had contravened the rules of engagement and gone ‘feral’. In response a further officer 
who served with Blackman, Major Steve McCulley, emphasised the nature of 
counterinsurgency, saying that the men were engaged in winning hearts and minds one 
minute and in contact with insurgents the next.1  
 
The journalist Neal Ascherson wrote in support of Blackman as the trial was ongoing, 
prompted by his own experiences in Malaya during the Emergency. Ascherson had served 
as a National Service Lieutenant with 42 Commando Royal Marines in 1952. In his article 
for The Herald, a Scottish regional newspaper, he described his ‘mercy killing’ of two 
wounded Communist insurgents, an act which ‘haunted’ him. In the article he implied that 
‘traumatic stress’ was a feature of active service in Malaya. ‘Most ex-servicemen who have 
actually fought get through their lives without much self-reproach, if any. (That’s not the 
same as saying that they don’t often suffer a degree of traumatic stress.)’ Ascherson goes on 
to state, ‘I implored British courts to take into account all the conflicting instincts, the 
adrenaline surges of fear and hate, which compete in war with the Geneva Convention 
rules.’2 Blackman’s sentence was later commuted to manslaughter, in large measure because 
of the use of psychiatric testimony in the appeals process. The stress and isolation of 
 
1 Hayley Dixon, ‘Military Row Over Marine A Acquittal as Commanding Officer Hits Out”, The Telegraph, 
19th March 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news. Accessed 24/07/18.  
2 Neal Ascherson, ‘“They were horribly wounded; I shot them both dead”: Neal Ascherson tries to make sense 
of a traumatic wartime memory’, Sunday Herald, 29th January 2017.  
http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion. Accessed 24/07/18. 
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Blackman’s position, as well as his personality, led three psychiatrists to independently 
diagnose an ‘adjustment disorder’, meaning a failure to cope.3  
 
The Blackman case, along with the Ascherson commentary, act as a prescient introduction 
to the key themes of this thesis. Namely, the stresses encountered during participation in 
counterinsurgency, the use of force, and the conceptualisation of resilience and breakdowns. 
These issues are all the more important because Britain has been almost constantly involved 
in conflict since 1945, with counterinsurgency and other low intensity conflict 
predominating. Ministry of Defence figures have revealed that until 2016, 1968 was the only 
year since the Second World War where no British troops had died in overseas operations.4 
This statistic speaks in part to the violence of the postwar period of decolonisation, and the 
ready use of British forces to subdue politically motivated insurgencies. In terms of 
psychological impact, the focus was initially on high intensity warfare, and it would be 
decades before the public and writers would turn their attention to the dangers posed by 
participation in counterinsurgency on the psychiatric health of service personnel.      
 
Psychiatric attrition during the First and Second World Wars had forced the military to 
recognise that some men would succumb to nervous disorders and resulted in continuing 
military efforts to categorise and respond to these. Approximately thirty years after the 
Second World War had ended, following research into soldiers returning from the war in 
Vietnam, this concern with military psychiatry would contribute to the creation of the 
diagnostic category, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which in turn has come to 
dominate modern formulations of trauma. However, situated between the World Wars and 
Vietnam, the British counterinsurgency campaigns of decolonisation have been largely 
overlooked within the history of military psychiatry. In focusing on the Malayan Emergency, 
which was declared in 1948 and officially ended in 1960, this research will begin to bridge 
that gap. More importantly, counterinsurgency engendered a different set of concerns and 
stresses than the previous world war. Not least, that the security forces were set against a 
determined opposition who were not readily identified from among the wider civilian 
population. As such, operations took place under a set of Emergency Regulations that 
 
3 Neil Greenberg, ‘In Two Hours I knew that Marine was a Broken Man’, Daily Mail, 16th March 2017. 
https://www.pressreader.com/uk/daily-mail. Accessed 24/07/18.  
4 Ministry of Defence, ‘UK Armed Forces Deaths: Operational Deaths Post World War II: 3 September 1945 
to 17 February 2016’, (March, 2016).       
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purported to control the use of force. Using the Malayan Emergency as a case study then, 
this thesis will investigate how the British Army and its service personnel adjusted to the 
stress of counterinsurgency.  
  
To do so, this thesis will employ two approaches informed by psychology. Firstly, it will use 
the contextual framework of psychological resilience, briefly defined here as adaptation to 
adversity, to understand how British soldiers coped with the stress of counterinsurgency. 
Secondly, it will use psychopathology, the study of mental disorders, to understand how 
psychological stress generated psychiatric conditions and how these conditions were both 
expressed by soldiers and conceptualised and treated by the military during this campaign. 
In this way, this research will more fully explore the psychological impact of participation 
on British service personnel. Both resilience and psychopathology have been subject to 
changing definitions within the military and these are discussed in more depth below. Before 
this, a brief overview of the Emergency will be provided as a frame for understanding the 
experience of counterinsurgency in Malaya.      
 
At its peak in 1952, the Malayan Emergency (1948-60) involved approximately 40,000 
Commonwealth forces, of whom around 25,000 were British.5 These included the full spread 
of services, for instance in Malaya artillery served as infantry and the Special Air Service 
(SAS) were deployed. They also included National Servicemen both as officers and other 
ranks, with the National Service Act of 1948 mandating 18 months service, later raised to 
24 months. The efficacy of National Service personnel was debated within the military, 
particularly their effectiveness in the jungles of Malaya. While senior officers recognised 
that they were needed to bolster understrength battalions, some doubted their ability to 
perform to the standards of their Regular counterparts.6 Nevertheless, by 1952 many British 
Army battalions serving in Malaya were comprised mainly of National Servicemen.7  
 
The cause of the Emergency was a Communist insurrection led by the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP), of which Chin Peng was Secretary General. Chin Peng and the MCP had 
played a leading role in wartime resistance against the occupying Japanese forces. In 1948-
 
5 Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960, (Connecticut: Archon, 1966), p.133.   
6 Donald Mackay, The Domino that Stood: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, (London: Brassey’s, 1997), 
p.94.  
7 Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966, (London: Routledge, 
1991), p.45.    
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49 it formed the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). The conflict also took on 
aspects of being a civil war. Malaya’s population when the Emergency began, in 1948, was 
approximately 5 million, comprised of 49 percent Malays, 38 percent Chinese, and 11 
percent Indian. More than 90 percent of the MNLA were Chinese. On the surface then it was 
an insurgency against the British but, underlying this, the population was forced to choose 
whether to support communist-led and predominantly Chinese-based insurgency or not. 8 
The insurgents were mixed with civilians which greatly complicated operations.              
 
In Malaya those operations initially included not just area patrolling, but large-scale jungle 
sweeps in search of the MNLA, whose strength peaked at 7,292 in 1951.9 This was not 
conducive to the process of intelligence gathering or building an understanding of the local 
terrain and people. As such, operations soon concentrated on smaller, more directed affairs, 
with units taking control of an area. In addition, soldiers were from the beginning involved 
in patrolling, and then searching small rural settlements, and sometimes in burning huts in 
order to deprive the communists of them and to move the population on. In both cases the 
units involved could be quite small, sometimes under local command of a junior officer or 
even NCOs. This decentralisation of command has itself become a characteristic of 
counterinsurgency.10 
 
Parallel to the evolution of patrols there was an attempt to separate the insurgents from the 
people, a process made easier for the British as the Communists were predominantly from 
the minority Chinese population. Initially, during 1948-49, that meant difficult interactions 
in which soldiers searched, or burned, remote huts where the population was assumed to be 
sympathetic to the enemy. Then from 1950 that evolved into the more systematic 
‘villagisation’ of the Chinese squatter communities that had formed on the jungle’s edge. 
This was the concentration of around 500,000 people into ‘resettlements’ surrounded by 
barbed wire, later rebranded ‘New Villages’. Further to this, movement was highly 
 
8 Karl Hack, ‘Everyone Lived in Fear: Malaya and the British Way of Counter-Insurgency’, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 23:4-5, (2012), p.672.   
9 By August 1957 the strength of the MNLA had been reduced to 1,830. Karl Hack, ‘Negotiating with the 
Malayan Communist Party, 1948–89’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39:4, (2011), 
p.608.  
10 Raffi Gregorian, ‘“Jungle Bashing” in Malaya: Towards a Formal Tactical Doctrine’, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 5:3, (1994), pp.352-353.    
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controlled, which alongside resettlement was intended to separate the insurgents from their 
support networks.11  
 
As those villages became established, joint army-police operations were deployed in the 
jungle, often involving troops in hours of static ambush, or long patrols by small units. The 
difference from early operations being that over time increasing numbers of these patrols 
and ambushes were within the framework of intelligence-led area operations. Finally, during 
1952-54, these operations pushed the MNLA deeper into the jungle, where the British had 
to follow. For some British troops, especially the SAS whose postwar reformation originated 
in Malaya from 1950, this meant deep jungle operations, introducing yet another set of 
challenges.12                                                                      
 
The insurgency in Malaya was therefore distinct from regular warfare, involving changing 
operations among different populations, political climates and terrains. Given these 
differences, how can psychology help us to understand the experiences of participating in 
wars which confronted soldiers with such unique challenges. A growing body of research 
has recognised that participation in counterinsurgency exposes service personnel to 
distinctive types of stressful situations and events and so the risk of developing stress 
reactions:        
 
Without the established boundaries of conventional operations, switching between 
diplomatic and combative roles can expose Soldiers to unique stressors when 
conducting COIN [counterinsurgency] operations. … The most common problems 
reported by Soldiers [sic] were operational stress characterized by anxiety, fear, 
irritability, frustration, and isolation.13  
 
 
11 Simon Innes-Robbins, Dirty Wars: A Century of Counterinsurgency, (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 
2016), pp.195-197.    
12 Karl Hack, ‘Corpses, Prisoners of War and Captured Documents: British and Communist Narratives of the 
Malayan Emergency, and the Dynamics of Intelligence Transformation’, Intelligence and National Security, 
14:4, (1999), p.218.                
13 Derrick Arincorayan, Larry Applewhite, Veronica Almeida et al, ‘The Psychosocial Challenges of 
Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations’, US Army Medical Department Journal, (2014), p.14. See also, 
Adam Borah, ‘Mental Health Care use by Soldiers Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations’, Military 
Medicine, 177:5, (2012), pp.501-506.    
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Further research into peacekeeping operations has reported that proximity to hostile 
civilians, changing and unclear mission objectives, as well as restrictive rules of engagement 
have also represented significant stressors, all of which were evident during the 
Emergencies. 14  
 
The field of psychological medicine has only recently begun to recognise and investigate the 
stresses that characterise counterinsurgency. As many of their individual records show, 
however, the participating officers and soldiers have long been aware of their existence. Just 
as the speed and mechanisation of the Second World War gave rise to the notion that new 
types of warfare may ultimately be more stressful than the trenches of the First World War, 
the postwar counterinsurgencies produced similar thoughts in the servicemen who 
participated in them.15 Major Ian Gibb, a platoon commander with a line infantry regiment, 
found the counterinsurgency in Malaya to be a ‘peculiar battleground’ that was 
‘psychologically’ difficult.16 With this in mind, this thesis addresses the following questions 
about the types of stressors experienced by British soldiers during these insurgencies: what 
was the nature of counterinsurgency in Malaya as experienced by the British service 
personnel who participated in it? How did the British services (mainly the army) adapt to 
meet the psychological challenges this posed?     
 
In answering these questions, this thesis will show that the early iteration of psychological 
resilience was ‘morale’. Morale was the characteristic, or state, the army argued, which was 
needed to underpin psychological resilience as well as for general military effectiveness. The 
thesis will argue that conceptualisations of resilience have to be considered both in terms of 
military understanding, but also within the wider social and cultural context.17 Firstly, 
concepts of resilience have to be understood as a part of military culture. Recent work 
investigating psychological coping strategies during the First World War have identified 
 
14 Susan M. Orsillo, Lizabeth Roemer, Brett T. Litz et al, ‘Psychiatric Symptomatology Associated with 
Contemporary Peacekeeping: An Examination of Post‐Mission Functioning among Peacekeepers in Somalia’, 
Journal of Traumatic Stress, 11:4, (1998), pp.623-624.          
15 Roger Broad, Conscription in Britain, 1939-1964: The Militarisation of a Generation, (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2006), p.203.        
16 Major I.S. Gibb, Memoir: A Walk in the Forest, IWM 86/3/1.           
17 Rony Berger, ‘An Ecological-Systemic Approach to Resilience: A View from the Trenches’, Traumatology, 
23:1, (2017), p.41.   
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morale as military shorthand used at the time for resilience and combat motivation.18 This 
thesis will show that the term morale continued to play this role into and beyond the interwar 
period. 
 
In turn, morale has been subject to changing definitions. A recent definition from the US 
Army Field Manual series states that morale is the ‘mental, emotional and spiritual state of 
the individual.’ In contrast to this individualistic interpretation an earlier British definition 
emphasises morale in relation to the group. ‘A confident, resolute willing, often self-
sacrificing and courageous attitude of an individual to the functions or tasks demanded or 
expected of him by the group of which he is part’.19 Further, morale has often been thought 
of in terms of the component parts that underpin it, including the fulfilment of physical and 
psychological needs, esprit de corps, psychological constitution, culture, commitment to 
aims, conditioning, training, group cohesion and leadership.20  The thesis research questions 
focus on resilience and morale in relation to the Malayan case-study: How was resilience 
articulated during the Emergency in Malaya? How did British service personnel demonstrate 
resilience in face of these stressors? How was morale conceived and instilled? 
 
The thesis will show that resilience, or high morale, was expected in Malaya. Inevitably, 
however, there were issues which raise a further set of questions, namely: When stresses 
caused resilience, or morale, to deteriorate, and how was this conceptualised and treated 
when it did? In answering these questions this thesis has sought to avoid the trap of projecting 
the current understanding of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) backwards. The 
American involvement in Vietnam resulted in what has been termed Post-Vietnam 
syndrome, which would be replaced by PTSD.21 Following this, researchers found similar 
symptoms in veterans of French postcolonial wars in Algeria and Vietnam.22 Furthermore, 
Russian veterans of their counterinsurgency in Afghanistan who came to display signs of 
 
18 Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British 
Armies, 1914–1918, (Cambridge, CUP, 2008), pp.140-141.   
19 Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (Eds), Handbook of Military Psychology, (London: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1991), pp.454-455.  
20 Watson, Enduring the Great War, 140-141.    
21 Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century, (London: Pimlico, 
2003), p.357.     
22 Marc-Antoine Crocq and Louis Crocq, ‘From Shell Shock and War Neurosis to Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder: A History of Psychotraumatology’, Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 2:1, (2000), p.53.    
  19 
 
 
psychological ill-health were referred to informally as having Afghan syndrome.23 It could 
be argued then that participation in counterinsurgency has come to be framed in terms of 
resulting mental health concerns. In his book on British National Service, Tom Hickman 
found anecdotal evidence of psychological problems, listed as Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder in the glossary, in interviews with veterans of the Malayan Emergency, one of 
whom had survived an ambush in Malaya.24 By contrast, Richard Vinen, also writing on 
National Service, found that cultural expectations in the 1950s meant that psychological 
effects were difficult to measure.25 PTSD had yet to enter the public lexicon. Which raises 
the question: how was psychological deterioration and breakdown understood at the time?                             
      
The Malayan Emergency helps here, since it was an earlier campaign, that generated a body 
of knowledge within service psychiatry relating to conditions very different to those of the 
two World Wars that it followed. The First World War had given rise to the term ‘shellshock’ 
which invoked the conditions under which soldiers succumbed to psychiatric symptoms. It 
also mirrored early theories about its aetiology (set of causes and conditions). It was thought 
that the concussive blast wave of a shell upset brain function. As the incidence of 
breakdowns increased and became to a certain extent accepted, ‘shellshock’ represented a 
dangerous term for the military. It could provide a legitimate escape from the front and had 
the potential to undermine discipline.26 The Second World War saw the use of different 
terminology for psychiatric breakdowns, a prominent example being exhaustion. This was a 
term that accepted the popular narrative that every man had his breaking point, but also 
implied that these were transient conditions which could get better with rest, ideally to be 
provided in-theatre.27 The military had learnt the importance of psychiatric terminology. It 
had tried to develop a system for treating psychiatric casualties in theatre, which became 
known as forward psychiatry. 
 
Forward psychiatry, however, was not immediately practised by the British at the outset of 
the Korean war, which ran contemporaneously with Malayan Emergency. Instead, the 
exigencies of the war and its diffuse command structure meant the British initially relied on 
 
23 Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89, (London: Profile, 2012), p.320.    
24 Tom Hickman, The Call-Up: A History of National Service, (London: Headline, 2005), pp.265-273.    
25 Richard Vinen, National Service: Conscription in Britain, 1945-1963, (London: Penguin, 2015), p.306.  
26 Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, ‘Battle for the Mind: World War 1 and the Birth of Military Psychiatry’, 
Lancet, 384:9955, (2014), p.1709. 
27 Jones and Wessely, ‘Battle for the Mind’, p.1710.    
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the American medical services and casualties were evacuated back to Japan.28 Finally, then, 
this research will ask: What was the incidence of psychiatric conditions during the Malayan 
Emergency? How were these conditions conceptualised and managed in Malaya?    
 
 
Summary of Research Questions        
 
1. Stress: What was the nature of the counterinsurgency in Malaya as experienced by 
the British service personnel who participated in it? What types of stress were 
characteristic of the Malayan Emergency? Was the combination of types and 
intensities of stresses in counterinsurgency distinctive?  
 
2 Resilience: How did British service personnel adapt to and cope with these stressors, 
thereby demonstrating resilience? In so far as resilience was seen as being 
underpinned by ‘morale’, in what ways did British forces attempt to build up morale 
in order to promote resilience to the particular stresses of counterinsurgency in 
Malaya? 
 
3 Breakdown: What was the incidence of psychiatric conditions in Malaya? How were 
these psychiatric conditions conceptualised and treated within the RAMC as well as 
the wider military? Further, how did the campaign in Malaya and the climate of 












28 Meghan Fitzpatrick, Invisible Scars: Mental Trauma and the Korean War, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 
pp.63-64.    
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This thesis is concerned with the impact that participation in these postwar 
counterinsurgency campaigns, specifically Malaya, has had on British service personnel. 
This is an area that has not yet been the subject of a sustained investigation. While there has 
been significant literature on these campaigns, research has focused mainly upon tactics and 
doctrine. This literature scarcely touches on the questions that concern this thesis. It does, 
however, frame the context in which British troops served. It has also been subject of much 
debate and revisionism.               
 
In histories of counterinsurgency, Colonel, later Major-General Sir, Charles Callwell is often 
referred to as the most prominent author on the subject, being  influential and reflecting ideas 
of the time.29 His Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, first published in 1896, took 
an aggressive stance toward adversaries of the Empire, recommending that British troops 
‘give them a lesson which they will not forget.’30 Other prominent pre-war writers on 
counterinsurgency, often framed as assisting the civil power in colonies, failed to recognise 
the increasingly political dimension, preferring instead the stern measures afforded under 
martial law. Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing, first published in 1934, 
advocated an initial show of force, to dispel thoughts of weakness, and the criminalisation 
of actions not normally taken to be offences.31 He understood the importance of cooperation 
with the civil power but not the political side of insurgency. Writing on the Irish conflict of 
1916-21, Colonel H.J. Simson, minimised the political lessons from it, preferring instead to 
advocate the advantages of martial law in Palestine. As such, Simon Innes-Robbins has 
argued that the British lacked a workable doctrine with which to wage the postwar 
counterinsurgency campaigns.32 Similarly, confusion in definition and response to civil 
disorder sometimes meant the security forces fell back on repressive measures during the 
 
29 Daniel Whittingham, ‘“Savage warfare”: CE Callwell, the Roots of Counter-Insurgency, and the Nineteenth 
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30 Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, (London: HM Stationery Office, 1906), 
pp.394-395.  
31 Major General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, (London: Macmillan and Co, 1939), pp.15-17.    
32 Simon Robbins, ‘Glimpsing the Future: The Irish Struggle for Independence, 1916-21’. In Gregory Fremont-
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interwar period.33 Furthermore, in failing to recognise the need to leave open the way to a 
political solution, repressive measures meant short term stability came at the cost of 
antagonising the civil population, ensuring a continuing cycle of civil protest and state 
response, in which security force personnel were caught in the middle.34      
 
From the 1960s, after more than a decade of further insurgencies, a new wave of writers 
shifted the emphasis of thinking on counterinsurgency, from approaching it merely as the 
control of hostile populations, towards its role as facilitating a political solution. According 
to Sir Robert Thompson, in Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966), the military were to 
be used to hold ground and allow time for this process to take place. Under this ethos, the 
use of violence had to be limited to avoid alienating the civilian population and increasing 
support for the insurgency.35 Thompson stressed the importance of the government acting 
within the confines of the law. Within this context, the British recourse to Emergency 
Regulations was interpreted as being tough but fair, in effect inhibiting the use of force, and 
emphasising government accountability.36  
 
The Emergency Regulations in Malaya were used to establish powers, such as detention 
without trial and searching private property without a warrant, within the law. Similarly, 
while Brigadier Richard Clutterbuck, in The Long Long War (1967) recognised that the 
extended powers afforded by the emergency legislation were open to abuse, he believed that 
this criticism was balanced against the safeguard of civilian oversight, as in the use of the 
independent Public Review Board in the case of Malaya.37 On the ground, Major Frank 
Kitson’s Gangs and Counter-Gangs (1960) reiterated the importance of the military as an 
intelligence-gathering organisation, and advocated the use of captured rebels to infiltrate 
insurgent groups and disrupt their organisation. This was to be done using a carrot and stick 
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approach, providing an incentive to cooperate coupled with more punitive measures should 
that cooperation not be forthcoming.38                        
    
By the 1980s, academic works had codified the political dimension of British 
counterinsurgency and sought to establish the military as a force, not to defeat the enemy, 
but to provide space to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. The term ‘winning 
hearts and minds’ has become shorthand for winning the civilian population to the side of 
the security forces. In theory, this is achieved by implementing socio-economic reforms that 
improve the living conditions of the population, and by extension alienate supporters from 
the insurgency. This included a call to retrain the security forces, as well as expand their 
administrative capability, to provide conflict resolution and meet the welfare needs of 
civilians. According to Richard Stubbs, in Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare (1989), 
this humanitarian side was designed to ‘extend control over the general population.’39 Where 
the principle of minimum force was contravened, for example in Malaya, Thomas Mockaitis, 
in British Counterinsurgency 1919-1960 (1990) contended that brutality was confined to the 
chaotic opening months of insurgency, and was ‘never a matter of policy’.40 Similarly, 
accusations of abuse during the Cyprus Emergency (1955-59) were explained as attempts to 
discredit the security forces, who were said to have acted with ‘characteristic restraint’ in the 
face of ‘extreme provocation’.41        
 
Susan Carruthers’ Winning Hearts and Minds (1995) has questioned how the hearts and 
minds of the people were won, concluding in part that propaganda and psychological warfare 
were thought to be instrumental to defeating insurgency on the ground. This included 
attempted censorship of local and international media outlets, to curb criticism and 
accusations of brutality against the security forces.42 Carruthers also noted that the army was 
aware that British public opinion would impact the morale of service personnel.43 Writers of 
the left, notably John Newsinger in The Blood Never Dried (2010), saw British imperialism 
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43 Ibid, p.16. 
  24 
 
 
as mainly oppressive, employing brutality to support and impose racial and economic 
exploitation.44 For example, in 1947, Malayan rubber was the Empire’s most profitable 
resource, earning more American dollars than the entire British manufacturing industry.45 
Indeed the revenue generated by resources from within Malaya was put to use in countering 
the insurgency, providing the funding for increased security and resettlement.46 
 
In the first two decades of the twenty-first century scholars started to question how far British 
forces had really been restrained, notably in the cases of Malaya, Kenya and Palestine. The 
supposed British success in counterinsurgency has been attributed to the security forces 
controlling or intimidating as opposed to winning over the population.47 Huw Bennett’s 
Fighting the Mau Mau (2013) has argued that the role of minimum force within British 
counterinsurgency has been overstated. He details instead a history of ‘exemplary force’ that 
he claims was of equal importance. This he defined as, ‘punitive force, characterised by a 
rapid, and harsh, response to rebellion which punished the general population and aimed at 
dissuading others from revolting.’48 However, later histories have also been criticised as 
partial. Jeremy Black’s Contesting History (2014) argued that such texts largely ignore the 
violence employed by the insurgents, more generally against the indigenous population and 
often along ethnic lines, as opposed to being directed at the more insulated colonisers. 
Furthermore, Black has argued that the British often enjoyed the support of parts of the 
population, which has again been downplayed.49 This ties into an overarching point of his, 
that grievance becomes a way to interrogate the past and as a warning to apply guidance to 
the future. However, this process is often not free of current political motivations.50 Jeremy 
Black followed this with Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History (2016), in 
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which he investigates whether the lessons of past counterinsurgencies can be applied in the 
future.51      
 
While Kenya has been portrayed as the dark heart of British counterinsurgency, responses 
to other insurgencies have challenged this supposed truism. Anthony Short’s paper, ‘The 
Malayan Emergency and the Batang Kali Incident’, was particularly interesting for the 
insights gained by the author’s experience, both as a soldier and historian. He stopped short 
of Huw Bennett's thesis, arguing instead that command never really got to grips with the 
complex situation on the ground, and as such there was a lack of clear guidance.52 The paper 
was perhaps also meant to exorcise the ghosts of an earlier interpretation. In his book The 
Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-60, first published in 1975, Short wrote that troops, 
thinking they had been ambushed by a superior force, opened up with automatic fire.53 The 
journal article was picked up by the Observer newspaper and printed under the heading ‘“I 
was wrong”, admits historian over claims of Malaya massacre’.54 Nevertheless, academic 
writing had mostly moved in the other direction by then, with David French’s The British 
Way in Counterinsurgency (2011) emphasising that, alongside attempts to find political 
solutions, the British readily resorted to exemplary and demonstrative violence to discipline 
populations.55 
 
Writing later, on the Cyprus Emergency, David French’s Fighting EOKA (2015), saw the 
practice of counterinsurgency there as both coercive, but also as more restrained than in 
many other British campaigns. This was in part due to resisting the forming of military 
courts, which in turn saved the island from martial law.56 Even so, the British were unable 
to win the hearts and minds of the people, in part as a result of EOKA intimidation.57 
French’s account was also driven by the migrated FCO141 files as well as further Colonial 
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Office files secured by the author.58 Similarly, Karl Hack has argued for a more nuanced 
understanding of British COIN, with campaigns to be understood in terms of phases (each 
with a different blend of coercion and persuasion, and tactics) and not as an over-generalised 
whole.59 The later writing has questioned the earlier thesis that countering insurgencies can 
be codified into an overarching doctrine, instead emphasising the importance of adaptability 
to different campaigns and campaign phases. This raises an important point, namely, that the 
experience of participation varies widely depending on campaign phase. What then were the 
stresses of campaign phases in Malaya?            
 
 
Minimum Force and Emergency Regulations  
 
Perhaps the dominant principle of Britain's postwar counterinsurgencies is that of minimum 
force. This is said to be when the military are deployed in aid of the civil power under the 
proviso that the minimum necessary force will be used to achieve the objective. The extent 
to which the principle of minimum force guided the actions of British service personnel is a 
matter of debate. A more tangible guide was the Emergency Regulations. Both concepts will 
be explored in more depth here.  
 
In 1948 Emergency Regulations were set up in Malaya in order to legitimise the measures 
needed to combat the growing insurgency.60 These Regulations created a template for those 
used to conduct further counterinsurgencies, for example in Kenya and Cyprus. Importantly 
they were also seen as being within the law. One paper published in 1965 stated that:      
 
Throughout the period of the Emergency, as in all other periods of British rule in 
Malaya, the British meticulously established the legal authority necessary to insure 
a government of laws, not of men. Each of the Emergency Regulations was made in 
accordance with the requirements of the general situation of the Emergency and the 
impelling necessity to obtain legal authority to take action.61 
 
 
58 Ibid, p.4.    
59 Hack, ‘The Malayan Emergency’, p.135.     
60 Rhoderick dhu Renick, ‘The Emergency Regulations of Malaya Causes and Effect’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian History, 6:2, (1965), p.33.      
61 Ibid, p.18.    
  27 
 
 
In these early works criticisms of the Regulations often contrasted with fear of inaction. 
Again, in relation to Malaya, the criticism that unfair enforcement of the Regulations by 
local government caused resentment was measured against the counterclaim that 
nonenforcement caused contempt.62 Other contemporaneous writers saw Emergency 
Regulations as essential if security forces were to act without handicap in defeating an enemy 
who operated outside of the law. The Regulations were understood to be unacceptable given 
normal conditions. However, this feeling was mediated by the fear that terrorists would 
escape punishment and by extension innocent lives would be imperilled. Against these fears 
ran a feeling that the short term gains would incur a future cost by undermining the British 
tradition of justice.63 This fear was not always reflected amongst soldiers who resented being 
restricted in the use of force, taking the pragmatic stance that an initial show of force would 
prevent unrest developing into insurgency and so ultimately prevent greater loss of life.64 
Charles Townsend has argued that ideas of minimum force have historically undermined 
autonomy, soldiers fearing prosecution due to not acting as well as acting overzealously.65 
More recently, fears about declining solder efficiency, efficacy and morale have been seized 
upon to resist civilian jurisdiction when it came to investigating military malpractice.66 It 
was argued that a heightened sense of the legal terrain when up against ruthless opposition 
would inhibit initiative and motivation.67  
 
Debate surrounding the effectiveness and use of minimum force must be balanced against 
reported incidence of excessive or exemplary force. In turn, the debate here has centred on 
the degree to which the latter were isolated incidents, whether they were officially 
sanctioned, and whether they were committed by colonial as opposed to British troops.68  
Excessive force has had a negative impact on both hearts and minds and operational 
effectiveness. The British have been criticised for having circumnavigated the principle of 
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minimum force in their overuse of local police and paramilitaries, to which they effectively 
deferred the use of excessive force.69 However, auxiliary forces also provided local 
knowledge of the terrain and of insurgents and their supporters, allowing a targeting of a 
specific enemy, minimising the impact on the population in general. The use of excessive 
force is often recognised as a factor in losing the hearts and minds of the civilian population, 
and further, inhibits the gathering of intelligence.70 Excessive force has also come to be 
conceptualised in terms of exemplary force, postulating that violence is used in a punitive 
way to punish transgressions and enforce order.71  
 
Huw Bennett’s work represents a revisionist view of the Regulations, highlighting the 
questionable jurisprudence of counter-insurgency, perhaps best summed up in his use of a 
quote from the earlier High Commissioner to Malaya Sir Henry Gurney, which dates to 1949 
and in part reads:  
 
It is in fact impossible to maintain the rule of law and to fight terrorism effectively 
at the same time. I have publicly said that it is paradoxical though none the less true 
that in order to maintain law and order in present conditions in Malaya it is necessary 
for the Government itself to break it for a time.72  
 
In his paper, ‘A very salutary effect’ Bennett puts forward the thesis that British acts of 
brutality, notably in the form of civilian casualties and the destruction of property, were not 
isolated accidents born of disorganisation but rather came to be exploited by the security 
forces for operational gain. Huw Bennett's thesis rests in part on what he terms the ‘highly 
permissive Emergency Regulations’,73 a set of orders the leniency of which gave tacit 
approval to the use of violence. He largely focuses on the plight of civilians in which the 
consequences of these Regulations could arguably be measured in deaths. Between July 
1948 and April 1949, 77 persons were killed trying to escape, versus the 7 wounded, and an 
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additional 30 captured in the same endeavour. He also emphasised the probability that more 
incidents went unrecorded.74 Similarly, in an earlier paper on the Mau Mau in Kenya he 
argued that the much-vaunted principle of minimum force gave way to a period of coercive 
and unchecked violence, in the form of intimidation, torture and executions.75   
 
All of this raises the questions: To what extent did British service personnel comply with the 
principle of minimum force and the Emergency Regulations? Conversely, to what extent 
were they engaged in acts of excessive violence in Malaya?  Above all, given the central 
themes of this thesis, how did these various approaches create stressors or assist in 
resilience?              
 
 
Resilience and Breakdowns 
 
This next section of the review will delineate some of the major works of military psychiatry 
resulting from the Second World War and from the War in Vietnam. Some key works have 
been chosen from the Second World War in order to frame the practice of military psychiatry 
during the postwar period. Then this review will move on to the war in Vietnam which, it 
will argue, came to frame the more recent histories on military psychiatry. Finally, it will 
summarise these histories in order to discuss the recent historiography of military psychiatry 
and its relevance to this research. 
 
The Second World War resulted in a number of works authored by wartime psychiatrists. 
Men under Stress (1945) was written by Colonel Roy Grinker and Major John Spiegel from 
their wartime experience as US military psychiatrists. In it they reported that ‘[u]nder 
sufficient stress any individual may show a failure of adaptation, evidenced by neurotic 
symptoms.’76 The development of these symptoms, however, was seen as due to a 
combination of personality, previous experience and the severity of the external stress. It 
was expected, or at least acceptable, for a serviceman to develop symptoms after a sustained 
period of severe stress. Conversely, if symptoms appeared after comparatively mild exposure 
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to combat stress, they were thought due to a personality defect or history of emotional 
disorder. Grinker and Spiegel saw combat stress, as well as adaptation to that stress, as an 
extreme version of ordinary or more routine stress.77 Published as the war was coming to an 
end, they were keen to emphasise the civilian applications of their research.78                                     
 
Published sometime after this was R.H. Ahrenfeldt’s Psychiatry in the British Army in the 
Second World War (1958). Ahrenfeldt was less concerned with the application of military 
psychiatry to civilian life, noting that some of this had been done elsewhere.79 He was instead 
concerned with preserving the psychiatric lessons of war.80 These were later codified in the 
official history The Principle Medical Lessons of the Second World War (1968). That was 
in turn part of the voluminous Medical Services in War series which were published over a 
twenty-year period, from 1952 to 1972. Its lessons were as follows: curative as well as 
preventative measures should be centrally organised, personnel should be subject to 
selection and allocation based on scientific methods, psychiatric casualties should be treated 
in theatre, and that treatment more generally should be aimed at rehabilitating personnel to 
return them to duty. A further lesson and common thread was the importance of morale. 
Morale could be boosted by good training and leadership and by meeting the welfare needs 
of service personnel. Conversely, poor morale was conceptualised as being responsible for 
psychiatric breakdowns as well as breakdowns in discipline.81 Military psychiatry then had 
become implicated not just in the treatment but also in the prevention of psychiatric 
conditions. Then in the late sixties and early seventies, it was this preventative aspect of 
psychiatry that was investigated by a further generation of practitioner scholars under the 
concept of morale. These studies were largely driven by thinking from the First and Second 
World Wars but also attempted to situate the concept of morale within the exigencies of 
Britain's postwar period of decolonisation.  
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John Baynes’ Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (1967) recognised the militarisation of 
the concept which had become intimately linked with the psychological state of soldiers.82 
The study concentrated on the Cameronians, or Scottish Rifles, during the First World War, 
a decision that was driven in part by experience; Baynes had served as officer with the 
Cameronians in Malaya from 1950 to 1953.83 His father had served with the Cameronians 
during  the First World War. In A Tale of Two Captains, (1990) he noted ‘Once a 
Cameronian, always a Cameronian.’ It was this ‘insoluble link’ which motivated the work.84 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the work emphasised the importance of esprit de corps, or 
regimental culture in the promotion and maintenance of morale.85 Baynes returned to morale 
in his later book The Soldier in Modern Society (1972), which situated the concept within 
the Cold War.86            
 
Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, a Royal Artillery officer and later editor of the journal of The 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), built on the work of Ahrehenfeld and the notion of 
morale. He published Modern Warfare in 1973. It ‘relied extensively’ on Robert 
Ahrenfeldt’s book in an effort to situate the ‘human factor’ within a strategic study.87 It also 
reflected contemporaneous fears, recognising that prophylactic measures would be useless 
in the face of nuclear war.88 The nuclear stalemate, however, meant that prophylactic war, 
or war of limited objective, the guiding principle of which was economy of force would be 
the predominant form of modern warfare.89 Bidwell drew on his experience at Far East Land 
Forces HQ during the ‘Malaysia-Borneo War of 1962-65’ to make the point that 
deterioration of morale can also be a problem for staff officers. The command had been 
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reduced for peacetime commitments when the confrontation broke out. The increased 
workload had then caused medical problems.90                         
 
In 1978 Major-General Frank Richardson published Fighting Spirit, which borrowed from 
the earlier works by Moran,91 Ahrenfeldt, Baynes and Bidwell. Like Lord Moran, 
Richardson also drew on his wartime service as a Medical Officer and lectured on morale at 
the Staff College in Camberley during the National Service years.92 According to him, 
‘During the post-war years morale was the chief topic discussed in military training’.93  
Richardson was a firm advocate of the promotion of morale as a preventative measure but 
took a more ambivalent stance toward the psychiatrist. In this he reflected military distrust 
of the psychiatrist. Instead he emphasised the role of the regiment and the regimental medical 
officer. Richardson had been a Regimental Medical Officer during the Second World War; 
his book was a further example of a practitioner-scholar who sought to codify his 
experiences into a doctrine concerned with the prevention of psychiatric and disciplinary 
breakdowns. Richardson, by then General Richardson, was one of the more influential 
military-medical practitioner-scholars, and one particularly germane to this research, due to 
his lecturing role.94  
 
Military psychiatry and breakdowns were marginalised in the postwar literature in the UK, 
which focussed instead on selection to sift out potential problems, and on morale and 
resilience as ways of avoiding breakdown. The war in Vietnam, however, would lead to a 
renewed investigation of stress and eventually a reconceptualisation of trauma.    
 
By the time of America’s involvement in Vietnam psychiatric casualties had become an 
accepted component of an army at war. Vietnam had also become an area exploited by 
researchers keen to understand how service personnel adapted to stress, with the army itself 
deploying researchers to the theatre. One of these was Peter Bourne, who published his 
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findings in Men, Stress and Vietnam (1970). Bourne saw the war as a ‘fortuitous opportunity 
to study man’s adaptive capacity while it is challenged beyond its accustomed limits.’95 His 
research was of a psychobiological nature, concerned with, for example, hormone secretions 
during the stress of counterinsurgency operations. The results were then mapped on to 
psychological concepts. For example low levels of a particular stress hormone among 
helicopter crews and Special Forces personnel were explained as an ability to utilise 
psychological defences that minimised their perception of threat.96 Confidence in the 
research and in American adaptability was in part driven by the ‘unexpectedly low incidence 
of psychiatric casualties’ among troops in Vietnam.97 This confidence was undermined as 
the troops returned home, the incidence of psychiatric conditions increased, and psychiatrists 
with a different agenda began to conduct their own research.           
 
Robert Jay Lifton’s Home from the War (1973) was an unashamedly unrepresentative work, 
which focused on veterans able to articulate their anti-war stance and who had been active 
in protest movements. Lifton saw his approach ‘as a form of “advocacy research,” in which 
intellectually rigorous investigation is combined with commitment to broader social 
principles, causes or groups.’ His conclusion was that the special features of the war 
brutalised and numbed soldiers which made the excessive and indiscriminate violence 
inevitable.98 Strangers at Home (1980), edited by Charles Figley and Seymour Leventman, 
was in part an examination of ‘post-Vietnam syndrome’, a term which came to encapsulate 
the malaise of depression, alienation and aggravation that some returning veterans 
experienced.99 In his postscript Figley recognised how politicised this label had become, 
being ‘a thinly veiled position of opposition to the war’. He also thought it misleading as the 
majority of veterans appeared to have adjusted well to their return home, without recourse 
to emotional instability.100 Nevertheless, post-Vietnam syndrome would evolve into Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder as evidenced by developing military definitions and 
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understanding. This diagnosis codified a psychological reaction to traumatic experience and 
was included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 1980 (DSM-III). In turn PTSD 
motivated historical interest in trauma and has come to frame multiple histories of the 
subject.    
 
A major debate within the history of military psychiatry and the wider field of traumatology 
is whether there exists a universal reaction to stress, as well as the extent to which these 
reactions change across time and culture. Since the inclusion of PTSD in the DSM-III, 
research into its origins has put forward previous war-related diagnostic categories as being 
earlier synonyms of the disorder. For example, one article stated that, ‘[s]ince war is not 
new, PTSD has been known under various names throughout military history’. These 
included, ‘combat neurosis’, ‘war neurosis’ and ‘shell-shock’.101 In line with this a number 
of works have used the diagnostic category as way to look for PTSD in earlier historical 
periods, two examples of which are presented here. Jonathan Shay found evidence of PTSD 
in Homer’s Iliad, which he explored in his book Achilles in Vietnam (1994). The book is an 
examination of themes found to be present in both Homer's epic and among the narratives 
of Vietnam veterans who have been diagnosed with PTSD. One example of this is betrayal 
by military leadership.102 This, he writes in an earlier article from which the book was 
expanded, is analogous to a shattering of assumptions about the world and self, which is also 
considered a predictor of PTSD.103 Similarly, Eric Dean in Shook over Hell (1997), compares 
the experience of Vietnam veterans with those of soldiers in the American Civil War. He 
questions the uniqueness of the Vietnam experience, instead finding precedent as well as 
PTSD among Civil War veterans.104 The implication in both is that traumatic reactions went 
largely undiscovered until the ‘discovery’ of PTSD and its codification within the DSM-
III.105                                   
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Some scholars have argued that the diagnosis did not go far enough. Judith Herman’s 
Trauma and Recovery (1992) emphasises ‘the commonalities of traumatic experience’ while 
at the same time arguing that there is a spectrum of traumatic disorders.106 This line of 
thought culminated in the proposal of a new diagnostic category.  Herman argued that the 
PTSD diagnosis is derived primarily from survivors of extreme but circumscribed trauma. 
As such it does not account for the symptoms of prolonged or repeated trauma. For example, 
the alterations in self-perception or in the perception of the perpetrator which may come as 
the result of domestic abuse or being a prisoner of war. Here she proposes the new diagnostic 
category ‘complex post-traumatic stress disorder.’107       
 
Against the thesis of a universal reaction to trauma, Allan Young’s The Harmony of Illusions 
(1995) argued that PTSD was a construction of the prevailing medical and moral climate. 
The strength of Young’s book was in its later chapters where he takes an anthropological 
approach, observing the treatment of Vietnam veterans in a psychiatric unit.  His stated aim 
was not to find out whether PTSD was real but rather how it became real.108 In illustration 
of this, he describes the process by which the narratives of Vietnam veterans came to be 
shaped by the therapeutic process until they conformed to the PTSD criteria.109 
 
Elaine Showalter negotiates a middle ground between these opposing arguments, this time 
under the concept of hysteria. In Hystories (1997) Showalter conceptualised Gulf War 
Syndrome (GWS) as a contemporary hysterical epidemic. Hysteria is explained as a bodily 
expression of psychological distress that cannot otherwise be articulated. While hysteria is a 
universal reaction to stress, existing across historical and national boundaries, the way in 
which it manifests is specific to culture.110 The diffuse range of symptoms associated with 
GWS have resisted diagnostic categories while the media and support groups have spread 
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ideas about its cause. In line with this, Gulf War Syndrome is explained as an acceptable 
expression of the stress of war, a modern male hysteria.111          
   
Several writers have introduced modernity as playing a key role in the manifestation of 
wartime psychiatric breakdowns. For example, Peter Leese’s Shell Shock (2002) has 
contextualised psychiatric attrition during the Great War within a wider trend of nervousness 
and anxiety that came as a response to industrialised society.112 Here again the cultural, as 
opposed to universal nature of traumatic stress, is emphasised.113 Ben Shephard’s social 
history A War of Nerves (2002), a comprehensive review of military psychiatry from the 
World Wars onwards, passes over Britain’s postwar counterinsurgencies, through to Korea, 
Vietnam, and the Gulf and Falklands wars. Using this wide-ranging approach, he traces 
psychiatric thought and practice over a period of approximately eight decades. In turn this 
enables him to conclude, in part, that after the initial clinical optimism engendered in the 
PTSD diagnosis, treatment methods began to revert to older models. For example, one 
prominent psychiatrist thought that traumatic experience should not be discussed, and 
instead, treatment should be focused on motivating the patient to function independently, a 
somewhat Victorian sentiment.114 This ties into one of Shephard’s more controversial points, 
that a cultural shift has eroded the masculine virtues of earlier wars, leaving men more 
vulnerable to traumatic reactions.115       
 
Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, meanwhile, take an epidemiological approach in Shell 
Shock to PTSD (2005) by investigating the incidence, distribution and control of mental 
disorders within the military. An overarching theme of the book is that war syndromes have 
been shaped by cultural forces, particularly, contemporaneous fears and beliefs relating to 
health.116 The monograph builds on their established body of work. Earlier research reported 
an absence of the characteristic PTSD flashback from war pension files relating to the World 
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Wars, as well as the Emergency in Malaya.117 Instead these earlier wars were characterised 
by somatic (relating to the body) symptomatology, for example the contractures 
characteristic of shellshock.118 Then the post-Vietnam period saw an increase in 
neuropsychiatric symptomatology, including the flashback. While conjunction is not 
causation, the flashback phenomenon coincided with its use as a cinematic device. The 
implication being that there is not a universal trauma reaction and rather that stress reactions 
are mediated by culture.119          
 
 
Resilience in Historical Research     
 
Allison Howell (2012) has suggested that the authority of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is 
being challenged by ‘increasingly powerful models of resilience which privilege 
“prevention” in the face of trauma.’120 Ben Shephard (2004) has argued that the PTSD 
construct has only served to medicalise normal human responses to trauma, and in so doing, 
create a culture prone to traumatic reactions. The PTSD research, Shephard argues, has once 
again began to assert the common-sense position that people are generally resilient and 
perhaps best left to their own coping strategies. The ‘new buzz word’ among trauma 
specialists, argued Shephard, is ‘resiliency’.121                         
 
Within the military context, Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely (2005) thought that there could 
be ‘no objection to renewed efforts to encourage resilience’ following traumatic events. 
‘Debriefing’ had been a failure in this respect. The imposition of a management plan on the 
normal, transient life cycle of post trauma symptoms might, they argued, even have 
increased distress in some cases. By contrast, a more informal, or decentralised system of 
communication and support might reduce the number of service personnel who experience 
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traumatic stress. Here they cite the Trauma Risk Management programme (TRiM) which 
trained NCOs to recognise stress in their peers without recourse to medical intervention.122  
 
Conversely, Robin May Schott (2013) has problematised the emphasis on resilience within 
interventions in the aftermath of political violence or natural disasters. The focus of 
resilience as adaptation means that ‘it is vulnerable subjects who lack resilience who become 
the object of criticism, rather than directing criticism against specific events, agents, 
institutions or dynamics that are complicit in mass violence.’123 Within the military context, 
this criticism would be transferred to soldiers who did not adapt to stress rather than military 
recognition of the stress of participation in counterinsurgency.   
 
This turn to resilience has been mirrored within military historiography. Following a wave 
of research on psychiatric attrition during war, historians have sought to understand why the 
majority of soldiers did not break down. In support of this line, Alex Watson (2006) invoked 
the five million British soldiers recruited during the Great War against the 120,000 who 
would eventually collect a pension for psychiatric injury. ‘Even allowing for diagnostic 
inaccuracies and contemporary ignorance of mental disease’, Watson argues, ‘most men 
clearly overcame battle stress extremely successfully.’124 Watson went on to argue that the 
resilience of soldiers during the Great War was predicated on an ‘unrealistic level of 
optimism’ and ‘highly positive perceptions of reality’. Optimism was engendered by 
invoking religion and superstition to create an ‘imagined structure of security’ on their 
environment, while, ‘concentrating on short-term risk and overestimating personnel control’ 
enabled soldiers’ to convince themselves of their survival.125     
 
Michael Roper’s The Secret Battle (2009) also examines how soldiers coped during the Great 
War. His main thesis, supported by correspondence between soldiers and their families, was 
that maintaining a connection with home enabled this coping. He also goes on to investigate 
how class impacted both correspondence and coping. A strength of Roper’s research is that 
it begins to address a gap within the shellshock literature, which arguably mirrors a wider 
gap within histories of war and trauma. Namely, the emphasis on those who broke down as 
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opposed to those who showed signs of stress but continued to function.126 Similarly, Peter 
Hodgkinson’s “Glum Heroes” (2016) has investigated resilience and coping among British 
soldiers on the Western Front. Class was again a central theme in this research. Hodgkinson 
argues that the working-class communalism of the factories and housing transferred itself to 
the trenches. Further, the working-class soldier was not given to introspection. These factors 
combined to create a culture of endurance and stoicism in the individual and a form of 
collectivism in which the primacy of the individual was secondary to the survival of the 
group. Hodgkinson goes on to make the supposition that this form of resilience is perhaps 
less available now due to the growing culture of individualism.127       
 
Mark Jackson (2015) has recognised that women have been marginalised within historical 
research on stress and resilience in the services. In seeking to redress this balance, he placed 
women's experience during the Second World War and postwar Britain within an evolving 
body of literature which recognised the link between psychological and physical adaptations 
to stress. Jackson reported that ‘post-war investigations reflected and consolidated long-
standing gendered assumptions about the greater emotional immaturity and psychological 
vulnerability of women.’128 This research, with its focus on ‘frontline’ service, is conscious 
that it skews towards the experience of male service personnel. This imbalance is also 
present in the archives, with the majority of personal papers being those of servicemen. This 
thesis will, however, examine the experience of the wives of service personnel, who joined 
their husbands in Malaya. This in itself is peculiar to the Malayan Emergency, when 
compared to the Second World War for example, and promises insight into contemporaneous 
military attitudes towards the psychological health of women and the impact of family on 
soldiers in an operational command. 
 
In summary, the literature raises the question of just how far the Malayan example confirms, 
or challenges or adds to, existing literature. It provides a foundation for studying resilience 
on the one hand, and psychological stress and breakdown on the other. This thesis will 
investigate the extent to which the psychiatric lessons of the Second World War were applied 
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in Malaya. Furthermore, this review has shown that the practice of psychiatry and the way 
symptoms are manifested appear to be mediated by culture. Therefore, it will investigate 
how the military conceptualised and treated psychiatric conditions within the very different 
conditions, cultures, practices and behaviours of the Emergency in Malaya. This review has 
also introduced the growing body of historical research concerned with resilience and coping 
during war. This thesis will add to this by investigating how soldiers coped with and adapted 
to the stressors of counterinsurgency, and what the military did to help them cope.  
 
 
iii. Methodology and Sources 
 
This thesis will investigate the impact of participation in the Malayan Emergency by looking 
at the causes of stress through two opposing but interrelated psychological concepts: 
resilience and psychopathology. Psychopathology has been defined as the study of mental 
disorders and is primarily concerned with their origin, development and symptoms.129 
Conversely, resilience can be seen as an ability (innate or acquired) to resist breaking down 
while experiencing stress or to experience and recover, or bounce back, from a stressful 
event and its concomitant symptoms. For example, the recent conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have raised the question of resilience in the face of the asymmetric threats of 
counterinsurgency. One study compared the incidence of mental disorder across UK and US 
forces deployed on operations. UK service personnel were found to have significantly lower 
levels of mental health problems and as such were seen as more resilient.130 However, this 
raises a psychometric concern, namely how does one measure or in this case investigate the 
absence of symptomatology?    
 
A recent review of the literature on psychological resilience put forward a positive definition. 
It reported that definitions of the concept varied, but that the majority centred on two main 
concepts, ‘adversity and positive adaptation.’131 Resilience then can be thought of as a 
positive adaptation to adverse experiences. The concept of resilience in turn allows an 
investigation of how soldiers adapt to the adverse experience of participating in 
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counterinsurgency. One of the ways in which evidence will be found of positive adaptations 
to adversity is by reference to the concept of coping. This is the psychological mechanism 
through which adaptation in an individual can be observed. In turn, ‘coping strategies’ have 
been broadly separated into active and avoidant adaptations. Through behaviours and 
psychological strategies active coping seeks to change the nature of the stressor into 
something more tolerable. Whereas an avoidant strategy seeks to replace the stressor with a 
more tolerable activity and may in itself be a symptom of disorder or seen as a disorder in 
itself. A good example here, and one germane to the military, is alcohol use.132 Looking at 
both negative and positive coping strategies allows insight and investigation into both 
resilience and psychopathology.  
 
Opposing genealogies have produced differing accounts of the emergence of the term 
resilience. Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper (2011) have argued that resilience emerged 
from systems ecology in the 1970s. Philippe Bourbeau (2018) has countered that the term 
resilience has been in use within psychological literature from midway through the twentieth 
century.133 Resilience, as a psychological concept then, was in its infancy within the 
psychiatric literature during the Second World War. For example, it was present, though not 
a central theme, in Abram Kardiner’s Traumatic Neuroses of War (1941), which was later 
rewritten as War Stress and Neurotic Illness (1947).134 The term also appeared within the 
literature generated by the practice of psychiatry in Burma during the Second World War. 
Firstly, in one of the contemporaneous psychiatric reports on forward psychiatry.135 These 
reports formed the basis for later histories, in which much of the material was reproduced 
uncritically. The earliest authoritative work was Robert Ahrenfeldt’s Psychiatry in the 
British Army in the Second World War, first published in 1958.136 Eight years later this was 
followed by F.A.E. Crew’s official medical history of the Burma campaign, published in 
1966. Secondly then, Crew’s history included the term resilience. 137 Thirdly, the term was 
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by then already in common use. In Defeat into Victory, first published in 1956, Slim uses 
the term to describe the psychological robustness of a fellow officer.138 While present in both 
British military psychiatry, and in common use, it was yet to be employed in any sustained 
way as the preferred term.  
 
Pat O’Malley (2010) has argued that retroactively ‘projecting’ resilience, as it is now 
understood, onto earlier periods implies that the concept has a ‘timeless character’.139 This 
criticism has led historians to look for earlier iterations of the concept. Alexander Watson’s 
Enduring the Great War (2008) has argued that morale has been ‘the common shorthand for 
military resilience and combat motivation’. In it he emphasises the importance of good 
morale in being able to endure conditions at the front.140 Similarly, Mark Harrison’s 
Medicine and Victory (2004) found that medicine and morale were recognised at the time as 
being mutually dependent. ‘Poor morale encouraged men to “malinger” and catch disease, 
while good medical arrangements could do much to maintain morale and unit cohesion.’141 
As such, Harrison emphasised that good morale was seen as fundamental in preventing both 
medical and psychiatric conditions, while conversely, the high incidence of these conditions 
was explained in terms of low morale.  
 
The term ‘morale’ has become synonymous with the military. The Google Books Ngram 
Viewer application, which produces a graphical representation of the use of a given phrase 
in published books over a given period, showed that the use of the phrase ‘morale’ increased 
sharply between approximately 1910 and 1948.142 While correlation is not causation, the 
sharp rise may in part be attributed to the literature resulting from the First and Second World 
Wars which had adopted the concept. In deference to O’Malley’s criticism, following 
Watson’s lead and drawing on this literature, this thesis will forward the postwar 
understanding of morale as being an earlier analogue to resilience. Looking at the preferred 
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contemporaneous terminology will allow insight into how resilience, or morale, was 
inculcated and maintained in soldiers during the Malayan Emergency.    
 
Evidence of the presence of coping strategies in the chosen campaign, and of development 
of morale and training to imbue resilience, will be sought, firstly and primarily, in the 
personal papers of service personnel, focusing on those in the Imperial War Museum 
archives. These personal papers will be measured against official documents relating to the 
Malayan Emergency, morale, and the practice of military psychiatry. In this way, this thesis 
will investigate how resilience and breakdowns were conceptualised and promoted by the 
military and how these methods mediated the impact of participation during the Malayan 
Emergency. The IWM was created with the aim of recording the experience of British 
service personnel, from senior officers to regular soldiers. It contains a wide range of letters, 
diaries and memoirs contributed by those deployed to the Malayan Emergency, both of those 
who sought to develop resilience and of those who experienced stresses related to 
counterinsurgency and the Malayan context. That combination makes the IWM collections 
ideal for this project. The intensive use of IWM sources (in addition to official papers) will 
allow the psychological experience of conflict, and so the literature and key concepts, to be 
tested against the reality of that experience on the ground. These archives are surveyed in 
more detail below.    
  
 
Survey of Published Memoirs  
 
The unpublished letters, diaries and memoirs housed at the IWM represent the core focus of 
this research. Critical and selective use will also be made of the more structured published 
memoirs held in the Imperial War Museum library and beyond. The latter will be used to 
contextualise the individual's experience within the prevailing culture. Indeed a crucial part 
of life writing is that it affords analysis of the way in which different cultural contexts affect 
the production, as well as the reception, of narratives.143 These published memoirs promise 
insight into the culturally sanctioned narratives of stress and resilience within the military, 
as they promote preferred models of masculinity as well as offer insight into colonial 
practices, behaviours and imperial tropes.  
 
143 Kim Lacy Rogers and Selma Leydesdorff with Graham Dawson (Eds), Trauma and Life Stories: 
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It likely that authors might play down any perceived weaknesses on their part, and perhaps 
exaggerate those of others. For example, Michael Roper has used Great War literature to 
interrogate the masculine ideal of the time. The prominent First War psychiatrist, W.H.R. 
Rivers, placed the masculine dilemma at the centre of his psychoanalytic thought. Where 
Freud thought neurosis was caused by sexual instinct, Rivers contended that his soldiers 
were breaking down due to a conflict between the instinct to survive and the wider social 
and military pressure to do one's duty. Roper has argued that the war showed that however 
entrenched the masculine ideal was, it could not wholly mediate the overwhelming effects 
of fear. As a result, some postwar memoir and fiction included examinations of fearful 
memories. These public investigations mirrored the uncovering of repressed emotions in 
psychotherapy144 and questioned the prevailing idea that masculinity was synonymous with 
stoicism.145 Furthermore, Graham Dawson has emphasised the importance of the soldier 
hero in moulding British imperial masculinities. The 1950s, and the wars of decolonisation, 
called into question accepted British values and sense of identity. Among fighting-age males 
there existed the narrative that there was not the ‘good war’ of previous generations. 
Conscription was in place throughout a large part of the 1950s and would have served as a 
mechanism by which masculine ideals and standards were passed down.146                
 
The first type of memoir considered here will be those published during the Malayan 
Emergency.147 Priority has been given to these earlier memoirs, which more closely reflect 
prevailing attitudes and concerns. The published memoirs were cross-checked against the 
secondary literature in order to better understand their use and impact. Later commentators 
have suggested that memoirs were used to shape both military and public perceptions of the 
conflict and counterinsurgency in general. French has reported that some officers were 
instructed to read Major Arthur Campbell’s Jungle Green (1953) before being deployed to 
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Malaya.148 Newsinger has suggested that the practitioner-scholar Frank Kitson used the 
military memoir to promote the use of particular tactics in counterinsurgency.149  Others 
have reiterated the use of these memoirs in propagating ideas about the evils of Communist 
terrorism, while extolling the innate virtues of the British soldier. Harper has suggested that 
understanding the insurgency as evil mediated the ‘horror of counter-terror’ in the minds of 
the British.150 Carruthers thought Campbell’s book mirrored Whitehall propaganda which 
alleged that the protracted nature of the Emergency was caused not by popular support for 
the communists but by the impenetrable nature of the jungle.151 This thesis will examine 
further how these memoirs were used to shape the experience and impact of participation 
during the Malayan Emergency. 
                             
Further, as the Malayan Emergency (1948-60) entered into its seventh year, military 
memoirs began to emerge which presented a narrative of the counterinsurgency and an 
insight into the psychology of its prosecution. Newsinger has characterised their contents as 
‘the very stuff of the imperial imagination’,152 a central theme of which was the likening of 
counterinsurgency operations to a hunt. For Newsinger (1994) the dehumanising hunting 
analogies, from within the Malayan Emergency memoirs, were derived from the British 
upper class propensity for blood sports and reflected the disparity between the security forces 
and Communist insurgents in Malaya.153 A number of writers have shown that the hunting 
metaphor was prevalent within the history of British imperialism.  
 
Alex Tickell has noted that the blood sports narrative had long been associated with the 
practice of counterinsurgency, being evidenced in India a century earlier as the British 
suppressed rebellion there.154 In The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular 
Imperialism, 1880-1918 (1994), Robert H. MacDonald, linked the hunting metaphor to 
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imperial narratives of warfare through training, suggesting it was the natural way for British 
officers to conceptualise the small wars of Empire: ‘To officers encouraged to believe that 
the best training for war was the field, the story of the hunt was a natural analogue’.155 John 
M. Mackenzie (1989) has argued that Scouting for Boys, by Robert Baden-Powell, employed 
hunting terminology to socialise Britain's youth for its imperial enterprise.156 He goes on to 
argue that the hunt itself played into ideas about Social Darwinism, ‘the fittest were created 
through the rugged individualism of the Hunt’.157  
 
Joanna Bourke (1999) has suggested that the hunting metaphor was not specific to the jungle 
or to counterinsurgency but instead a recurring description of warfare. The metaphor, Bourke 
has suggested, ‘allowed a certain degree of emotional distancing.’158 Simon Harrison has 
given an anthropological reading of the hunting metaphor in his book Dark Trophies: 
Hunting and the Enemy Body in Modern War (2014). Harrison writes that in nineteenth and 
twentieth century colonialism the white hunter was a ‘liminal figure’ who inhabited a 
‘borderland between civilisation and savagery, and between humanity and the animal realm’. 
He writes that hunting was at once a ‘civilizing’ and ‘natural’ activity, requiring strategy and 
intellect, whilst also being a behaviour shared with animals.159 The relationship between 
hunter and hunted was ‘a reduced and attenuated form of sociality.’ The hunting metaphor 
represented the dehumanisation of the hunted and also the desocialisation of the hunter.160  
 
The hunting metaphor was clearly a powerful imperial and military trope. In terms of 
methodology, this case-study applies key questions to the memoirs. Namely, what was the 
function, psychological or otherwise, of their key metaphors and narrative devices? Were 
they just a story-telling and framing device, or did they reflect actual experience? In so far 
as they did, how far did they play roles more directly relevant to psychological 
 
155 Robert H. MacDonald, The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880-
1918, (Manchester: MUP, 1994), p.29.    
156 John M. Mackenzie, ‘Chivalry, Social Darwinism and Ritualised Killing: The Hunting Ethos in Central 
Africa up to 1914’. In David Anderson and Richard H. Grove (Eds), Conservation in Africa: Peoples, Policies 
and Practice, (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p.51. 
157  Ibid, pp.53-54.  
158 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare, 
(London: Basic Books, 1999), p.222.    
159 Simon Harrison, Dark Trophies: Hunting and the Enemy Body in Modern War, (Oxford: Berghahn, 2014), 
p.155.   
160 Ibid, p.194. 
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considerations? Such as reframing combat to dehumanise an enemy and salve consciences, 
or programme behaviour and provide coping mechanisms?      
 
A second type of memoir to emerge focusses on participation in the Emergencies 
autobiographically through the lens of National Service. This is in large part due to the 
National Service generation reaching retirement age, their service years perhaps taking on 
greater significance. Accounts of National Service have appeared in life memoirs. Two 
notable examples are from the writers Alan Sillitoe (Life without Armour (1996)) and Leslie 
Thomas (In My Wildest Dreams (2006)), both of whom had already written fictionalised 
accounts of their service in the Far East.161 These fictional accounts of service will not be 
the main focus of this research but may offer further insight into colonial culture, practices 
and behaviours.  
 
A third type of memoir to emerge more recently is that which have been produced through 
independent or digital publishers.162 These methods of publishing have facilitated the trend 
of recounting participation in Emergencies through National Service, written in later life. 
Independent and digital publishing has been generally criticised for low editorial standards. 
That said, it is also a form which democratises the production of written works. In this 
research these texts will be used to check for details that may have been omitted from earlier 
works. For example: commentary on psychiatric conditions which have become more 
accepted in recent years.  
         
 
The IWM Documents Archive    
 
It is the scope and nature of the IWM archive that makes it so suitable for this sort of project, 
originating as it does in a desire to mark, and record, British experiences of war. In 1917 the 
National War Museum was formed, which later became the Imperial War Museum. In the 
same year of its foundation its Director, Sir Martin Conway, wrote that ‘the Museum should 
be for all time the centre of research concerning all matters connected with the history of the 
War, [t]he historian should find there all materials from the British point of view for war 
 
161 Alan Sillitoe, Key to the Door, (1961); Leslie Thomas, The Virgin Soldiers, (1966).         
162 Arthur Hutchings, From Gunner to Infantryman, (2011); Anthony Dawson, National Service - A Slot in 
Life: “It was never like this in Sungei Besi!” (2015).  
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research’. A later amendment added that ‘[t]o prosecute this study to the fullest extent, it is 
necessary to form a Reference Library, which should deal with every phase of the War’. This 
saw the creation of the IWM library.163  
 
In 1953 the museum’s remit was expanded to include all military operations to which British 
and Commonwealth forces had been deployed.164 This brought the postwar 
counterinsurgencies within its domain. In 1964 the official records of the First World War 
became available to view through the Public Records Office, now called ‘The National 
Archives’ (TNA), under the fifty-year rule. The records of the Second World War followed 
in 1972. A few years prior to this in 1969 the museum’s then director, Noble Frankland, 
thought that these official documents and the history of these wars would be better 
understood if placed alongside the personal papers of those who had served. The Department 
of Documents was, therefore, evolved out of the library under instruction to build up a 
collection of unpublished letters, diaries and memoirs.165  
 
The documents archive now consists of well over 20,000 individual collections of private 
papers. These include the experience and testimony of British service personnel as well as 
official documents.166 These official documents will be used to contextualise the experience 
of British service personnel. A strength of the personal papers, specifically the letters and 
diaries, is that they offer contemporaneous insight into stress and coping during the Malayan 
Emergency. These letters, diaries and unpublished memoirs will be the primary focus of this 
research.                           
 
 
Survey of IWM Documents Archive 
 
The term ‘Malaya’ was used to search the IWM documents archive. A manual search of the 
returns using each document’s synopsis was then conducted. Unpublished memoirs, letters 
and diaries relating to service in Malaya outside of the Malayan Emergency (1948-60) were 
 
163 Julie Robertshaw, ‘The Imperial War Museum Library’, Draft article for the M25 Annual Report 2016-17, 
p.1.    
164 Anthony Richards, ‘Archive Report: The Department of Documents at the Imperial War Museum’, 
Contemporary British History, 18:2, (2004), p.103.      
165 Ibid, p.104.      
166 Imperial War Museum, http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/documents. Accessed 10/08/17.      
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excluded, as were documents relating to non-service personnel, the Royal Navy, the Royal 
Air Force, and civilians. The remaining documents, surveyed below, are of British Army 
personnel and Royal Marines. These have been subdivided into rank and type of service 
engagement, either Regular (R) or National Service (NS).  
 
The rationale underlying this categorisation is firstly that ground troops were subject to the 
full range of stressors implicit within counterinsurgency and so are likely to provide the most 
relevant material. Secondly, that rank largely determined both experience as well as the 
expression of that experience. For example, junior officers and NCOs occupied a pivotal role 
within the decentralised nature of counterinsurgency and were subject to a different set of 
stressors than their more senior counterparts. Therefore, junior officers are defined here as 
ranks up to and including Major. These junior ranks led service personnel on 
counterinsurgency operations in the field. Officers above the rank of Major spent little, if 
any, time in the field and were more generally concerned with managing operations within 
their area of operations. As such, their experience of participation was much different from 
junior officers. Thirdly, the National Service personnel and Regulars engaged in 
counterinsurgency at this time have opposing contributing factors. Two examples here are 
Second World War service and length of service engagement. Prior service in the war may 
have contributed to the occurrence of psychiatric conditions in individuals who later served 
in the Emergency. Conversely the short service engagements of National Service personnel 
may have led to resilience in this group, due to a delimited period of stress.          
 
IWM Documents Archive Malaya 1948-60 
Junior Officers (NS)  6 
Junior Officers (R)  6 
Senior Officers (R) 18 
Other Ranks (NS) 11 
Other Ranks (R) 7 
Rank Unknown  4 
Total  52 
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These documents range from brief 5-10-page recollections to 200-plus page structured 
memoirs. They also range in style from descriptions of events to more reflective accounts, 
including descriptions of emotions and psychological processes. These self-conscious efforts 
will be prioritised and analysed in more depth for signs of stress, resilience and psychiatric 
conditions. These documents also range in date: while the majority are contemporaneous 
with the events in question, some are more recent. Memoirs written sometime after the 
events in question introduce memory as a complicating factor. They do also offer the 
opportunity to check for omissions in earlier accounts and it has been argued that time and 
distance from the given experience allows a greater degree of introspection.167 A selection 
of further personal papers held at the IWM, such as accounts of breakdowns during the 
Second World War, have also been used, bringing the total of private collections used to 77.  
 
 
The IWM Sound Archive  
 
The Imperial War Museum Sound Archive is a collection of over 33,000 recordings, with 
approximately 22,000 of those being oral histories. It spans from 1914 to the present day, 
covering the experience of British and Commonwealth personnel in both major wars as well 
as the colonial conflicts of the interwar and postwar period of decolonisation.168 The oral 
histories were a response to the rise of oral history in the 1970s. The aim was to bring to 
light the experiences of British and Commonwealth service personnel, in line with the 
overarching aim of the museum. The process was greatly facilitated by the advent of portable 
recording equipment which meant interviewers could travel to their subjects.    
 
At its creation in 1972 the priority was to record the reminiscences of the rapidly ageing 
veterans of the First World War.169 Its creator David Lance was new to the field and 
confessed to being unfamiliar with oral history. He had however been employed at the IWM 
for a number of years and saw the sound archive as a way to fill in the gaps of the museum’s 
wider collections, which in 1974 he identified as both the interwar and post war periods. It 
 
167 Hodgkinson, “Glum Heroes”, p.xix.   
168 Imperial War Museums, http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/sound. Accessed 03/09/17.  
169 Conrad Wood, ‘Ten Years of the Department of Sound Records of the Imperial War Museum’, Oral History, 
11:1, (1983), p.9.    
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was also meant as a people's history, the aim of which was to humanise campaigns which 
written histories often ‘made to sound more like games of chess.’170     
 
In order to preserve the nuance of recorded testimony that resisted being transferred into 
writing, the interviews were only selectively transcribed, forcing the historian to listen. 
Initially unstructured, interviews evolved to take a more structured approach, asking similar 
questions of participants while allowing a degree of elaboration. The aim was to gather 
testimony in a more systematic manner which would in turn enable generalised answers and 
comparative research. The aim was to conduct research that could challenge existing 
opinion.171 Interviews at the IWM followed a procedure comprising a preliminary interview, 
followed by a main interview and a written synopsis.172 A modification was the 
discontinuation of pre-interviews which were found to impact the content of the second 
recording. Participants tended to omit information from the final interview having already 
recounted the experience in the pre-interview.         
   
By 1981 work had begun on the interwar period,173 yet a couple of years later there was still 
little concerning the postwar period.174 By 1989 the emphasis had shifted to the Second 
World War with a large-scale programme of interviewing. By this time attention was also 
beginning to be paid to the postwar themes, such as the ‘colonial divestitures’. An initiative 
to transfer all documentation to a computer database had also begun.175                    
 
Participants were recruited on a fairly ad hoc basis through veterans’ associations as well as 
by word of mouth. Interviews were sometimes driven by the interests and personality of the 
interviewer. Conrad Wood was one of the main interviewers of veterans of the Malayan 
Emergency. Affiliated to the Communist branch of Bury St Edmunds, he initially focused 
on the political component of the Emergency. However, after finding that many of the 
service personnel interviewed had little interest or understanding of the overarching politics 
 
170 David Lance, ‘Oral History in Britain’, The Oral History Review, 2, (1974), pp.66-69.   
171 Ibid, pp.69-70.            
172 Sian Jones, ‘Oral History and Museum Education’, Oral History, 12:2, (1984), p.69.     
173 Conrad Wood, ‘Current British Work in Oral History’, Oral History, 9:1 (1981), p.12.  
174 Conrad Wood, ‘Ten Years of the Department of Sound Records of the Imperial War Museum’, Oral History, 
11:1, (1983), p.11.   
175 Margaret Brooks, ‘The Department of Sound Records at the Imperial War Museum’, Oral History, 17:2, 
(1989), p.56.   
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his focus reverted to personal experience, within career-focused interviews. His choice of 
interviewees was also guided in part by family connections with Hull. While visiting his 
mother there he would interview veterans of the East Yorkshire Regiment. This was Hull’s 
local regiment, involved in the Malayan Emergency in the mid-1950s. By the 1990s the 
museum was conducting interviews with service personnel who had been diagnosed with 
PTSD and Wood was also asking about painful memories, reflecting the rising awareness of 
war related trauma.                                  
 
As mentioned above, the Malayan Emergency interviews were recorded around thirty years 
after these events took place, as priority was being given to the aging veterans of previous 
conflicts. To a certain extent this makes them less reliable than contemporaneous sources as 
memory and narrative become influenced by later events. For example, memory may be 
‘distorted by physical deterioration and nostalgia in old age, by the personal bias of both 
interviewer and interviewee, and by the influence of collective and retrospective versions of 
the past.’176 Similarly, comparative research concluded that interviews conducted in the 
aftermath of combat, though disjointed, are an accurate account of individual experience. 
Whereas, a weakness of later interviews is that the individual has had time to forget elements 
as well as make sense of their experience.177 A further criticism, specific to the Malaya-
related interviews at the IWM, is that despite the above mentioned aim of standardising 
questions, questions differed across interviews and so resist systematic comparative analysis.                     
 
Nevertheless oral history remains a way to challenge and augment traditional narratives, 
allowing the military historian to ‘look beyond command level strategy and equipment to 
the conditions, recreations, and morale of other ranks’, and in this way allow ‘a more realistic 
and fair reconstruction of the past, a challenge to the established account.’178 While history 
often focuses on the archetypal experiences of war, oral history may bring to light important 
though often unreported routine aspects.179 Further, oral history may provide insight into the 
weaknesses stated above, for example, in understanding how meaning is applied to 
 
176 Alistair Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’. In Donald A. Ritchie The Oxford 
Handbook of Oral History, (Oxford: OUP, 2011), p.79.     
177 Fred H. Allison, ‘Remembering a Vietnam War Firefight: Changing Perspectives Over Time’, The Oral 
History Review, 34:2, (2004), p.82.      
178 Paul Thompson, Voice of the past: Oral history, Third Edition (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p.7.  
179 Megan Hutching, ‘After Action: Oral History and War’, in The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011), p.234.      
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experience.180 Indeed, the psychiatrist Stevan Weine has put forward the thesis that oral 
history may enable survivors, as well as researchers, to understand or make sense of 
traumatic experience. This is of value to the individual as well as society because trauma 
distorts or disrupts the meaning-making process.181                                                             
   
The above rationale applied to the IWM documents archive was again applied to IWM sound 
archive. Due to the high returns, and in line with the stated aim to focus on the documents 
archive, a select number of oral history interviews was used (approximately 50 interviews 
were looked at in detail with 10 being directly cited within the text). The more detailed 
thematic synopsis of the interviews enabled the use of a keyword search of the sound archive. 
A selection of the keywords used were, ‘psychiatry’, ‘psychology’, ‘breakdown’, ‘stress’, 
‘nervous’, ‘neurosis’, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, ‘resilience’, ‘coping’, ‘morale’. The 
interviews of key personalities were also included.182     
                  
IWM Sound Archive Malaya 1948-60 
Junior Officers (NS) 12 
Junior Officer (R) 27 
Senior Officers  76 
Other Ranks (NS) 37 
Other Ranks (R) 73 
Total  225 
 
To complement and contextualise the IWM sources this research will also make selective 
use of ancillary archives and medical journals, predominantly The National Archives (TNA) 
and the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps (JRAMC). The National Archives contain 
a wealth of papers relating to the Malayan Emergency. A tight selection of these have been 
used, specifically a series of medical reports for their specialist content, together with 
 
180 Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, p.80.    
181 Mary Marshall Clark, ‘Case Study: Field Notes on Catastrophe: Reflections on the September 11, 2001, 
Oral History Memory and Narrative Project’, in The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 
p.256.      
182 As the research progressed key personalities became apparent. The oral history archive was summarily 
checked for interviews with or concerning these personalities.   
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Director of Operations reports which delineate the overall progress of the Malayan 
Emergency. A series of morale reports relating to confrontation in Indonesia have also been 
used to introduce how counterinsurgency related to the concept of morale. Psychiatric 
reports from the Second World War and immediate postwar period have also been used, to 
show how thinking was evolving as the Emergency commenced.  
 
Perhaps the most useful of these sources is the JRAMC, which is the official organ of the 
RAMC. It has a range of articles relating to military psychiatry and medicine as practised 
during various Emergencies. It also contains an extensive range of articles concerning the 
practice of psychiatry during and after the Second World War. Together with the official 
history, The Medical Services at War, as well as a number of articles from further medical 
journals, this has been used to piece together contemporary medical thought and practice 
related to the Malayan Emergency. The Wellcome Collection and The Medical Services 
Museum archive also have a small number of documents specific to military medicine and 
psychiatry in relation to the Malayan Emergency.  
 
 
iv. Conclusion  
 
This research will look for signs of resilience, stress, coping and psychopathology within the 
writing, and interviews, of British service personnel who served during the Malayan 
Emergency, including through proxies such as morale. It will make use of a select number 
of published memoirs written during the postwar period of decolonisation. Within these, the 
focus will be on the more self-conscious which offer insight into both psychological 
processes and the prevailing military and colonial cultures. These contemporaneous 
accounts will be checked against later memoirs for omissions. The primary focus of this 
research will, however, be the letters, diaries and unpublished memoirs housed at the IWM. 
These range from texts written by junior to senior officers through to other ranks, and vary 
enormously in style and length, and overall afford valuable insight into stress, resilience and 
psychopathology in Malaya. A selection of further diaries, letters and unpublished memoirs 
will be also be used from ancillary archives. Here again, the focus will be on accounts that 
reveal psychological processes. A selection of interviews from the IWM sound archive will 
also be used. These introduce memory as a complicating factor as they were recorded 
sometimes decades after participation, but also offer a more introspective insight. As with 
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the later memoirs they also present the opportunity to check for omissions from the 











































   
This chapter will provide an overview of the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960). Based on a 
selection of official documents it will show the campaign as it progressed through its 
different phases. In this way, it will suggest that participation, and the stress that participation 
encompassed, during the opening phases of the Emergency was a different experience than 
participation in later phases. The documents used in this chapter provide the official view of 
the Emergency and the experience of service personnel was framed by this official narrative. 
This chapter will, however, go on to suggest that once service personnel were on the ground 
their perceptions of the Emergency, and the insurgents, could diverge from the official 
narrative. In terms of service personnel deployed, the Emergency was primarily a land 
campaign. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the activity of the Army. It should also be 
noted that the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were also employed in Malaya. The Royal 
Navy patrolled the East and West coasts of the peninsula and provided fire and air support 
to the land forces. The Royal Air Force gave logistical, fire and helicopter support to the 
land forces as well as conducting aerial reconnaissance.183 Before introducing the insurgents 
and delineating the campaign phases, this chapter will first turn to what was a constant strain 
on service personnel; the terrain over which the counterinsurgency was fought.                 
 
 
1.2. Terrain  
 
The Federation of Malaya comprised nine states, each with a sultan, and two settlements 
which were under direct British control. The settlements were the ports of Malacca and 
Penang. The Northernmost states were Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Kelantan and Terengganu. The 
central states were Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. The Southernmost state was 
 
183 M.O.D. Unison by Planning Staff, ‘Historical Records of United Kingdom Operations 1950-1966’, p.7, 
(1967), NAM 2001-06-1.3. Hereafter ‘Planning Staff Report, 1967’.  
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Johore, off which sat the Crown Colony of Singapore. The nine state governments, two 
Settlement governments and the Federal government made up the civil administration. 
Though the Federal Government wielded overall control of the States, their Sultans had an 
effective veto over changes affecting Malay customs and religion (including citizenship), 
and over some key areas such as land. The campaign against the Communist insurgency was 
the responsibility of the Civil Government. Its normal instrument to maintain its Civil 
Authority was the Police Force. Under the State of Emergency, however, the Armed Forces 
were mobilised in support of the Civil Power.184 General Bower, who would become 
Director of Operations in Malaya, later criticised the civil administration as over-





184 Director of Operations Malaya, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM), (1958), 
Chapter III, Section I.      
185 Lieutenant-General Roger Bower, Director of Operations Malaya, ‘Review of the Emergency in Malaya 
from June 1948 to August 1957’, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, (September, 1957), p.12. TNA AIR 
20/10377. Hereafter ‘DOO Report, 1957’. 




Figure 1: Map of Malaya. 
Source: Reproduced from ‘Malaya in the 1940s-60s’ with permission of Karl Hack.186  
 
 
Malaya was rich in natural resources, with tin being the main mineral resource. In 1956 the 
country produced 62,295 tons which equated to a revenue of approximately $60 million 
dollars and employed 37,515 people. Agriculture was also lucrative for those in control of 
 
186 Chin Peng and Karl Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on the Malayan Communist Party, 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2004), p.xxix.    
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Malaya. The prime example was rubber, which by 1956 covered approximately 3,500,000 
acres and produced about a third of the total world output. In the same year the export duties 
yielded approximately 144 million dollars and the industry directly employed nearly 300,000 
people.187 It was these industries which sustained the most damage during the Emergency. 
A favourable market, at crucial points underpinned by a ‘Korean War boom’ in demand, 
nevertheless lent a resilience to these industries. ‘The high price of rubber and tin and the 
consequent prosperity of the country’, wrote Bower ‘helped to sustain morale’.188                  
 
A 1953 census, reproduced in an operational report to the nearest thousand, numbered 
Malaya’s population at 5,734,000. It grouped Malaya’s population by ethnicity. The largest 
group was listed as Malays, and the Federation of Malaya constitution entrenched a historical 
view that the country was essentially Malay. These Malays (who included a good number of 
immigrants from elsewhere in insular Southeast Asia) numbered approximately 2,831,000. 
The second largest group was the Chinese at 2,153,000. Indians and Pakistanis and other 
ethnic groups comprised approximately 700,000 combined.189 There were also around 
100,000 ‘aborigines’ in Malaya,190 some of whom would be employed as guides by the 
British.191 The latter were widely dispersed over the interior jungle. Outside of the major 
towns much of the population gathered into areas of employment, for example near rubber 
estates and tin mines. In the early years of the Emergency, over 1 million Chinese (more 
than half) had no citizenship rights and around half a million had congregated into ‘squatter’ 
communities on the jungle’s edge. These ‘squatters’ had been greatly increased in numbers 
by displaced persons who fled persecution by Japanese forces during the Second World War. 
They came under no administrative authority and went largely unprotected. As such, the 
Communists came to rely on these communities for support, and they became important 
sources of ‘money, supplies, recruits and information.’192           
 
 
187 Director of Operations Malaya, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM), (1958 [first 
edition 1952]), Chapter I, Section VII.     
188 DOO Report, 1957, p.13. 
189 Lt. Colonel J.M. Forster, ‘Operational Research Unit (Far East) Report No.1/57: A Comparative Study of 
The Emergencies in Malaya And Kenya’, p.3, (June, 1957), TNA WO 291/1670. Hereafter, ‘Forster, 
Comparative Study, (1957)’.    
190 ATOM, Chapter I, Section IV.    
191 ATOM, Chapter XIX, Section III.  
192 DOO Report, 1957, p.12. 
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It was arguably the climate, however, that had the most immediate impact on British service 
personnel arriving in Malaya. Being close to the equator, Malaya’s tropical climate was 
characterised by hot humid days, averaging 90 degrees Fahrenheit (32 degrees Celsius) by 
noon, with the temperature falling during the night. Monsoons swept the peninsula twice a 
year.193 This humid, tropical peninsula stretched approximately 500 miles from its border 
with Thailand in the North to its Southern border with the island of Singapore. At its widest 
point the country measured approximately 200 miles across, narrowing considerably in the 
north and south. Bisecting the peninsula ‘was a backbone of jungle-covered mountains rising 
to a height of 7000 [sic] feet from which fast rivers flow EAST and WEST.’194 A network 
of Hill Stations, which offered respite from the climate, topped this mountainous backbone. 
Malaya had three primary Hill Stations, on Fraser’s Hill, Maxwell’s Hill and the Cameron 
Highlands, all at an altitude above 4,000 feet.195          
 
Malaya covered an area of 53,240 square miles, with the common comparison being that the 
country was ‘rather larger than ENGLAND without WALES’.196 To its South, separated by 
the Straits of Johore, was Singapore island. The island was connected to the mainland by rail 
and road, which ran across a causeway approximately three quarters of a mile long.197 On 
the peninsula, there were 6,354 miles of road and 1,028 miles of railway.198 The road system 
included approximately 6,000 miles of ‘good metalled main roads’ with a ‘limited number 
of laterite roads and tracks’ running into rubber estates and Government Forest Reserves. ‘In 
the jungle’, however, ‘even game tracks are seldom met.’199 ‘Four fifths of the land’ then ‘is 
trackless evergreen forest and undergrowth.’ Jungle trees created ‘a solid roof of green, 
shutting out the sky’. From the tree branches ‘hang curtains of vine and creeper which join 
the undergrowth to make a jungle so thick that a standing man is often invisible at twenty-
five yards.’ Rubber plantations, rice fields, tin mines, towns and villages made up the 
remaining one fifth of the peninsula.200        
 
193 ATOM, Chapter I, Section II.  
194 Forster, Comparative Study, 1957, p.16. 
195 J. E. Spencer and W. L. Thomas, ‘The Hill Stations and Summer Resorts of the Orient’, Geographical 
Review, 38:4, (1948), pp.643-645.      
196 Forster, Comparative Study, 1957, p.16. 
197 ATOM, Chapter I, Section I. 
198 Forster, Comparative Study, 1957, p.5. 
199 Ibid, p.17.     
200 Ibid, p.16.        




The ‘whole peninsula’ was considered an ‘operational area’, meaning insurgent actions 
could take place at any location. This meant the security forces had to provide a presence 
across the peninsula and to be prepared to negotiate its varying terrains. These terrains were 
divided into types and understood through the problems they posed to those on operations. 
The ‘fixed patterns’ of rubber plantations, in which the undergrowth was cleared, offered 
good visibility ‘often up to several hundred yards’, and ease of movement ‘even at night’. In 
primary jungle ‘trees grow at a very high density and up to a hundred feet and more in 
height’. The undergrowth, however, ‘is not sufficiently dense unduly to impede movement.’ 
In secondary jungle there was fewer trees but ‘a dense undergrowth of bushes, creeper and 
bamboo make movement very difficult.’ In coastal areas there was also swamp, in which ‘a 
man can sink up to his waist and visibility is reduced to a few yards by trees and 
undergrowth.’ Finally, ‘[i]nterspersed with the above are found belukar (low scrub and 
bushes), lallang (long grass) or cultivated land.’201  
 
The jungle contained a wide variety of wildlife and vegetation, some of which could prove 
harmful to those out on patrol. The British counterinsurgency manual, Conduct of Anti-
Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM) listed snake bite and poisonous trees within its 
chapter on First Aid. The effects of these were uncomfortable, the ‘poisonous trees would 
produce a ‘severe rash’, but were generally not fatal, snake bite ‘rarely causes death in 
Malaya’. A more pressing concern were insect-borne diseases, such as Malaria and Scrub 
Typhus.202 Between 1950 and 1956 an average of 9.6 per 1,000 service personnel across Far 
East Land Forces Command would be hospitalised with malaria.203 Dysentery and other 
intestinal diseases, being more prevalent still, were also a major concern.204 Between 1950 
and 1956 an average of 39.9 per 1,000 service personnel deployed to the Far East would be 
hospitalised as a result of Intestinal Disease.205 Contracting disease in Malaya was not 
confined to those in the field, although the increased exposure of jungle operations was a 
 
201 Ibid, p.16.        
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203 Sydney Rosenbaum, ‘Cross-Sectional Review of Morbidity among Young Soldiers’, British Journal of 
Preventive & Social Medicine, 13:3, (1959), p.123.    
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factor.206 One disease that was not a result of jungle operations, also listed in ATOM, was 
venereal disease.207 An average of 97.5 per 1,000 service personnel across FARELF 
Command – just shy of 10% - would contract one of a variety of venereal diseases between 
1950 and 1956.208 As one infantryman put it ‘they had rubbed it into us young Guardsmen 
that the real enemy was venereal disease … [T]hey didn't want all their soldiers going down 





The Malayan Communist Party and its Malayan National Liberation Army (referred to as 
the Malayan Races Liberation Army in British sources of the time and more than 90% 
Chinese) was presented to troops as essentially alien inspired.210 On the global level the 
Communist insurgency in Malaya was presented to troops as a campaign within the Cold 
War. As one National Serviceman noted: ‘[W]e were out there for a specific purpose and the 
specific purpose was to fight for our country, it was to rid this country of Malaya, this British 
province, of the terrible thing called Communism.’211 The Director of Operations report for 
1957 described it as ‘part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is 
strategically and economically one of the most important areas in South-East Asia.’ The aim 
of which was a revolution to ‘overthrow the Malayan Government and to set up in its place 
a Communist-controlled Peoples’ Democratic Republic.’212 Soviet intervention in the 
region, ATOM (1958) stated, took place through the intermediary Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). In turn, the CCP had been instrumental in the creation of the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP), which was firmly established during the early 1930s. The MCP then became 
engaged in infiltrating and subverting labour and youth movements in the country. The 
Second World War, however, saw Soviet Russia enter into an alliance with Britain, which 
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included the former receiving economic aid. The MCP ceased its actions so as not to disrupt 
the Soviet war effort and later offered its services to Britain in the war against Japan.213 The 
MCP formed a military wing, which became known as the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese 
Army (MPAJA) and conducted offensive operations against the Japanese.214 The MPAJA 
were supplied arms and training  by the British from 1944 and worked in conjunction with 
British Force 136 officers who were in control of small parties, themselves seeking to disrupt 
the supply lines and troop movements of the occupying Japanese. The MPAJA was 
disbanded following the Second World War but replaced with an Ex-Comrades Association. 
When the MCP mobilised again in mid-1948, ex-MPAJA members provided much of the 
early rank and file, and many of the experienced leaders. Initially using different names from 
State to State, by February 1949 these were formally announced to comprise the Malayan 
National Liberation Army (MNLA, commonly rendered MRLA or ‘races’ army by the 
British for propaganda reasons).215 Initially referred to as ‘Bandits’ the Communists came to 
be officially termed ‘Communist Terrorists’ from 1952, broadly defined as ‘[t]hose who in 
any way actively further the Communist campaign’.216 The MNLA were, however, only a 
portion of the MCP’s forces. It also had the Min Yuen, or mass organisation, which could 
include families of fighters, sympathetic villagers and even children acting as suppliers. 
 
In contrast to the communist’s own view of themselves as nationalists and pursuers of social 
justice against imperial oppression, ATOM told soldiers that ‘Communism in Malaya … 
was not an indigenous movement’ based on the grievances of the labouring classes, nor on 
‘a frustrated desire for national independence.’ Instead, the insurgency ‘was the result of the 
direct injection of Communist virus into a small section of the Chinese community in 
Malaya’.217 As well as being ideological then the insurgency took on a definite racial 
dimension. The vectors of the ‘virus’, for the British, were to be found among the Chinese 
population. The wider Chinese community, the comparative report argued, maintained ‘an 
attitude of neutrality to the Emergency’ as ‘self-governance for MALAYA may mean a 
withdrawal of the BRITISH and the substitution of RED CHINESE influence.’ The rural 
Chinese community in particular were regarded with suspicion and would be subject to the 
brunt of the population control measures that would later be introduced. The Malay 
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population, by contrast, were described as ‘a peace-loving race’ who, somewhat 
contradictorily, ‘have made the largest contribution to the fighting of the Emergency and 
have aided the terrorists the least.’ It was a contradiction which suggested British racial 
characterisations were determined by the allegiance of the group in question, and which 
ignored the small but determined group of Malay leftists, unionists and nationalists who did 
join the MCP and MNLA. The Indian population were presented as happy with any 
government, provided they were afforded ‘social justice’, despite their record of heavy 
involvement in the MCP-led strikes of 1947-48.218                 
 
 




In May 1948 the MCP increased attacks on people it identified as strike breakers or as 
mistreating labour. In response, a State of Emergency was declared in Malaya. At the start 
of the Emergency the security forces numbered one field artillery regiment, three British 
infantry battalions, six Gurkha battalions and two Malay battalions. In addition to these there 
were also approximately 11,500 Police (including administrative staff) and 17,000 police 
auxiliaries. Initially, between June 1948 and January 1949, the security forces had to commit 
considerable resources to guarding key personalities and infrastructures in order to allow 
commercial interests to continue to function.219 The security forces also conducted limited 
offensive operations, including arrests and sweeps and searches. If these did not defeat the 
insurgents, they would push them deeper into the jungle.220 Major Gibb served as a platoon 
commander with an infantry regiment in the opening years of the Emergency. ‘Many 
thousands of troops were engaged in Malaya during the Emergency. Not so many were there 
at the beginning in the early days. Later there was to be much more control. Much more 
organisation,’ wrote Gibb, ‘… At the beginning there was little.221            
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The insurgents continued with the campaign of killings, the destruction of property and 
intimidation of the population. All in an effort ‘to disrupt the two main industries of the 
Federation - tin and rubber’ and to garner support from the population.222 By October 1948 
the British had detained around 3,800 persons, for up to one year, under the Emergency 
Regulations. Expecting this figure to increase, Sir Henry Gurney admitted that the detentions 
would ‘place an unduly heavy strain on our Security Forces, who could be more usefully 
employed in re-establishing law and order.’223  
 
In January 1949 the Emergency Regulations were extended, ER 17D allowing collective 
detention and deportation. These powers were put to use in areas where inhabitants in general 
were thought to have aided and abetted the insurgents, withheld information from the 
security forces, or were generally believed to be being used as enemy support areas with the 
knowledge and support of inhabitants. Or, as one source put it, ‘Measures under Emergency 
Regulation 17D must be undertaken in more of the areas that are being used by the bandits 
as bases.’224 Sir Henry Gurney, as High Commissioner, was keen both to use ER 17D but 
also to create a dominant police presence in ‘the areas in which the squatters will remain.’225  
The area around the town of Kajang, for instance, had become infamous as an area of 
Communist activity and the site of a number of incidents in the opening year of the 
Emergency.226 Perhaps because of this nearby villages were chosen as the site of the first 
operation to take place under Emergency Regulation 17D. This allowed collective detention 
to be employed against civilians, essentially on suspicion that they had aided and abetted the 
Communists.227  
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By the end of 1948 approximately 900 SF and civilian casualties had been attributed to the 
Communists. These efforts did not instigate a ‘popular uprising’ and in response to army 
sweeps, 17D operations and their failure to consolidate larger support areas or liberated 
zones, between April and October 1949 the Communists withdrew deeper into the jungle 
where they reorganised their army and system of supply in order to conduct a protracted 
campaign. In October 1949 the Communist forces launched a major new offensive. As a 
result, the incident rate increased sharply, further increasing in response to large scale 
resettlement which began in June 1950. Incidents were averaging approximately 500 a 
month throughout 1951.228                        
 
Statistics were kept as ‘a means of measuring the progress of the Emergency’. The extent of 
Communist aggression was measured in incidents and casualties to the Security Forces.229 
An incident was defined as an act of aggression instigated by the Communists. Incidents 
were sub-divided into major and minor. A major incident being one that ‘results in loss of 
life, serious injury or considerable damage to property’. A minor incident denoted all other 
Communist instigated incidents. Casualties denoted killed and wounded among both the 
police and the military.230 For years up to and including 1950, the total number of incidents 
will be given. Thereafter, incidents will be given as major and minor. Conversely, the 
success of ‘Government policies’ and ‘operational efficiency’ was gauged by contacts and 
eliminations.231 A contact was defined as an action initiated by the security forces.232 
Eliminations was a technical term for any ‘bandit’, or, in the post-1952 terminology, 
‘Communist Terrorist (CT) removed from the fight. These were sub-divided into killed, 
captured and surrendered enemy personnel.233 In 1948, there was a total of 1,274 Communist 
instigated incidents in Malaya. The total of Security Force casualties amounted 360 and 
Communist eliminations amounted to 693. It is worth noting that Communist wounded 
would not be recorded until 1951.234  
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In September 1949 terms of surrender were offered by the administration which assured that 
the death penalty would not be carried out, unless an individual had the blood of civilians on 
their hands. After an initial wave of surrenders the rate dropped leaving a hard core of 
insurgents to fight on.235 By the end of 1949 the indices of insurgency and counterinsurgency 
had risen across the board. Total incidents amounted to 1,442, with total security forces 
casualties numbering 476 and the total Communist eliminations at 1,207.236 
 
 
Figure 2: Incidents and Contacts.  
Source: Adapted from Short, Communist Insurrection, Appendix 
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Figure 3: Casualties. 





By 1950 a system had evolved to control counterinsurgency operations.237 Prior to April 
1950 the Commissioner of Police ‘controlled and coordinated’ the campaign with the Armed 
Forces supporting the Police Force. Then in April 1950 General Briggs was appointed 
Director of Operations (DOO) to coordinate the operations of the Police and Armed Forces. 
In that same month Briggs set up a Federal War Council, chaired by himself as Director of 
Operations, reporting to the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. The War Council 
assumed responsibility for policy and the allocation of resources. Further to this, State War 
Executive Committees (SWECs) and District War Executive Committees (DWECs) were 
set up to implement Federal policy at the State and District levels respectively. A 
corresponding Director of Operations combined Staff and headquarters was established at 
all levels. In November of that year the High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney took control 
of the War Council to streamline proceedings, which ‘assumed over-riding powers on all 
Emergency matters.’ The Federal War Council (FWC) expanded to represent Malay and 
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Chinese groups. Then from the expanded FWC a Director of Operations Committee was 
formed in November 1951 to concentrate on more detailed planning. In that same month 
General Lockhart replaced General Briggs as Director of Operations.238             
 
General Sir Neil Ritchie stated in his September 1949 report that he did not think much of 
‘the martial qualities of the bandits in Malaya.’ Ritchie thought them poorly led ideologues, 
who possessed cunning but lacked courage. Instead, for Ritchie, ‘their strength lies in the 
fact that they can so easily disperse and disappear amongst the squatter population.’ 239 The 
civilians were thought inclined to support the Communists and reluctant to provide 
information on their capture. As such ‘the bulk of the Army was deployed on large scale and 
fruitless searches of the jungle….,’ and along its edge.240 On 3rd April 1950 Lieutenant-
General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed Director of Operations in which role, supported by 
the High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, he was to create and institute the ‘Briggs Plan’.241  
The plan aimed to concentrate the ‘squatter population’ within ‘resettlement villages’ 
controlled by the administration. Controlling the population in this way would serve to 
isolate the Communists from their support base and deprive them of their resources.242 The 
plan then was fundamentally one of ‘population and spatial control’.243  ‘The plan in brief’, 
noted a summary, was ‘To bring the whole population of Malaya under effective 
administration by either taking administration to the population or bringing the population 
within reach of the administration; to provide the population with security and thereby to 
encourage them to assist Government and, in particular, to provide information; to isolate 
the bandits from their potential supply areas and to destroy them.244  
 
L.S. Ives, a rifleman with the 1st Battalion Green Howards, described his part in assisting the 
civil administration with ‘squatter resettlement’. ‘Our part in all this (The Briggs Plan) was 
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to find isolated squatter areas and persuade them to move to the new locations. Sometimes 
this necessitated the burning down of huts and sheds as a final inducement to the naturally 
reclusive peasants involved. Many of the hutments were beautifully made from local 
materials and it was a great shame to burn them down.’245 Ron Miles, a Coldstream 
Guardsman in the early years of the Emergency, related his understanding and part in one 
such operation; ‘they refused co-operation and covered up for the bandits and were their 
allies, so the powers-that-be decided to wipe the entire bloomin’ village out.’ Miles went on 
to describe the systematic manner with which it was undertaken over a period of forty-eight 
hours. ‘So we were called in … everything had to be numbered and written down on lists 
and taken out’. This was followed by livestock, and then the villagers themselves; ‘they 
would never see their village again, they had to get right out of it and go home to China as 
they were not considered suitable residents for Malaya anymore, they'd upset the authorities 
very much indeed.’246  
 
In June 1950 the Emergency Regulations were again revised, this time making the death 
penalty available for those convicted of acquiring food or money for the Communists. This 
revision was in support of the Briggs Plan, which aimed to separate the insurgents from the 
people, in order to deny them food and finance.247 Gurney also suggested that detention on 
the grounds of suspicion alone, for the duration of the Emergency, would ‘break the 
emergency’. In effect, he was asking for the right of appeal, through review committees, to 
be revoked knowing that ‘many innocent people would be held.’248  
 
By April 1950 with the arrival of 26 Gurkha Brigade from Hong Kong, the security forces 
available in Malaya amounted to one armoured car regiment, eight British infantry battalion, 
eight Gurkha battalions and four Malay battalions. In June 1950 the security forces were 
again reinforced with an additional armoured car regiment, an additional British infantry 
battalion, a commando brigade and one locally raised artillery unit. Between June and 
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September 1950, the main strength of the security forces were deployed to priority areas to 
implement the Briggs Plan, which initially envisaged concentrating forces to break the 
MNLA in one state at a time, working from south to north. That part of the plan was 
eventually abandoned, but nevertheless patterned force deployment in 1950 to early 1951. 
Three of these priority areas were Johore - to which six infantry battalions were deployed - 
Negeri Sembilan - where four infantry battalions were deployed - and Pahang - where three 
infantry battalions were deployed. Holding operations took place in other areas. These 
included Selangor - to which two infantry battalions were deployed - Perak - where the 
Commando Brigade was deployed - Pahang - to which two infantry battalions were 
deployed. Further, an infantry battalion was deployed to both Kedah and Kelantan. Two 
armoured car regiments were deployed to patrol Malaya’s roads in response to insurgent 
actions.249 National Serviceman Len Ives, for example, described a truck that had been 
caught in an ambush and then left outside a police station. He noted that it was originally 
one of the British Army’s. ‘So much for the alleged lack of marksmanship! This truck was 
proof enough that these guys knew what they were about. We took due notice.’250 Further to 
those deployed there were also two infantry battalions kept in reserve. In September 1950 a 
home guard was introduced and in October of that year it was decided the two additional 
Malay Regiments and companies of Police jungle squads should be raised.251 In 1950 the 
indices again increased. Communist instigated incidents amounted to 4,739, 1,744 major and 
2,995 minor, against 983 contacts made by the security forces. There was a total of 942 
insurgents eliminated and 889 casualties among the security forces.252  
 
Along with the ‘villagisation’, which separated the insurgents from their supposed support 
base, food would be strictly controlled in order to starve the insurgents. The food control 
operations brought the plight of British Forces into sharp contrast with that of the insurgents. 
British troop morale was in large measure dependent on functioning logistics, such as 
supplies and evacuation, and periods away from the jungle. Conversely, the British sought 
to destroy the morale of the insurgents by isolating them from any logistical support. ‘It is 
not possible to live on the jungle without serious deterioration in health and morale. ...’, 
wrote General Ritchie, ‘The fact that we, through air supply, can do so almost indefinitely 
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bestows on us a tremendous advantage over our enemy.’253 By June 1951, a food denial 
campaign had been instituted, following the resettlement program. Its essential features were 
the rationing of rice, restricted food areas, control of shops and the control of food while in 
transit.254 Lieutenant-General Roger Bower later wrote that the food denial operations had 
an immediate effect and became a standard part of all operations. ‘One of the first effects of 
food denial was to force CT units to split into smaller parties and thus deprive them of much 
of their offensive power. It now forms the basis of the majority of SF operations and has a 
significant effect on CT morale.’255 As stated in the January 1955 Director of Operations 
report, in 1951 the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) issued a directive urging the majority 
of its forces to withdraw to the jungle, with a portion to continue ‘intensive cultivation’. This 
was in order to become ‘self-supporting’ and so ‘relieve the burden on their supporters’.  The 
policy, as stated by Lieutenant-General Roger Bower, put the insurgents at a disadvantage 
as ‘only in rice and root crops could they ever achieve any success.’ ‘The inevitable result 
was that they became soft and their morale deteriorated.’ Further, the growing separation 
between insurgents and civilians meant civilians ‘took heart’ increasing both their resistance 
to the insurgency and support for the security forces.256  
 
Between January and May 1951 operations against the insurgents increased in tempo.257 The 
additional measures, and the increased tempo of operations, were beginning to have a 
measurable impact by early 1951. The rate of contacts was ‘more than double the mid 1950 
rate and eliminations rose accordingly.’258 By 15th June 1951 resettlement of Johore state 
had been completed and a security force offensive initiated there. In August 1951 the 
deployment of police jungle companies allowed the deployment of a battalion to both 
Selangor and Perak.259    
 
In response to the Briggs Plan the insurgents ‘launched an all-out offensive’. ‘This period’ 
wrote Bower in his 1957 DOO report, ‘with its peak of Communist violence and widespread 
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expectation of wholesale Communist occupation of South East Asia was undoubtedly the 
most dangerous of the Emergency.’260 This sentiment was reflected in the incident rate. In 
1951 Communist instigated incidents peaked at 6,082 (2,333 major and 3,749 minor).261 The 
offensive included the killing of High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney on the 6th October.262 
Gurney was killed when his convoy was ambushed on its way to Fraser's Hill. In 
conversation with Chin Peng, the historian Anthony Short suggested that it was the high 
point of the insurgency for the Communists. It was a coup, although apparently an 
unintentional one. Chin Peng’s counter suggestion was that under increasing pressure from 
the security forces the Communists were more concerned with reorganising their forces at 
that time, breaking them down into smaller groups and dispersing to avoid the British. The 
immediate concern of those left operating around Fraser’s Hill was to acquire weapons and 
the convoy was an easy target.263   Then, only a few weeks after Gurney’s killing, 11 platoon 
of the Royal West Kent Regiment was ambushed on the Ulu Caledonian estate, resulting in 
the deaths of eleven British servicemen and three Iban trackers. In the space of a few weeks 
the security forces had lost the High Commissioner and suffered what would be the heaviest 
loss due to one incident during the Malayan Emergency.264 1951 proved to be the bloodiest 
year of the Emergency for the security forces. Casualties would also peak that year at 
1,195.265          
 
On the 27th November 1951 Lockhart replaced Gurney as Director of Operations.266 The 
population control measures, in concert with additional troops and the increased tempo of 
operations also made 1951 the turning point of the Emergency. Sir Harold Briggs, according 
to Bower, had been instrumental in devising and creating ‘the conditions which enabled 
victory to be won’.267 By August of that year implementation of the population control 
measures, codified in the Briggs Plan, had ‘resettled’ approaching ‘half a million Chinese 
squatters … into New Villages’. The resettlement was coordinated with food denial 
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operations by the security forces. The mass deportation of suspected Chinese Communists, 
along with United Nations led intervention in Korea, led to a feeling that the Communist 
threat in South East Asia was being contained. These factors combined, Bower argued, ‘had 
a marked effect on public confidence’. Whether ‘confidence’ or acquiescence to the 
increasingly dominant security forces, the result was an ‘increased flow of information.’ This 
flow of information meant intelligence led operations, in place of the largely undirected 
jungle excursions which had preceded them. In turn the contact rate reached what would be 
its peak throughout the Emergency, at 1,911.268 The Communist casualties, which numbered 
2,049 and by this time included wounded, also increased and would peak the following 
year.269 Prior to 1951 there was no concerted effort to estimate the number of CTs who were 
operating in the jungle. By 1951, surrendered enemy personnel enabled many of those 
remaining in the jungle to be identified by name. In 1951 there were 7,292 CTs operating in 
the jungle.270                         
 
In February 1952 General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner and 
Director of Operations. The combining of these positions, which prior to Templer’s 
appointment were separate, centralised the command structure. As Bower put it, ‘for the first 
time there was supreme and unified control, not only of the Emergency, but of all 
Government activities.’ ‘Under his forceful leadership’, Bower continued, ‘the complacency 
that still existed in some Government departments … was swept away’.271 The earlier 
histories broadly agreed with this. Anthony Short and Richard Stubbs have both suggested 
that the unification of these roles under Templer’s ‘forceful’ personality represented a 
turning point in the Emergency. As Karl Hack has convincedly argued, many of the 
mechanisms for the defeat of the insurgency, however, had already been put in place prior 
to his arrival.272 The statistics certainly suggest that by 1952, the insurgency was in steady 
decline. While, in 1952, the total Communists casualties peaked at 2,131 the other indices 
had sharply decreased. The total Security Force casualties were almost half that of the 
previous year at 664, with the total incidents at 3,727 and contacts 1,868.273   
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Templer focused on reorganising and training the recently expanded police force and 
improving the intelligence services, which by now had recruited significant numbers of 
Chinese speakers.274 By 1st April 1952 the security forces now numbered two armoured car 
regiments, seven British infantry battalions, eight Gurkha battalions, five Malay battalions, 
two Kings African Rifles battalions, two Royal Marine Commando battalions and a Fiji 
battalion under training, totalling twenty five infantry battalions. In June 1952 Templer 
established his operations headquarters in Kuala Lumpur which included elements of the 
civilian administration and military forces. Lockhart had been re-designated as the Deputy 
Director of Operations. By December 1952 military security forces deployed to Malaya 
peaked at thirty and one third (one third of a field artillery regiment) major units including 
twenty-eight infantry battalions (numbering around 40,000 troops). By this time there is an 
addition 60,000 full time police and 229,000 home guard.275 This was against an estimated 





By 1953, the insurgents had initiated a fresh wave of attacks on isolated outposts and 
civilians suspected of informing ‘in order to raise the terrorists’ own morale and to re-
establish their domination of the public, improve their food supplies and increase their 
finances.’277 At the time, the insurgents had also withdrawn into the jungle to build deep 
jungle bases supplied by their own cultivated land. In order to not alienate the population, 
the insurgents refrained from destroying people's livelihoods and targeted those who they 
could hold up as ‘oppressors of the poor’. By early 1953, the average civilian and Security 
Force casualty rate had dropped from approaching 200 a month in mid-1951 to under 30. 
The reduced threat enabled the security forces to focus offensive actions without presenting 
weaknesses in other areas. The first states to be focused on were Malacca, Pahang, Selangor 
and Negri Sembilan, where the MCP where considered to be at their weakest. This would 
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mean the Police and Home Guard could take control of these states leaving the Army to 
concentrate on areas under greater Communist influence, such as Perak and Johore.278     
 
In August 1953 Sir Gerald Templer heralded the success of food denial operations and the 
restrictions placed on movement. In response he proposed relaxing both within ‘white areas’. 
This was designed to simultaneously raise the morale of those within the white areas and 
encourage those in remaining problem areas to comply.279 In September the first ‘White 
Area’ was declared in Malacca, where Emergency restrictions were relaxed.280 While 
Templer was keen to see that the ERs were relaxed for compliant civilians he was anxious 
to maintain discipline among service personnel. Templer wrote: ‘There will be no easing of 
Security Force vigilance.’281 The policy would be instituted, and over the next two to three 
years the ‘white areas’ would be extended to encompass nearly half of the population of 
Malaya.282 By the end of 1953 the indices of the Emergency had again sharply fallen. 
Casualties among the security forces were nearly a third of what they had been the previous 
year at 209. The total incidents were recorded at 1,170, 258 major and 912 minor, and the 
contacts at 1,407. Communist casualties had also now begun to decline at 1,695.283 In 1953 
there was an estimated 4,373 CTs in the jungle.284 
 
The 1955 DOO report suggested that ‘there is evidence in some areas to show that their 
morale is not high, that they are short of supplies and that our food denial is still the most 
effective weapon which we employ against them.’285 Richard Clutterbuck later described the 
captured and surrendered insurgents as being generally ‘dirty, unkempt and exhausted; they 
were undernourished, pale from lack of sunlight under the jungle canopy and weakened by 
festering sores from the bites of insects and leeches’.286 For Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. Belas, 
 
278 DOO Report, 1957, p.10.  
279 Short, Communist Insurrection, p.379.    
280 Planning Staff Report, 1967, p.6.  
281 ‘[‘White area’ in Malacca]: inward savingram no 1480/53 from Sir G Templer to Mr Lyttelton on a proposed 
relaxation of emergency regulations in part of the Settlement’, 28 Aug 1953, Document 303. In Stockwell (Ed), 
Malaya, Part II.        
282 Short, Communist Insurrection, p.379.    
283 Ibid, Appendix.   
284 DOO Report, 1957, p.4.      
285 DOO Report, 1955, p4.    
286 Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960, (London: Cassell, 1967), 
p.102. 
  77 
 
 
of the RAMC, Clutterbuck’s narrative was evidence ‘that many of these men had broken 
down, or were on the verge of doing so.’287 L.S. Ives, a National Service infantryman in 
Malaya, praised Freddie Spencer Chapman’s book The Jungle is Neutral (1949) for its 
insight into the environment but also the Communist insurgents. Spencer Chapman’s book 
was an account of his wartime service in occupied Malaya, where he met what would become 
key personalities in the Emergency. ‘Nothing really prepares you for the jungle as an 
environment - it is quite unique. Many eminent people have written about it. Probably the 
finest book on the subject is ‘The Jungle is Neutral’ … We all read this book - which if 
anything emphasised the durability of the people we were up against!’288 John Newsinger 
has argued that Chapman’s book about wartime cooperation with the MPAJA expresses 
admiration for the communist guerrillas, which provides ‘a view that is in stark contrast with 
British propaganda during the Emergency’.289  
 
By 1954, the main Communist threat was considered to be broken which meant the roles of 
High Commissioner and Director of Operations were again separated.290 In June 1954 
General Templer left Malaya and his Deputy Donald MacGillivray replaced him as High 
Commissioner.291 Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey Bourne took on the combined role of 
Director of Operations and General Officer Commanding Malaya Command.292  Between 
1954 and 1956 there was a gradual reduction in the strength of the military element of the 
security forces. By 1st July 1956 this military element comprised two armoured car 
regiments, one field artillery regiment and nineteen infantry battalions. Some of the infantry 
battalions were to be kept in strategic reserve and not committed to security operations.293 
In 1954 there were 1,197 Communist casualties recorded, 241 casualties among the security 
forces 1,077 incidents and 993 contacts.294 In 1954 there were an estimated 3,402 CTs in the 
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jungle.295 Control of offensive operations was gradually being passed over to Malaya’s 
political leaders in preparation for the coming independence.296       
     
By June 1955, the security forces were dominant and both Moscow and Peking (Beijing) 
were pursuing a policy of competitive co-existence with the west, hoping to win concessions 
by negotiation and diplomacy, as they had at the Geneva conference of 1954. There was also 
an impending election in Malaya, with the intention of forming a government. These factors 
led to an MCP overture toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict.297 In July 1955 Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, leader of the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), was elected 
Chief Minister, forming a government with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and 
the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), in a grouping calling itself the Alliance. This first stage 
in the transition from colonial rule meant ‘the MCP was deprived of one of its strongest 
propaganda lines.’ One of Abdul Rahman’s first acts was to declare an amnesty, the aim of 
which was to allow the Communist forces the opportunity to surrender. During this period 
the security forces were ordered to ‘shout before you shoot’. There were, however, few 
surrenders and the policy was later discontinued. In December 1955 the MCP and the new 
government entered peace talks in Baling. The Secretary General of the MCP, Chin Peng, 
offered to end the fight on the condition that his organisation was recognised as a political 
party. The talks broke down when the Chief Minister of the Federation refused to recognise 
the MCP and instead called for their unconditional surrender.298 
 
During 1955, a decision to focus the security forces on areas in which Communist influence 
was weakest resulted in Pahang being declared a white area following intensive food denial 
operations. Similar success followed in South Selangor which expanded the growing white 
area in central Malaya. In turn, this enabled the security forces to shift their focus to Selangor 
and Negri Sembilan in 1956.299 By the end of 1955 the indicators of the Emergency had 
again fallen. The security forces had generated 565 contacts resulting in 884 Communist 
casualties. The Communists had instigated 781 incidents divided into 206 major and 575 
minor incidents, with 182 casualties among the security forces.300 In 1955 there was an 
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estimated 2,798 CTs in the jungle.301 In early 1956 a date was agreed upon for Independence, 
after which preparation for self-governance, including the ‘Malayanisation’ of the 
government, gradually replacing British with Malayan personnel.302 In 1956 there were 608 
Communist casualties recorded, 126 casualties among the security forces, 435 incidents (102 
major and 333 minor) and 486 contacts.303 In 1956 there were an estimated 2,231 CTs left 
in the jungle, many of them on or even over the border with Thailand.304  
 
July 1957 saw the first month in which no civilian nor member of the security forces was 
killed, and where no major incident occurred. Communist insurgents, however, would 
continue to be killed at an average of one per day throughout 1957. By August 1957 Central 
Selangor was declared a white area, which meant the white areas now extended from coast 
to coast through central Malaya. This also meant the Emergency Regulations had been lifted 
for approximately half of the population.305 On  31st August 1957 the Federation of Malaya 
became an independent  member of the Commonwealth.306 By this time, there were an 
estimated 1,830 CTs in the jungle,307 mainly concentrated in Johore, Central Perak, and 
across the border in Thailand.308 In 1957 there were 540 Communist casualties recorded, 44 
casualties among the security forces, 190 incidents (40 major and 150 minor) and 303 
contacts. The figures continued to fall after independence. By 1959 there were 119 
Communist casualties recorded, 10 casualties among the security forces, 12 incidents (4 
major and 8 minor) and 27 contacts.309 Then, on 31 July 1960 the Emergency was formally 
declared to be at an end.310 By the end of 1960 there had been 5 minor incidents and no major 
incidents recorded. The security forces had made 21 contacts, with 48 Communist casualties 
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1.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has delineated the campaign phases and has suggested that the experience of 
participation in the opening years of the conflict was different from in the closing years. The 
chaotic opening years of the Emergency (1948-1949) saw the security forces engaged in 
large scale operations which involved sweeps of the jungle and more generally reacting to 
Communist instigated incidents, with little intelligence. The Briggs Plan from 1950, and the 
system of War Executive Committees, alongside slow improvements in intelligence, meant 
security forces were increasingly well informed and controlled, shifting over more and more 
to intelligence-led operations. The resettlement of the Briggs Plan shaped the period 1950-
52. On the one hand, it created a clearer area of separation between the settlements and 
jungle, and a better framework for control. On the other hand, the Communist counter-
offensive and the increased tempo of operations (1950-52) represented a period of continued 
strain on the security forces. 1951 saw the Communist insurgency reach its zenith with the 
highest number of incidents recorded that year. As a result, it would also be the bloodiest 
year of the Emergency for the security forces. Casualties would peak in 1951, which 
included the high profile killing of the High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney and the 
ambush of 11 platoon of the Royal West Kent regiment, the heaviest loss due to one incident 
during the Malayan Emergency. 312 By the end of 1952 the security forces had gained the 
upper hand. This was indicated by the statistics which gauged the progress of the Emergency 
and demonstrated a steady downward trend from 1953 onwards. After this time (1953-1960) 
the security forces were engaged in mopping up operations. The jungle, however, remained 
a constant stress for service personnel throughout the Emergency. Using official materials 
this chapter has shown the insurgency and the insurgents as they were presented to service 
personnel. It has suggested that these official perceptions were challenged when service 
personnel came into contact with the insurgents. The following chapter will show how 
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As shown in the introductory chapter, resilience, as a psychological concept, was in its 
infancy within the psychiatric literature during the Second World War. It was, for example, 
largely absent from the psychiatric reports and papers generated by the campaign in Burma. 
These reports formed the basis for later histories, in which much of the material was 
reproduced uncritically. The earliest authoritative work was Robert Ahrenfeldt’s Psychiatry 
in the British Army in the Second World War, first published in 1958.313 Eight years later 
this was followed by F.A.E. Crew’s official medical history of the Burma campaign.314 
Crew’s history included a notable addition to the terminology, stating that: ‘The conditions 
in this theatre were such as to make unrelenting demands upon a man’s powers of endurance 
and upon his resilience.’315 Pat O’Malley (2010) has argued that ‘projecting’ resilience, as it 
is now understood, onto earlier periods implies that the concept has a ‘timeless character’.316 
This criticism has led historians to look for earlier iterations of the concept. Alexander 
Watson (2009), writing on the Great War has argued that morale has been ‘the common 
shorthand for military resilience and combat motivation’.317 In deference to O’Malley’s 
criticism and following Watson’s lead this chapter will forward morale as being an earlier 
iteration of resilience. In the official history of the medical services in the Second World 
War Ahrenfeldt sought to codify the lessons of the war and emphasise the use of ‘psychiatric 
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prophylaxis and the promotion of mental health’.318 Fundamental to the prevention of 
psychiatric and disciplinary breakdowns was high morale which, wrote Ahrenfeldt, could be 
inculcated through training.319   
          
A number of recent writers have looked at the role of political ideology in the production of 
morale. Omer Bartov (1991) has argued that ideological indoctrination was key to morale in 
the German Army during the Second World War.320 S.P. Mackenzie (1992) has examined 
the links between education, citizenship and morale in the British army during the twentieth 
century.321 Mackenzie found that ideas about citizenship and empire were promoted during 
the Second World War to fortify morale.322 Other writers have argued that ideology will 
carry the infantryman only so far and instead that comradeship was the main reason men 
fight. In this reading the small group was fundamental to the production of morale. One of 
the first to expand on this idea was S.L.A Marshall, chief United States Army combat 
historian during the Second World War and Korea. In Men Against Fire (1947) Marshall 
wrote:       
 
Lofty ideas and ideals we must have, if only to assure that man will go forward. But 
it is unworthy of the profession of arms to base any policy upon exaggerated notions 
of man’s capacity to endure alone. In battle, you may draw a small circle around a 
soldier, including within it only those persons and objects which he sees or which he 
believes will influence his immediate fortunes. These primarily will determine 
whether he rallies or fails, advances or falls back.323     
 
Hew Strachan (2006), has suggested that the customary explanations of morale are not 
exclusive and that the historian needs to consider an important further factor, that of 
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training.324 Joanna Bourke (2018) has shown that the British experimented with different 
forms of behavioural training during the Second World War.325 Military training, being 
based on the enforced repetition of prescriptive routines, is certainly grounded in behavioural 
conditioning. There is also a psychological dimension to training. ‘The value of training’, 
writes Strachan, is ‘in large part psychological: it is an enabling process, a form of 
empowerment, which creates self confidence.’326 It is this psychological dimension that will 
be examined in this chapter, as applied to training.            
 
As delineated in the literature review, a number of writers have linked hunting and the use 
of hunting terminology with military training and operations. This chapter will build on these 
works by situating the hunting metaphor within the concept of morale.  This chapter will 
argue that morale was also conceptualised, amongst other ways, as ‘offensive spirit’. It will 
go to suggest that ‘offensive spirit’ in action was promoted through a hunting metaphor 
within the military training pamphlets and memorandums generated by Far East Land 
Forces. Firstly, however, it will look at ‘hate training’ during the Second World War in order 
to draw out some salient points against which to think about the idea of ‘offensive spirit’ and 
the hunting metaphor. 
 
The ultimate end of training the infantryman was arguably the act of killing. Joanna Bourke 
(1999) has argued that soldiers enjoyed killing and those who did not have the opportunity 
to kill often broke down.327 Bourke employed the hunting metaphor to illustrate the soldiers 
enjoyment of  killing.328 Edgar Jones (2006) has countered that entry into the combat zone, 
where the killing takes place, greatly increases exposure to serious injury and death. 
Exposure to combat has proven the most reliable indicator of psychiatric breakdowns, and 
the combat zone is where the majority of psychiatric casualties occur.329 Both were in 
agreement that training was the mechanism that facilitates the ability to kill. This chapter 
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will also suggest that the hunting metaphor deferred to Second World War psychiatric 
thought which sought an answer to the problem of training soldiers to kill. Much of the 
thinking from the jungle campaign in Burma migrated to postwar Malaya with veterans of 
Burma and the reuse of military training literature. The Malayan Emergency, however, was 
not only prosecuted through jungle operations but also through population control measures. 
This raises the question of the use of force. This chapter will suggest that the behavioural 
training and its overarching narrative focused on the use of force needed to combat 
insurgents in the jungle, over its delimitation, which was needed when dealing with civilians 
and disputed populations.              
                    
 
2.2. Morale and Training     
 
This chapter is concerned with the lessons of the Second World War and the application of 
those lessons in Malaya during Britain's postwar period of decolonisation. British Second 
World War psychiatric thought can be traced back to a committee of enquiry that was set up 
in the aftermath of the First World War. The report resulting from the Southborough ‘Shell-
Shock’ enquiry governed much of British military psychiatric policy in the Second World 
War and continued to be influential during the postwar period. In April 1920, Lord 
Southborough, speaking in the House of Lords, raised the need for an enquiry into ‘Shell 
shock’. Subsequently, a committee was convened, meeting for the first time in September. 
Following investigation, which included expert testimony on the medico-legal aspects of 
‘Shellshock’, the committee published its findings and recommendations in 1922.330 It 
reported that soldiers were more susceptible to psychiatric disorder and indiscipline when 
morale was low. 331 The historian of British psychiatry, L.S. Hearnshaw, later noted that as 
the rate of breakdowns varied across units there was ‘an important element of truth’ in the 
‘emphasis on morale’ reported in the enquiry.332 Better training was put forward as the means 
to inculcate morale and discipline and to maintain mental and moral efficiency. Barrack 
square drill was emphasised as a means to instil these qualities but there was also a call to 
create soldiers who could think and act for themselves.333    
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There was also a recurring fear within the British Army that its conscripts were becoming 
less adept at soldiering because of social progress. Delivering an address on war neuroses to 
the Royal College of Physicians in November 1918, consulting neurologist, Colonel William 
Aldren Turner, stated that compulsory service brought those ‘who are constitutionally and 
by upbringing and education unable to adjust their outlook to service conditions. In other 
words, the young soldier becomes neurasthenic owing to a failure of adaptation to a 
continued emotional cause and the struggle to bring about such adaptation (Dejerine).’334 
Being grounded in evolutionary thought, adaptation was also central to the work of one of 
the more prominent figures in the history of British military psychiatry: Captain (and 
neurologist) William Rivers. 
 
Rivers was already an established doctor and neurologist when he joined the Army in the 
First World War. But he is perhaps best known as being the ‘father-confessor’ to the war 
poet Siegfried Sassoon,335 a patient-doctor relationship that has subsequently been 
fictionalised in Pat Barker’s influential novel Regeneration (1991).336 For Rivers, training 
was the mechanism through which citizens were adapted into soldiers. Drill was designed to 
habituate citizens to the army and increase suggestibility to orders. In this way individuals 
were formed into an aggregate with their needs becoming secondary to the group. This 
strengthened the social instinct, exemplified by the desire to do one's duty, which, in turn, 
enabled the more primitive instinct of self-preservation to be repressed. For Rivers then, war 
neurosis was a failure of adaptive repression.337 When Rivers gave his opinion on morale to 
the Committee he commented that the ‘whole object of military training is to produce esprit 
de corps and other factors which give good morale’ and that the reason why so many had 
succumbed to psychiatric disorder was because of ‘incomplete training.’338  
 
Concern that British citizen-soldiers had become ill-suited to the hardships and stress of 
battle would again resurface during the Second World War. This would lead to experiments 
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in behavioural training, which sought to condition recruits to stress.339 The following section 
will show that the limitations of behavioural training would be exposed when overzealously 
applied. It will go on to suggest that the psychiatric services invoked and instrumentalised 
the concept of morale to address these limitations.               
 
 
2.2.1. Morale and Training during the Second World War 
 
A memorandum concerning the work of the Directorate of Army Psychiatry (January 1944) 
during the Second World War, stated that it had largely followed the recommendations of 
the Southborough Committee on Shell Shock (1922). More specifically, the tenet that 
‘“prevention is better than cure” and the prophylactic approach has been followed wherever 
possible.’340  General prevention took the form of advisory work on morale and training. The 
memorandum made clear that the ‘mental training’ should avoid ‘the activation of primitive 
blood lust’, which would cause psychiatric breakdowns, and instead promote ‘the 
maintenance of military motivation’.341    
 
By 1942 the Army had set up its first battle school in order to replace outdated training 
methods and to better psychologically prepare soldiers for war. Training was emphasised as 
a way to prevent breakdowns by conditioning soldiers to stress and debunking preconceived 
notions about battle. This brought training within the domain of psychiatry and a psychiatric 
adviser was attached to the school. The underlying idea was to introduce soldiers to the stress 
of battle by creating a realistic environment, which became known as ‘battle inoculation’.342 
This medicalised language mirrored increasing confidence in prophylactic medications and 
the importance of preventive over curative measures.  It was initially proposed that ‘the 
maximal amount of live ammunition and high explosive noises’ be used throughout. This 
high exposure to stress left recruits visibly shaken, however, and even caused a case of 
hysterical paralysis in one. Recruit responses were found to be less pronounced under 
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graduated exposure to stress. This led to the working hypothesis that graduated training 
would enhance ‘military judgement’ and reduce fear.343                
    
This behavioural training was initially combined with ‘training in “Hate”’. Hate training 
utilised atrocity photographs, visits to slaughterhouses and the use of blood during exercises. 
A 1944 War Office report on the work of army psychiatrists in relation to morale  stated that 
the practice was discontinued after students again experienced deleterious effects, noting 
that: ‘The analogy of the battle field to a slaughter house did not seem to be relevant or 
inspiring, and the emphasis on the more sadistic aspects of war appeared to upset many 
students.’ The practice was abandoned but a ‘sadistic atmosphere’ continued to be employed 
in some battle schools, and a psychiatrist had to be dispatched to explain its harm.344 There 
was also public dismay at the practice of hate training when the media picked up on its use.345 
The War Office report was later codified and operationalised as a technical memorandum 
from the Directorate of Army Psychiatry. The memorandum distanced the British from the 
use of ‘Hate’ training, and instead emphasised it as Nazi like practice. Training should be 
aimed at installing confidence and a belief in victory. The memorandum stated that:                   
 
The inherent danger of all attempts to “condition” men is that, unless carefully 
controlled, such attempts may have an effect exactly the opposite to that intended. 
… It must be clearly realised that advanced training is designed, not to frighten men, 
but to give them an opportunity to realise the emptiness of much of their fear. Each 
man's mental picture of war should become one of attack with a reasonable chance 
of success.346     
 
Just as the limitations of behavioural training had been exposed by non-graduated exposure 
to stress, hate training had illustrated the importance of narrative in the formation of attitudes 
toward battle. It had become clear that inciting hatred did not work, so instead the psychiatric 
services invoked the concept of morale to appeal to British nationalism. The Memorandum 
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described morale as ‘the will to win and the capacity to endure’ because of national ideals.347 
‘Offensive spirit’, was ‘indistinguishable from good morale’. It was conceptualised as ‘an 
active determination to be better trained and to have more speed, initiative, ingenuity and 
persistence than the enemy.’348 Thus, the concept of morale became militarised as offensive 
spirit. The psychiatric memorandum had picked up on a history of the use of the term 
‘offensive spirit’ within the British Army.   
 
Simon Innes-Robbins, for example, has identified the importance that British 
Generals placed on the concept during the First World War. In the opening years, the 
generalship expected ‘offensive spirit’, even over technique, to be the decisive factor on the 
Western Front.349 By 1918 this had changed, as the generals had realised that the will to fight 
had to be allied with the skill to fight and fresh impetus was placed on training the 
British infantryman.350 Conversely those who did not perform to the required standards were 
seen as having a lack of offensive spirit. In July 1916, for example, a group of soldiers 
refused to go out on patrol claiming they were unable due to stress. Their officer later 
reported that they had demonstrated ‘a great lack of offensive spirit’.351 Grounding the 
concept of morale in action on known military terminology, as opposed to psychiatric 
terminology, the memorandum presented the concept to the military in an accepted form. 
Affirmation of the psychiatric position came in the form of a later memorandum, circulated 
by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery in his ‘Memorandum On Battle’. This stated that: 
‘Any attempts to create an artificial blood-lust or hate during training is worse than futile. 
Such an attitude of hate is foreign to the British temperament and attempts to produce it by 
artificial stimulus during training are bound to fail in battle, as they did in the last war.’ What 
he called for instead was ‘true offensive spirit’.352                          
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As the war continued, military training pamphlets emerged which codified some of the more 
behavioural aspects of training, such as battle inoculation, into doctrine. The pamphlets also 
revealed additional ideas and narratives surrounding training and operations. The military 
training pamphlets in the Far East, for example, were an evolving set of instructions 
compiled from the growing experience of jungle warfare.353 Taken collectively they also 
revealed a distinctly psychological concern with preparing soldiers’ minds for the rigours of 
the jungle. In part this took the form of ‘debunking’ the jungle, or, as expressed in The Jungle 
Hiker (1944), a survival guide for downed aircrew, ‘Dejunking The Bungle’.354 The manuals 
also included advice on how to more effectively engage soldiers during training. Instead of 
ideas about hate they promoted competition: ‘The ordinary man is so built that his mind is 
most active when he is up against something or somebody. The feeling that he has got to pit 
his own mind against some form of competition automatically stirs him on to a greater 
effort.’355 This thought followed into operations: ‘Jungle warfare should be regarded as a 
game, healthful, interesting and thrilling; the men should feel at home in the jungle and 
regard it as a friend.’356              
 
‘Military Training Pamphlet No 51: Preparation for Warfare in the Far East’ (1945), 
introduced the term ‘offensive spirit’ into the Far East Training material: initiative and 
offensive spirit was to be maintained by action.357 M.T.P. No 51 also revealed a recurring 
fear among senior officers, although this time it was transposed onto the jungle. It warned 
that the average British citizen-soldier had become psychologically habituated to modern 
industrial society. In response it called for training techniques that simulated the jungle and 
broke these ties:                     
 
Training at night, especially on nights when there is a half moon, is probably the best 
substitute that can be produced for jungle training ; constant night work forces men 
to become self-reliant and tends to dispel the “herd instinct”, a characteristic that is 
 
353 Timothy Moreman, The Jungle, The Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-45, 
(London: Frank Cass, 2005), p.104.         
354 A Royal Air Force Welfare Publication, The Jungle Hiker, (Colombo: The Times of Ceylon, 1944), p.1.  
355 Army in India Training Memorandum: A.I.T.M. No. 25, (War Series, 1944), p.38.      
356 The War Office, Warfare in the Far East, Military Training Pamphlet 52, (1944), p.81.   
357 The War Office, Military Training Pamphlet No 51: Preparation for Warfare in the Far East, (1945), p.8.  
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only too common among British troops, the majority of whom have lived their lives 
in towns and cities.358                        
 
Within MTP 51 the ‘herd instinct’ was seen as something that could sap initiative and was a 
bond that needed to be broken. Instead, what was called for in the jungle was self-reliance. 
For the authors of these pamphlets, the qualities needed in jungle warfare were embodied by 
the hunter. The Army in India Training Memorandum (1944) stated that: ‘A good hunter 
must have patience, and in jungle fighting the soldier is a “hunter” in the strictest sense of 
the word.’359 In the tactical guide, Jungle Jottings (1945) the hunting metaphor was used to 
urge soldiers to overcome behaviours and attitudes deleterious to jungle operations: ‘We 
must equally overcome the self-consciousness that leads some of us to feel that crawling on 
the belly is childish and savours of boys out scouting. We must all try to copy the hunters, 
trappers, and frontiersmen of America whose lives depend on their being able to beat the 
Red Indian at his own game.’360           
 
The aim of the MTPs was the widespread dissemination of their lessons. The Jungle Book 
(1943), a prominent example, was mass produced with 45,000 copies being distributed to 
both Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers. Timothy Moreman has argued that the 
lessons were made comprehensible by employing an accessible format and illustrations.361 
Within this context the hunting metaphor, which invoked figures from popular culture, can 
be seen as an accessible way of conveying the preferred attitude, and so mode of morale, to 
soldiers. This appeared to be tacitly understood within a further codification which 
synthesised literature on jungle warfare from both sides of the Atlantic. Major-General 
Rowan-Robinson published a manual on Jungle-Warfare in 1944. In it, he saw Burma as a 
continuation of earlier colonial campaigns and recognised the power of popular culture in 
conveying this message: ‘we see in jungle-warfare a reversion to the combats of colonists 
with Red Indians which stirred our blood in the days of Fenimore Cooper and Mary 
Johnston.’362 Rowan-Robinson went on to argue that there was a need to combine British 
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tactics and technology with the ‘combat-craftiness of the Mohican’.363 As we shall see, these 
ideas re-emerged later in Malaya, under the instruction of Burma veteran and Gurkha officer 
Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Walker.    
 
 
2.2.2. Training and National Character 
 
As Montgomery had stated during the war in his ‘Memorandum On Battle Drill’, ‘The 
methods we adopt must be suited to our national character, which does not include blood 
lust.’364 If the idea of hate training and the slaughterhouse analogy of warfare was 
incongruent with the British character the same could not be said for the hunting narrative. 
Blood sport had long been part of British military and imperial culture. Colonel J.C. Gawler, 
who commanded a punitive column during the Anglo-Sikhim War of 1861, later published 
his experiences as a guide to jungle warfare. Its language and underlying psychology appear 
prophetic in relation to the training pamphlets that later emerged from the Far East during 
the Second World War. Gawler thought an intellectual regression was required for British 
soldiers to be effective in the jungle. To convey his message, he invoked figures from 
popular culture:                 
 
The intellectual part of bush tactics is only the exercise of the animal instincts and 
intelligence, which the uneducated savage possesses; and, with a little practice, 
where should be found men more apt for border raid, or “hunting craft by lake and 
wood,” than the countrymen of Robin Hood or bold Rob Roy? 365               
 
Charles Callwell’s Small Wars (1896), regarded as a forerunner to later codifications of 
counterinsurgency, recommended the use of Europeans who were accustomed to living 
outdoors in areas of guerrilla warfare to be used as scouts. These ‘adepts at the hunter’s craft’ 
moved ahead of the main body of troops to ‘fix the quarry’.366  
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Robert Baden-Powell, the founder of the Boy Scouts movement, wrote Aids To Scouting: 
for N.-C.O.s & Men (1899) with similar thoughts in mind. It was written from his experience 
as a seasoned campaigner in Britain’s small wars of Empire. Competitive hunting-based 
games were to be used to develop the skills needed to become a Scout.367 The manual 
encouraged the Scout to enter the mind of his enemy: ‘Hunting an enemy is like hunting 
game. … to be successful at it you must know something of the ways and habits of the animal 
you are after’.368 In 1908, Baden-Powell also wrote Scouting for Boys, which had its roots 
firmly in his earlier manual. The book emphasised duty toward king, country and 
countrymen. Scouting was the first step toward fulfilling that duty and joining the ranks of 
the soldiers, pioneers, explorers and missionaries that had built the Empire.369 The manual 
emphasised what were considered civilised ideas, for example chivalry which in his example 
meant not to steal, but also  encouraged boys to enter the mind of those would steal: ‘a 
policeman does not catch pickpockets by standing about in uniform watching for them, he 
dresses like one of the crowd … If a guilty person finds himself being watched it puts him 
on his guard’.370 Baden-Powell was suggesting that the Empire was not an entirely civilised 
place and its inhabitants were not bound by the same laws or principles as the British. To 
survive there meant understanding that and to some extent becoming uncivilised. 
Competitive games were used to instil the physical and psychological skills the boys would 
need to emulate their forebears,371 with instructors encouraged to play on the imaginations 
of the boys.372       
   
A later work more explicitly aligned assumptions about national character with hunting.  In 
his book, Pink and Scarlet or Hunting as a School for Soldiering (1900), Lieutenant-Colonel 
E.A. Alderson wrote that ‘hunting can take up the fighting education of the young Officer 
just where the barrack-square and drill-field can go no further, and that, if taken and made 
use of in the right way, it can continue to educate him in a way that nothing else, except 
actual experience of active service, or work under conditions very nearly akin to those of 
active service, can possibly do.’ Alderson spoke against the military ‘craze’ for ‘uniformity’ 
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and argued that hunting developed ‘self reliance and decision of action’. These were 
attributes of ‘buoyancy’, along with ‘flexibility and adaptability to circumstances’. For 
Alderson, the English socio-political system demonstrated a propensity for individualism. 
Hunting developed this propensity, ‘hence’ the English ‘have buoyancy as a national 
characteristic’.373 The Manual of Training for Jungle & River Warfare, published in 1914, 
wrote that the educated officer  may find the jungle bewildering but that nevertheless troops 
from a civilised country could be trained to fight in this terrain, although it meant unlearning 
the lessons of the parade ground.374 The scout became increasingly important as the eyes and 
ears of the formation in the jungle.375 ‘The best training they can get is to be frequently taken 
out by officers going shooting, and taught to stalk, move noiselessly through the jungle, and 
read tracks.’376 The Far East training material appeared to have fallen back on a well-
established Empire narrative to motivate service personnel. 
 
 
2.2.3. The Psychological Rationalisation of the Hunting Metaphor and Resilience during 
Jungle Warfare   
 
In 1968, a volume of the official history of the medical services in the war was published. It 
contained a section on military psychiatry by Robert Ahrenfeldt. In this he argued that hate 
training was ineffective and harmful as it ‘undermined one of the foundation stones of 
morale - human self-respect’. Encouraging ‘primitive, instinctual and sadistic trends’ was, 
he argued, ‘unnatural’ to ‘emotionally mature citizens of contemporary societies of Western 
civilization.’ This, he writes, was what Montgomery had meant when he had stated that hate 
was foreign to the British national character. While Ahrenfeldt was critical about the use of 
hate he went on to argue the need to dehumanise and depersonalise the enemy ‘so that killing 
then loses some of its emotional impact for the civilised man’. He linked this with offensive 
spirit: ‘It is obviously necessary to “build” the true offensive spirit.’ Removing the inhibition 
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to kill in a controlled manner was, for Ahrenfeldt, one of the most difficult problems of 
human psychology.377  
 
The hunting metaphor certainly achieved the aim of depersonalising and dehumanising the 
Japanese in Burma. Perhaps the most virulent example of this comes from Lieutenant 
General Sir William Slim’s contribution to M.T.P. No. 51 (1945): ‘The jap is an insect. 
Picture yourself fighting man-size red ants and you’ve got it. … We have to produce a tough, 
self-reliant hunter, who is out to get up to his enemy and kill him.’378  The pernicious mixture 
of metaphors was accompanied by equally abhorrent imagery. The front cover of The Jungle 
Book, mentioned earlier, depicted a caricature of a Japanese soldier being gripped by a fist, 
with ‘good training’ branded on the forearm.379 The meaning was clear, training was the 
mechanism by which the Japanese were dehumanised and would be defeated. The hunting 
metaphor, being central to military thought, was a more accepted form of dehumanisation 
and depersonalisation. The recurrent use of contemporaneous psychiatric terminology in the 
M.T.P.s implicated military psychiatrists, at least indirectly, in their production. Notable 
examples are the sections on man management and the need to debunk the fear of operations, 
both of which were present in the earlier psychiatric reports on hate training. Psychiatrists 
had certainly been engaged in debunking ideas about the Japanese infantry being superior 
jungle fighters. As R. F. Tredgold, Adviser in Psychiatry to Southern Army, India Command, 
explained: ‘Two extravagant attitudes were noted in 1943-that the Jap was a superman, and 
that he was undersized. Both were “debunked” - by intelligent instruction in which the 
divisional psychiatrists played their part.’380     
 
Commentators on psychiatric attrition during the First and Second World Wars thought that 
weaponry and warfare had advanced past the soldier’s ability to cope. George Elliot Smith 
and T.H. Pear wrote, in Shell Shock and its Lessons (1917), that the conditions of modern 
warfare had become ‘unnatural’. The natural way to fight, thought Smith and Pear, was in 
brief hand to hand encounters, driven by pugnacity and fear. Instead, enduring sustained 
periods of shelling, and with no way to release pent up emotions, the soldier became unable 
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to suppress his emotions.381 This thinking continued into the Second World War. Ultimately, 
psychiatric attrition was found to be lower in Burma than in other theatres. This led one 
psychiatrist to note ‘that people accommodate themselves better to the more natural strain 
of hunting and being hunted than they do the strain of heavy shelling and bombing.’382 The 
conclusion was interesting as it implied that modern weaponry had advanced past the innate 
resilience of human beings. Hunting and being hunted, however, was considered a natural 
activity, one humans shared with other animals. It was a conclusion which suggested that 
jungle warfare did not require soldiers to evolve new forms of coping as such, but instead, 
return to the natural resilience engendered by the hunter and humans in their earlier state.      
 
While jungle warfare in Burma was found to be less harmful than other theatres overall, 
supposed racial differences were invoked to explain why more British than Indian soldiers 
broke down during the Arakan campaign:            
 
During battle, fewer Indians broke down in the Arakan apparently because of the 
type of warfare, and because there was little or no guilt about killing the enemy. The 
type of warfare which caused the Indian least anxiety was that in the jungle which 
consisted of savage small-scale encounters. It was a war between man and man. This 
type of war was more difficult for British soldiers who disliked the cruelty of 
individual combat. It roused more guilt feelings in them, as they had been brought 
up in a society which regarded human life as sacred. The Indian had no such 
reluctance to kill an enemy for reasons already discussed.383 
 
Indian soldiers were taken to be more resilient because, Williams thought, they lacked the 
socialisation of British soldiers. Kirpal Singh, of the Indian Army Medical Corps, wrote that 
the ‘vast majority’ of Indian troops were uneducated and held fatalistic attitudes, derived 
from superstitious beliefs, which he considered an asset during war. Where psychoneurosis 
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Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History, (London: Virago Press, 2005), pp.204-206.  
382 ‘15 Indian Corps. A.L.F.S.E.A. Psychiatric Report 1943-1945’ p.6, TNA WO 222/1571. See also Crew, 
The Army Medical Services: Campaigns. Vol. V Burma, p.679; Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History, pp.204-206.     
383 A. Hyatt. Williams, ‘A psychiatric study of Indian soldiers in the Arakan’, British Journal of Medical 
Psychology, 23:3‐4, (1950), p.169.     
  96 
 
 
was seen, it was in the more ‘sophisticated’ Indian soldiers.384 All of this tied in to long held 
Imperialist notions concerning the hierarchies of fighting races. A further report on 
psychiatric casualties in Burma explained the lower incidence of psychoneurosis in Indian 
Other Ranks through their being ‘accustomed to a lower standard of living’ which meant 
they found the ‘hardships less onerous’.  More importantly ‘the I.O.R. infantry soldier comes 
from a martial race, and being at war requires no re-orientation of attitude.’ Further, ‘The 
Gurkhas’, who, ‘produced very few cases, either psychotic or psychoneurotic’ were thought 
‘perfectly adapted to fighting and accustomed to the jungle.’385 While British troops were 
largely conscripted, Gurkha troops were considered members of a ‘martial race’.386         
 
The idea of British civility and martial races had, however, been questioned in the interim. 
During the interwar period dissenting voices accused the government-recognised and War 
Office-influenced Cadet and Officer Training Corps of militarising British youth.387 As L.B. 
Pekin, a teacher and pamphleteer wrote in 1937: ‘Its real evil is that it accustoms them to the 
idea of war as a human activity; whether they like the idea or not is really irrelevant. The 
corps is mimicry of soldiering, perhaps, not real soldiering; but constant mimicry may have, 
by its very monotony, an extraordinarily potent influence. The boy unconsciously absorbs 
the notion, over a number of years, in a variety of ways … that war is an honourable 
occupation, that though it may be lamentable, it is unfortunately inevitable.’388 During the 
Second World War, ‘Great stress was laid by the services on the value of pre-service 
training’ in the different cadet and scouting groups.389 Generally then, those who had been 
militarised were preferable. Conversely, Sir David Henderson and Robert Gillespie’s 
influential A Text-Book of Psychiatry, which will be discussed in more detail in a later 
chapter, stated that ‘seeming antipathy to aggressive action, whether against other boys in 
the shape of boxing, or against animals, as shown in aversion to even the mildest of blood 
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sports’ signified a predisposition toward ‘lifelong neurotic anxiety’.390 It was a 
conceptualisation of psychological resilience and vulnerability which reflected the societal 
need to produce willing recruits to fight in the World Wars and the small wars of empire.  
 
 
2.3. National Service and Postwar Training  
 
Prior to being deployed to Malaya and the Emergency National Service personnel received 
varying levels of training in the UK. Many were drilled in the army staple of ‘square 
bashing’. This was a traditional technique that was meant to instil discipline, uniformity and 
the habit of following orders in the ranks. Officers underwent a more advanced programme 
of training. National Service Officers were trained at Eaton Hall, where instruction in areas 
such as tactics, weapons handling and military law were taken to be secondary to developing 
a less tangible skill: ‘Dominating all teaching is a constant stress on leadership’. While the 
school seemed sure of this ethos it appeared less sure of how this would be achieved. Recruits 
were made to take responsibility for themselves and sometimes for each other, but generally 
speaking there was little ‘practical experience’ of leadership. Instead, instigating rivalry 
between the recruits played a key role, with potential officers motivated by the ‘stimulus of 
competition’.391 Some would remain impressed by their time at Eaton Hall even after 
completing later dedicated training in Malaya. Lieutenant Walter Schwarz recorded high 
praise for army training in his diary (1952-53):                         
 
The army has a genius for courses. The imagination and the unbounded common 
sense which goes into the organisation of its training has always seemed to me to be 
the most admirable thing about the army. Perhaps Eaton Hall is the finest example 
of all. The FTC [Fareast Training Centre, Malaya, established September 1948] 
reminded me of Eaton Hall though perhaps it was not quite the same standard. There 
was the same masterly systematisation of experience, but some of the slickness of 
presentation was missing.392   
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  98 
 
 
Others, however, felt unprepared by their time there. As Lieutenant K.P. O’Sullivan wrote 
in his later memoir, ‘Very little we had learned at Eaton Hall was relevant in Malaya, so at 
a jungle base near Johore we learned and, above all practised a new trade: patrolling, 
ambushing, being ambushed, air drops, first aid, casevacs, weapon training and so forth.’393 
One more senior officer, Brigadier J.L. Brind, 1st  Battalion Somerset Regiment in Malaya 
from 1952 to 1954, attempted to bring the lessons of Malaya to Germany but ultimately 
concluded that there was no substitute for training in the jungle. Brind compiled his 
experiences into a manuscript, which he then sent to John Harding for use within a 
regimental history. Harding was then preparing to take up the post of Governor of Cyprus.394 
Brind reported in his manuscript that he began training the Somersets by utilising the 
experience of an officer who had been deployed to the Malayan Emergency. Even so, 
‘Looking back on those days, our efforts at training for jungle fighting in Germany were 
rather pathetic. … Trying to pretend that the forests of Sennelager represented the Malayan 
jungle was stretching the imagination too far.’395      
 
 
2.3.1. Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Walker and the Jungle Warfare School        
   
As a State of Emergency was declared in Malaya it became almost immediately apparent 
that British Forces would have to undergo specialised training in preparation for jungle 
operations. On 19th August 1948, at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the idea of district training 
centres was raised but because of the cost and other commitments was considered 
impractical. Instead, it was decided that a central Jungle Warfare School would be set up at 
Kota Tingi in Johore. It was decided that Walter Walker was the man for the job and ‘must 
be made available for FERRET training and for this Jungle Warfare Training Centre’.396 
Under the more formal name of FARELF Training Centre (FTC), the Jungle Warfare School 
was established in an abandoned ‘lunatic asylum’ in Johore at the southern end of the Malay 
peninsula.397           
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Walker, a veteran of the Burmese jungle-fighting of the Second World War, had earlier (July 
to August) been  tasked with training Ferret Force.398 The Ferret groups were led by a 
collection of volunteers who were veterans of Force 136 and the Chindits.399 Those who led 
the Ferrets were highly motivated individuals who intended to beat the bandits at their own 
game and on their own ground, being tasked to take their patrols into the jungle itself.400 
Walker’s methods were criticised from within this group for being over-planned and 
rehearsed. In response, Walker later wrote that the Ferret commanders were ‘amateur 
soldiers [who] did not take favourably to the professional jungle warfare tactics’.401 In 
training then, Walker was attempting to professionalise, or standardise, their tactics. In order 
to achieve this, he had to reign in their over-confidence, in one instance devising an ambush 
to underline their vulnerability in the jungle and the inferiority of their own tactics.402                                         
 
Ferret Force was a short-lived experiment. By September 1948 Major General Boucher had 
written to one of its leaders, John Davis, explaining his intention to disband the Ferret groups 
and instead to replace them with a Ferret Company incorporated into every battalion. 
Boucher stated his intention to retain ex-members where possible and to employ others as 
advisors. He also mentioned that the new Jungle Warfare School would be in charge of 
training incoming instructors as well as the proposed Ferret companies.403 Davis’ terse 
response was that this new role would not attract new recruits, they would be subsumed by 
the army, be unable to source supplies and unable to perform what is essentially a police 
job.404 To this, Richard Broome, another Ferret group leader, added that the organisational 
and rank structure of the Army would not lend itself to being broken down into small groups 
and that the best application of local knowledge is a self-contained force.405                              
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Broome authored a later report which again focused on the use of intelligence-led operations 
but this time in conjunction with regular forces. He also emphasised that Ferret Force was 
not superior to Regular Forces when it came to fight what he termed ‘bandits’.406 
Reinforcements with no jungle warfare experience were by now arriving in Malaya.407 This 
message was more suitable for incoming service personnel. On receiving a copy Major 
General Boucher informed Broome that he would be circulating copies to commanders 
across FARELF and to the OC of the Jungle Warfare School and perhaps even to the press.408 
On the face of it Boucher was keen to retain their accumulated knowledge but the movement 
of personnel from Ferret Force to the Jungle Warfare School also signalled a shift toward 
regular forces and his intent to retain greater control of the forces under his command. The 
correspondence highlighted the challenge of training personnel for counterinsurgency. An 
accumulated body of experience had suggested that irregular forces, led by typically 
independent, self-motivated individuals was effective. The challenge then would be to train 
regular forces to think and behave like irregulars.     
 
Walker, who had been in charge of training Gurkhas in Burma, thought that training was 
directed toward conventional war in Europe as a result of the Soviet threat, and that the 
jungle warfare lessons of the Second World War had been forgotten and would have to be 
relearned.409 To this end, he revivified a body of thought that had been codified within the 
literature that had emerged from the Far East, including the emphasis noted above on actual 
training in jungle conditions, and the use of the hunting metaphor. Much of the knowledge 
was transferred directly over from that gained during the war through Walker’s re-use of 
material from wartime Military Training Pamphlets.410 ‘The principles advocated in the 
above pamphlets’ wrote Walker, ‘have been embodied in the precis which are issued by this 
Trg Centre to all students attending Jungle Warfare Courses.’411                        
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In the quarterly reports of the school Walker emphasised that most Officers and NCOs had 
little tactical knowledge of jungle warfare and those with some experience had developed 
bad practice. Training, for Walker then, was to be more important than experience.412 While 
at the FTC, officers and NCOs would be schooled in the combat drills needed to conduct 
and lead operations. The training was designed to remove ‘indecision’ and ‘shyness’ in using 
weapons. Interactive ranges were used which also lent a realism to the training and 
underlined it as a behavioural exercise.413 The time dedicated to these drills was limited, 
however, and so was the number of service personnel who completed them. These 
limitations were accounted for through use of a cadre system, whereby regiments would 
carry out their own training, using the experience gained by those who had passed through 
the FTC. When course attendees returned to their regiments, however, other responsibilities 
and the attitude of the CO represented further constraints to them passing on what they had 
learnt.414 Later, a ‘British Junior Leaders’ Jungle Warfare Course’ was added, as well as a 
Company Commanders course, the aim of which was to allow a forum for discussion and 
assessment of jungle warfare tactics being deployed.415 As Brigadier J.L. Brind, mentioned 
above, wrote:   
 
The centre of all tactical doctrine in Malaya is the FARELF Training Centre. Here 
all lessons are learnt, experiences gained are sifted, co-ordinated and promulgated. 
Here, the basic principles of anti-terrorist operations are worked out, discussed and 
taught, and here all battalions receive their first lessons in the art of “jungle 
bashing”.416 
 
By March 1949, Walker decided that troops who arrived for training were showing a lack of 
‘offensive spirit’.417 What he felt was needed was a narrative which instilled behaviour that 
was conducive to success and reinforced the lessons of the Jungle Warfare School in its 
 
412 Appendix ‘B’ To FTC Quarterly Historical Report Quarter Ending March 1949, p.1, TNA WO 268/116.   
413 Appendix ‘B’ To FTC Quarterly Historical Report Quarter Ending March 1949, ‘Part II - Standard Of 
Weapon Trg.’ TNA WO 268/116.   
414 Marston, ‘Lost and Found in the Jungle’, pp.99-100.      
415 ‘Quarterly Historical Report - FARELF Training Centre - Quarter Ending 31 Mar 50.’, TNA WO 268/117.  
416 Brigadier J.L. Brind, ‘The Somersets in Malaya’, p.9, IWM 67/142/1.       
417 ‘Appendix ‘B’ To FTC Quarterly Historical Report Quarter Ending March 1949, ‘Part II - Standard Of 
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students. Instead, Walker wanted his recruits ‘to move as if hunting’.418 The general 
impression Walker got was that ‘the average NCO has little imagination or powers of 
concentration.’419 He was frustrated by the language of the British Other Ranks and now 
sought to instil in them a terminology which reflected his attempt to professionalise training 
and their behaviour, writing that ‘An unfortunate term called “jungle bashing” has crept in. 
The qualities required of the real jungle fighter are not those of the elephant but rather of the 
poacher, gangster and cat-burglar.’420 Walker was returning to the metaphors and tropes used 
in training troops for the Burma campaign, and for imperial conflicts before that.  
 
Exercises at the Jungle Warfare school took on a realism, particularly in the early years, as 
recruits were operating in an area where there was Communist activity.  On one exercise ‘a 
small “hunting” patrol’ of ours’, Walker reported, ‘moving extremely carefully, met, 
surprised and ambushed three unsuspecting bandits.’421 ‘Hunting’ had become the preferred 
metaphor for jungle patrols at the FTC. The reports generated at the FTC were used to 
confirm the efficacy of the tactics which the metaphor embodied. It was a narrative that 
Walker felt accurately described the practice of counterinsurgency as he redeployed it in his 
later writing, both in forewords to regimental histories, and in his autobiography in reference 
to British involvement in the Borneo confrontation, where he was Director of Operations as 
the go-to jungle fighting expert.422         
 
The wider objective of the course then was the transmission of knowledge. The training 
would filter through the ranks as students returned to their units.423 Commanding Officer 
Conferences were set up and visits to the school arranged to further ‘spread the gospel’.424 
Walker was conscious of both the importance of language and his use of it. In Burma he had 
published ‘golden rules’ in his orders and posted them on notice boards, so that these rules 
‘stuck in the minds of the men’. In a later interview he commented that ‘The words I used, 
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the phrases I used, were designed to try and instil in my men a fighting spirit that they must 
kill every single Jap that they encountered. … It was a code of conduct.’425 In this way, the 
blood sport narrative acted as a mnemonic device. It reminded soldiers of how to behave in 
the jungle, and unlike the behavioural training, it could be passed by word of mouth.                
 
The cadre system appeared to be in operation and effective throughout the Emergency. 
Thomas Halley-Frame, a senior NCO and veteran of both the Second World War and British 
Army training gave an account of this process in his memoir. ‘I was immediately sent to the 
mainland - Malaya itself, to do several weeks on a jungle training course. Meanwhile the 
Battalion had moved up to a camp [near] Sungei Besi just outside Kuala Lumpur’. After 
training he re-joined his battalion. ‘We remained here for a while having a restful time with 
intense training’, after which ‘the Battalion moved south to Selangor to take up jungle 
patrolling a notorious place Kajang.’426 While Halley-Frame does not explicitly state that he 
went on to conduct the battalion training, the logistics within his narrative, as well as his 
rank, suggests that he was sent to the Jungle Warfare School to then impart the knowledge 
he gained there. Further personal testimony also suggests that the mechanics of the cadre 
system were being implemented. Michael Gray, later Sir, who was deployed to the Malayan 
Emergency as a young officer between 1953 and 1955, requested to be sent to the jungle 
warfare school at Kota Tingi, Johore. There he was impressed by the practical nature of the 
course, which had little theory, and which taught soldiers how to live and fight in the 
jungle.427 He later went on to put his experiences to use in training National Service Officers 
for the jungle.428  
 
The Jungle Warfare course came to be reinforced with periods of retraining. H. Atkins was 
deployed to Malaya in 1954 as a senior NCO with the Queen’s Royal Regiment. The 
regiment ‘moved up country from Singapore within a week of disembarking, to the Jungle 
Training Centre at KOTA-TINGI, … At the end of the training period, Companies were 
deployed throughout the State of Jahore [sic] and commenced operations against the C T s.’ 
Later there was a ‘re-training period of about six weeks’.429 As National Service personnel 
came to the end of their time in Malaya the need also arose to train their replacements. 
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Brigadier Brind reported that manpower was low and that the strain on NCOs and officers 
was exacerbated by the need to train National Service replacements.430 The field diary of 
Second Lieutenant J.P. Macdonald revealed glimpses into the process of training a new draft: 
‘gradually the inst[ructor]s managed to get them functioning on I[nitial] A[ction] drills.’431 
Then a later entry showed how the draft had progressed onto advanced training which 
employed realism: ‘We took the draft out behind the police camp and practised attacking a 
bandit camp. The noises were so realistic they thought we had had a bump.’432               
             
The behavioural nature of training was also evident in the memoirs. L.S. Ives completed a 
version of the jungle warfare course, known among service personnel as a cadre, near 
Bentong in Pahang:                 
 
Needless to say this special cadre was to teach us the skills we would need to be 
effective jungle warriors - and I suppose to stay alive. Great emphasis on shooting 
skills saw us blasting away on the ranges zeroing our new rifles and firing Brens 
from the hip and at various angles for, as the man says, here people may live in 
trees!433   
 
John Scurr, who completed a cadre-run course in northern Malaya, in March 1950, wrote 
that figure-shaped targets were used on jungle ranges. He also wrote that accuracy was 
balanced against speed if the intention was to survive.           
 
Firing accurately from the hip was extremely difficult. … However, we practised this 
for the simple reason that in a sudden face-to-face encounter in the jungle, there 
would be no time to raise your weapon to your shoulder to take aim. … At the same 
time we were advised by our instructors that if we were unable to shoot reasonably 
well from the hip, our chances of survival might be greater if we risked the extra time 
involved to shoot from the shoulder.   
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The jungle training also began to break down naive preconceptions about the conduct of 
combat. Scurr came to the realisation that cinematic representations of combat were often 
‘ludicrous’. Further, he wrote that one of his senior N.C.O.s, ‘kept drumming into us: “The 
tendency is always to shoot high - so aim for his goolies!” ’434 In short, soldiers were primed 
into the use of force. Later, reportage that emerged from the jungle warfare school supported 
this. Harry Miller, a journalist who visited the school, reiterated the teaching of one of the 
instructors in his book. ‘Shoot into the undergrowth and shoot at every blade of grass you 
see moving.’435 While the training was strenuous in parts the pace was also limited by the 
environment. Indeed, the further function of the training period was to allow acclimatisation. 
Frederick Hudson left for Malaya in 1957 to do his National Service with the Loyal 
Regiment. In his self-published memoir Hudson noted: ‘Training was certainly not intense; 
I think that the steady pace of everything at that time was also to give us time to become 
accustomed to the unbelievable heat.’436                                 
 
Walter Schwarz arrived in Malaya in October 1952 to take up his post as a subaltern with 
the Manchester Regiment. Schwarz first went out on patrol under the guidance of a sergeant 
and only later completed the three-week course at the jungle warfare school in Johore Bahru. 
By this time he was a seasoned soldier which enabled insight into what he saw as the course’s 
shortcomings. He suggested the training was lagging behind the counterinsurgency. On 2nd 
December 1952 he noted:      
 
It’s really no longer a matter of defending oneself; the bandits are already too much 
on the run: more stress should have been laid on the tremendous problem of locating 
them. Elementary tracking is not enough, for the bandits are much cleverer at it than 
we are. They should have taught more about rational methods of location i.e. 
calculation of likely places. A second criticism is that they taught us to large and 
unwieldy patrols. Bandits are best caught with patrols of six or less.437                               
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As mentioned above, the volunteer Ferret Force had been disbanded in favour of training 
regular soldiers in jungle warfare. By 1950, however, as some insurgents went deeper into 
the jungle, it was again accepted that a long-range penetration group was needed to follow 
the insurgents. In 1950, two years after the Ferrets had been disbanded, Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff General Sir William Slim recommended that a fellow Burma veteran, ex-
Chindit officer Michael Calvert, travel to Malaya to conduct research into the insurgency.438 
In his subsequent report, Calvert concluded that a special counterinsurgency force should be 
raised to operate deep in the jungle and to stay there for extended periods of time.439  
 
Calvert was given the job of raising the force he had recommended. By the end of August 
1950, he had set up A Squadron The Malayan Scouts (Special Air Service).440 Calvert was 
instrumental in the recruitment and training of the Malayan Scouts. He had trained the 
Chindits along with Orde Wingate in Burma.441 Calvert carried Wingate’s thinking into 
Malaya, operating under his thesis that anyone could fight with ‘brilliant volunteers’ but the 
real challenge was to fight with the ‘ordinary soldier’. This was how he saw the challenge, 
complaining that commanding officers had sent him far from their best men. Calvert meant 
his training to ‘break down the inhibitions’ which had grown up around the jungle, and, to 
‘retrain these people mainly to give them initiative and to take away all the discipline which 
they'd had beforehand.’442 To achieve this result training took a similar approach to the 
behavioural exercises of the FTC, although with at least one notable exception. Soldiers were 
set in competition, being given pellet guns and the task of stalking one another.443 Calvert 
was experimenting, though perhaps unknowingly, with a more extreme form of 
conditioning. He was using pain to highlight tactical errors which by extension reinforced 
the behaviours he was trying to instil in his troops. Whether a result of recruitment, training 
or Calvert’s personality the Malayan Scouts acquired a reputation for poor discipline in the 
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early days, both in the field and on leave.444  This would eventually result in the ‘Scouts’ 
being succeeded by the Special Air Service (SAS) in 1952.    
 
 
2.3.2. Counterinsurgency Manuals and Instructions 
 
In 1949, the updated training pamphlet Imperial Policing and Duties In Aid Of The Civil 
Power was released. Of particular interest was its apparent concern with curbing the use of 
punitive force. The pamphlet recognised that Britain's postwar counterinsurgencies were 
beginning to have an impact on its service personnel, which, ‘try their patience and naturally 
tend to embitter their outlook.’ In response the pamphlet prescribed ‘humanely administered 
discipline’ to curb thoughts of revenge.445 This in turn raises questions about the prosecution 
of the Malayan Emergency and the much-debated idea that British counterinsurgency has 
traditionally taken place within a culture of ‘minimum force’. 
 
The Imperial Policing booklet circulated in 1949 made clear that ‘no more force shall be 
applied than the situation demands’, but of course it was aimed primarily at troops who were 
confronted with unarmed protesters or civilians, or at least people lightly armed with sticks, 
stones and easily obtained items.446 The FTC was aimed mainly at getting troops ready to 
find, and capture or kill, armed and uniformed insurgents. Not surprisingly, the idea of using 
minimum force was noticeably absent from Walker’s early reports from the Jungle Warfare 
School. The problem, however, was that troops in the Emergency would have to operate in 
areas where it was not clear if they would confront civilians or armed insurgents, or unarmed 
civilians who might vary from coerced to fanatical supporters. The ‘Briggs Plan’, which 
entailed close contact with the civilian population, demanded instruction in the proper use 
of force in such complicated circumstances. There is some evidence to suggest that once the 
plan had been formulated in 1950, with its emphasis on resettling squatters in order to control 
and protect them, and to separate them from insurgents, the use of ‘minimum force’ may 
have been the subject of instruction at the FTC. A precis of the ‘Briggs Plan’ was drawn up 
for use at the Far Eastern Land Forces Training Centre.447  
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There was, however, a need for a codified method of instruction. The Minutes of a 
Commander’s Conference HQ Johore District, 24th September 1948, note that ‘Each 
Commanding Officer was given a copy of Lt Col Suthers paper on jungle training’ and told 
to take note of the section on training.448 Suther’s paper stressed the importance of 
inculcating fire discipline during battle training. Based on his experience fighting the 
Japanese in Burma, however, his concern was with teaching effective fire and conserving 
ammunition, rather than ideas about minimum force.449 Bill Greer served at the headquarters 
of 2nd Guards Brigade early in the Emergency, in October 1948, and then later as part of a 
joint Army and Special Branch intelligence unit.450 In a letter to Asian Affairs (2012) he 
wrote:                        
 
On the British side the Scots Guards wrote, by hard practise, their own manual of 
jungle warfare, as no doubt did the other early battalions in the fray. That this became 
gospel for future successor jungle operations says quite a lot for men having no 
history of experience of such combat, no proper guidance either in the very early 
days.451 
 
The counterinsurgency in Malaya demanded its own training pamphlet then. Walter Walker 
duly mapped the teachings of the FTC and lessons of the early years of the Malayan 
Emergency into a manual for counterinsurgency, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations 
in Malaya (ATOM), first published in 1952. The manual re-emphasised the primacy of 
training over experience and stated that courses should not stop, even in the face of increased 
operations.452 This point may have been in reference to the suspension of the FTC in late 
1949. In the final quarter of 1949, no courses were held there due to a building intensity in 
counterinsurgency operations.453 It was primarily a technical manual laying out in a 
schematic fashion the mechanics of conducting patrols and ambushes in the jungle. Coming 
in 1952, ATOM included a section on the Brigg’s Plan and also emphasised that the Army 
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were being used in support of the police.454 ‘The primary role of the Army is to seek out and 
destroy CT in the jungle and on its fringes.’ noted ATOM. ‘The secondary role of the Army 
is that of supporting the Federal Police in the populated areas by helping to enforce food 
denial measures, curfews, etc.’455 These measures were more fully set out within a section 
on the Emergency Regulations, supplemented by instructions on how to conduct searches.456 
This suggested that a more disciplined approach to counterinsurgency was being pursued by 
the time of publication.  
 
In one section ATOM also reflected the language found in the Second World War training 
pamphlets. This is again illustrated by the Lieutenant-General Sir William Slim quote used 
above: ‘We have to produce a tough, self-reliant hunter, who is out to get up to his enemy 
and kill him.’457 This phrasing would, in part, be reproduced in ATOM. The manual advanced 
the concept of the ideal junior leader ‘a mentally tough, self reliant hunter’.458 This 
adaptation of the metaphor can be read as a sign of the intended readership of the manual. 
The junior officer became a pivotal position within the decentralised nature of 
counterinsurgency. In ATOM then, the hunting narrative was again codified into 
counterinsurgency doctrine. There was a clear tension in using the language of wartime 
training pamphlets to prepare soldiers to act in aid of the civil power. The hunting metaphor 
was obviously thought to have utility in directing soldiers while conducting the Army’s 
primary role; the seek and destroy operations in and around the jungle. The secondary role, 
however, brought soldiers into contact with the civilian population, where it is difficult to 
reconcile this narrative with the idea that the use of force in Malaya was bound by the 
principle of minimum force. Particularly as many iterations of the ideal or prototypical 
counterinsurgent were unbound by law.                                      
 
The creation of ATOM both codified and supplemented the teachings of the Jungle Warfare 
School for units arriving in Malaya. As Ian Gibb, who served as a platoon commander in the 
opening years of the Emergency, put it, ‘Later much of what we learnt the hard way became 
included in newly written-up training and jungle pamphlets and new batches of mainly 
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National Service arrivals would spend a period of time acclimatizing, under instruction, or 
at the Jungle Warfare School’.459 The obvious advantage that the manual had over the Jungle 
Warfare School was that it could be put into use before troops arrived in Malaya.  
 
One senior officer who later attempted to bring the lessons of Malaya to his troops stationed 
in Germany also saw the utility of acquiring the manual as early as possible. Brigadier J.L. 
Brind, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion Somerset Regiment in Malaya from 1952 to 
1954, had wanted copies before departure: ‘At that time the excellent pamphlet of Anti-
Terrorist Operations in Malaya had not reached us. Copies had been promised, but we only 
received them just before we sailed.’460 Copies of the manual were also requested by the 
King’s African Rifles, who were preparing to leave Kenya for Malaya. 14 copies, along with 
some maps, were sent in August 1953.461 
 
The earlier military training pamphlet, Preparation for Warfare in the Far East (1945) 
contained a short paragraph warning that ‘All units that go to the Far East may be called 
upon to perform duties in aid of the civil power.’ In response, the manual stated that officers 
should discuss the subject while on the voyage. These discussions were to be based on the 
instructions within Notes on Training for Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (1945), to be 
issued on the troopship.462 Major Johnston’s 1946 notes on ‘Imperial Policing and Internal 
Security’ gave some insight into what these instructions may have been, which included 
instructions on using force to disperse crowds.463  By the time of the Emergency, it was 
ATOM that was being discussed on troopships. Ron Miles, a Coldstream Guardsmen 
deployed to Malaya before the creation of ATOM commented on the lectures he received on 
board his troopship in his unpublished memoir. ‘We had lectures on trucks and vehicles and 
all sorts of history and geography lectures, a massive amount of things’, noted Miles. More 
specific information about the Emergency and the insurgents appeared uncertain and even 
to generate wild speculation. ‘Rumours started flowing about on board, rumours that the 
enemy, Communist Guerillas [sic] that we had only just vaguely heard about during a couple 
of lectures we had had, were going to torpedo us’.464                
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Once aboard the troop ship the manual was put to use in preparing soldiers for Malaya and 
the counterinsurgency there.  The diary entry of a National Service subaltern with the 
Manchester Regiment, Lieutenant Walter Schwarz, made on 30th September 1952, is an 
illustration of this. On board the troopship to Malaya, Schwarz planned lectures, one ‘on the 
whys and wherefores of Malaya, and another on “the conduct of anti-terrorist operations in 
Malaya” - the knowledge for the second lecture to be gleaned from an excellent army 
pamphlet on the subject, borrowed from a colonel.’465  Schwarz’s diary entry showed that 
ATOM was being used to prime service personnel on what to expect but also suggested that 
there were a limited number of copies made available to junior officers, arguably those who 
would need it most.      
 
Among those officers who did report having a copy, the manual appeared a useful guide. 
One officer, in an interview for the Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, described it as a 
‘bible’, saying that ‘we went through it page by page and chapter by chapter’.466 An 
unpublished memoir listed ATOM in its bibliography and quoted directly from the manual 
within its text. It was authored by Captain Peter Head, an officer with the Royal Artillery in 
Malaya 1953-1955. Head felt that ATOM clarified the use of artillery, and by extension his 
role as an artillery officer, within the counterinsurgency. He wrote: ‘HQ Malaya Command 
had very clear views of the use of artillery in the conduct of anti-terrorist operations’.467  
 
While there is evidence of ATOM’s use amongst officers there is little evidence direct of 
knowledge of the manual among the other ranks. The opening section of the manual survives 
in the papers of R.G. Thwaite, held at the IWM. Thwaite was a national serviceman and an 
other rank but his experience was atypical. As a clerk with HQ company in Kuala Lumpur 
he was exposed to material, and personalities, that other ranks generally were not. His letters 
home reveal contact with some of the British administration’s key personalities, for example 
a visit to the house of General Templer.468 The ATOM section in his personal papers may be 
explained by this access. Instead, ATOM was a manual for those in a leadership position with 
the officer becoming its translator to other ranks. This was in contrast to the Jungle Book, 
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one of the Far East Training Pamphlets. As mentioned above, the Jungle Book was mass 
produced for distribution to both commissioned and non-commissioned officers and made 
accessible through its use of language and pictures.                
 
While neither accessible nor widely available the creation of ATOM was significant at a 
strategic level. Its doctrine could be spread, and lessons applied across theatres without the 
cost of being relearned on the ground.469 This proved timely as in October 1952 a State of 
Emergency was declared in Kenya. In response General Headquarters East Africa pressed 
ATOM into use. Training Instruction No 9 ‘Patrols and Ambushes’ expanded on the earlier 
instruction Training Instruction No. 7 ‘Operations Against The Mau Mau’ and emphasised 
the need for a ‘commando-type unit in each brigade’ which would improve the chance of 
‘beating gangs at their own game.’ A special force was also proposed because of doubt that 
regular forces could achieve the required patrol standards. The competition that had been 
encouraged within the Second World War literature was to a certain discouraged in this 
Kenya literature, which stated that the creation of a special force was not intended to cause 
rivalry.470 Inter-unit competition did arise, however, and became manifest in scorecards 
being kept of dead insurgents.471 A later comparative report noted that white hunters were 
employed in Kenya and an expert sent to Malaya to advise on training methods employed at 
the FTC.472 
 
Then in 1954 A Handbook On Anti-Mau Mau Operations was produced. This was a much 
more concise version of ATOM, adapted for use in Kenya.473 The blood sport narrative was 
again employed, ‘The qualities which must be developed in troops engaged against the Mau 
Mau are therefore those required to track down and shoot shy game.’474 The fieldcraft section 
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noted that practical instruction would be difficult before arriving in the theatre but lectures 
should be given ‘to acclimatize their minds to the standard of mental alertness’ needed in 
the forest. ‘At the very outset men should be made to understand that they are going to be 
playing a game of blind man's bluff with a very skilled adversary.’475 The narrative appeared 
to reach its zenith in Kenya where a public reaction against anti Mau Mau operations being 
presented as a big-game hunting expedition led the Colonial Office to curb the use of hunting 
and sporting metaphors within press releases.476           
 
   
2.3.3. The use of Instructional Film during the Malayan Emergency     
 
In September 1948, at a Commander-in-Chief’s Conference, Major General Boucher raised 
the possibility of employing the Malayan Film Unit (MFU) to make instructional films to 
teach the troops tactical lessons and fieldcraft.477 Film was developed as a valuable aid to 
propaganda and training during the Second World War. The nuance of cinematography took 
on greater importance due its assumed effect on morale. A good example of this was the use 
of perspective. Under advice from the Director of Army Psychiatry, the Director of Army 
Kinematography chose not to show guns firing towards the camera, which cast the audience 
as being under attack.478  
 
Returning to the Malayan Emergency, Boucher’s idea was belatedly realised in 1956 when 
an instructional film titled Jungle Warfare was produced by the MFU. This opened with 
aerial footage of the jungle expanse accompanied by dramatic commentary using adjectives 
like ‘dark’ and ‘impenetrable’. The Director of Psychiatry may not have agreed with this 
choice of perspective which seemed to reinforce rather than dispel fears. This, instead, 
appeared to be a film concerned with realism and the ‘primitive’ existence in the jungle. One 
scene depicted soldiers burning leeches off each other with cigarettes, another, showed a 
soldier sinking sharpened bamboo into the ground to create a defence. The final scene 
panned over the stoical faces of a jungle patrol who were described by the narrator as ‘silent 
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and alert’. It was a film that echoed the teachings of Walter Walker and the Jungle Warfare 
School.479  
 
Jungle Warfare was introduced as an ‘instructional’ film in the opening credits which 
implicated it as training aid in preparing soldiers for the jungle. The MFU, however, had 
more generally been employed in producing short films for the government as well as 
footage for newsreels.480 Whether a true instructional film or a more general short, coming 
in 1956, it was too late to have had much of an impact. There is not, for example, any 
reference to the film in the later letters, diaries and memoirs. It is, however, an indication 
that film was understood to have some utility in shaping soldiers’ perceptions of the jungle 
and if shown would have shaped perceptions of jungle operations. The importance of film 
was picked up in a comparative report published in 1957.                
 
A report from the Operational Research Unit in the Far East compared the Emergencies in 
Malaya and Kenya. It listed several conclusions in relation to training. Soldiers should be 
familiarised with both the terrain and insurgents of their deployment. In order to achieve this 
the report reiterated the importance of literature and preparatory film. It also emphasised the 
importance of an in-theatre battle school to train both advance parties as well as the main 
body of a unit as it arrives, and particularly junior leaders. First on the list, however, was 
that training should be used to spread awareness of the ‘legal implications’ of, presumably 
the use of force in, counterinsurgency.481 There was a preoccupation with conditioning 
soldiers to use force in the opening years of training. What the comparative report arguably 
reflected was an awareness that training should also be used to delimit the use of that force.      
 
 
2.4. Conclusion  
 
The World Wars had left the British Army the impression that high morale was fundamental 
to the prevention of psychiatric and disciplinary breakdowns which, wrote Robert 
Ahrenfeldt, could be inculcated through training.482 Behavioural training was used to 
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inoculate soldiers against the stress of battle.483 This working hypothesis was that graduated 
exposure to stress would enhance ‘military judgement’ and reduce fear.484 A War Office 
report was later codified and operationalised as a technical memorandum from the 
Directorate of Army Psychiatry concluded that training should be aimed at installing 
confidence and a belief in victory.485 Good morale then was typified by offensive spirit, 
terminology which drew on a history of use within the British Army. 486  
 
The term ‘offensive spirit’ was introduced into the Far East Training material.487 For the 
authors of these pamphlets, the qualities needed in jungle warfare were embodied by the 
hunter.488 The hunting metaphor was used to urge soldiers to overcome behaviours and 
attitudes deleterious to jungle operations.489 The aim of the MTPs was the widespread 
dissemination of their lessons.490 Within this context the hunting metaphor, which invoked 
figures from popular culture, can be seen as an accessible way of conveying the preferred 
mode of morale to soldiers. It was also a metaphor which had a long history of use within 
British Army manuals on jungle warfare and counterinsurgency.491  Hunting was an integral 
part of Britain’s colonial culture. In this way the hunting metaphor drew on an established 
history of cultural use to convey the preferred mode of morale. Further, the hunting metaphor 
offered a solution to what Robert Ahrenfeldt thought one of the most difficult problems in 
human psychology. Namely, removing the inhibition to kill in a controlled manner.492                    
 
The hunter, this chapter has suggested then, became the embodiment of offensive spirit in 
the training pamphlets that emerged from the Far East during the final years of the Second 
World War. It was these training pamphlets which formed the basis for much of the practical 
instruction which took place at the Far East Land Forces Training Centre during the Malayan 
Emergency. The MTPs were revivified there by Walter Walker, a veteran of Burma. The 
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cadre system then spread the methods and message of the Jungle Warfare School to units 
serving in Malaya. The emphasis on behavioural training and offensive spirit at the Jungle 
Warfare School conditioned recruits into the use of force. In the opening years of the 
Emergency, the Far East Land Forces Training Centre focused almost exclusively on 
preparing service personnel to conduct a jungle war.    
 
Once the Briggs Plan came into force in 1950 there is also some evidence to suggest that 
population control measures were being discussed at the FTC.493 Certainly by 1952 there 
appeared to be more emphasis on guidance for population control measures. By that time 
Walter Walker had codified the teaching of the Jungle Warfare School into a doctrine within 
The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM), population control measures 
had come to play significant part. The manual, however, still emphasised jungle warfare, 
and still codified the hunting metaphor into counterinsurgency doctrine. This arguably 
privileged the jungle warfare component of the Malayan Emergency over the population 
control measures. The behavioural training, and its narrative, primed soldiers into the use of 
force. Conversely, there appeared to be little instruction in the delimitation of that force. The 
likening of counterinsurgency operations to a hunt was carried to Kenya where a further 
Emergency had been instituted. There, just as hate training had during the Second World 
War, the hunting metaphor caused public disquiet. While the hunting metaphor appeared to 
reach its zenith in Kenya during the postwar period of decolonisation it continued to be used 
in Malaya. The next chapter, morale in action, will look at how the behavioural training and 
its narrative framed troops’ experiences of jungle operations.                               












493 ‘The Briggs Plan’, Major-General J.K. Shepheard Papers, p.1.        





Morale in Action 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Chapter 2 has shown how training was used to install a highly militarised conception of 
morale in service personnel. This took the form of training that produced a behavioural 
template designed to determine the actions of soldiers when they met suspected insurgents. 
Overlying the behavioural training, a hunting metaphor was used to shape soldiers’ 
perceptions of jungle warfare and further guide their behaviour. In effect, the hunter was put 
forward as the prototypical counterinsurgent and a manifestation of the preferred mode of 
morale. This chapter will look at what happened when that training met the reality of 
deployment and counterinsurgency operations. It will look at how effective the training was 
and what other factors came to play in maintaining morale. In so doing, it will introduce 
regimental culture as a further key theme in the production and maintenance of morale. It 
will show that regimental culture sustained morale during a period of high turnover of 
service personnel and drove inter- regimental competition.    
 
A number of recent histories have recognised the importance of the concept of morale within 
the British Army during the First and Second World Wars.494 These histories have taken 
combat and the respective environments, either the trenches of the First War or the deserts 
and jungles of the Second, to be the stresses against which coping strategies evolved and the 
morale of soldiers was tested. As this chapter will show, the jungle tested the morale of 
soldiers and became fundamental in their conceptions of stress and resilience. Within this 
context, this chapter will describe how morale was not only a militarised concept but also a 
medicalised one. In contrast to the World Wars, however, the counterinsurgency which 
British service personnel were engaged in during the Malayan Emergency was typified by 
an elusive opposition. This chapter will show that the highly militarised conception of 
morale that evolved during the Second World War became dependent on an easily identified 
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and Morale in the North African Campaign (2011) and Fighting the People's War (2019).     
  118 
 
 
enemy and object of opposition. Counterintuitively then, counterinsurgency operations and 
contact with the insurgents during the Emergency came to be seen as being good for morale. 
Instead, it was their enemy’s elusiveness that was now a problem. In short, the military-
medical conception of morale came to reflect the pressures of participation in 
counterinsurgency.  
 
The militarised conception of morale, this chapter will suggest, allows fresh insight into the 
use of force during the Malayan Emergency. The concept of ‘minimum force’, that the 
minimum necessary force should be used, has been a central theme within the 
counterinsurgency literature and there has been significant debate over whether the principle 
held in the case in Malaya. Anthony Short, for example, has suggested that excessive force 
was the exception, the result of confusion on the ground.495 Whereas revisionist histories, 
such as Huw Bennett’s paper on the opening year of the Malayan Emergency, have 
countered that the British tacitly allowed the principle of minimum force to be contravened 
for operational gains.496     
 
Raffi Gregorian, meanwhile, has argued that the techniques taught at Malaya’s Jungle 
Warfare School were essentially those used against the Japanese in Burma during the Second 
World War.497 As will be described below, while appropriate for jungle work in Malaya, the 
training became problematic when employed in the contested spaces in which civilians 
whose loyalties were doubted, or highly contested, were present. This chapter will suggest 
that the combination of tools to develop morale was effective for most anti-insurgent 
operations, but in some cases it contributed to instances where minimum force was 
contravened in these contested and populated spaces. This chapter will finally go on to 
suggest that the militarised morale engendered in training and promoted in action through 
regimental culture went some way to answering what has been referred to as ‘the soldiers 





495 Anthony Short, ‘The Malayan Emergency and the Batang Kali Incident’, Asian Affairs, 41:3, (2010), 
pp.340-341. 
496 Bennett, ‘“A Very Salutary Effect”’, p.418.    
497 Raffi Gregorian, ‘“Jungle Bashing” in Malaya: Towards a formal Tactical Doctrine’, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 5:3, (1994), pp.346-348.  
  119 
 
 
3.2. Service Personnel, Regimental Culture and Morale   
 
The seriousness with which the issue of morale was taken was a continuation of the 
importance placed on ‘man-management’ during the Second World War. An abiding lesson 
of the Second World War was that morale was of critical importance. In his Memoirs (1958), 
Field Marshal Montgomery stated that ‘The Morale of the soldier is the greatest single factor 
in war’.498 After the war Montgomery raised the issue with the Army Council, extolling the 
need for scientific research into ‘how to create high morale.’499 As Bidwell later wrote, it 
had become a ‘military truism that the symptoms of disintegration - excessive desertion, 
break-down of discipline, large sick-parades, a high incidence of psychiatric cases including 
self-inflicted wounds and mutiny - are invariably caused by bad leadership and bad personnel 
management, or “man-management”.’500 
    
Following the Second World War, the morale of soldiers in the Far East was monitored, with 
the headquarters of Allied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA) required to produce tri-
monthly reports.501 As ALFSEA was re-organising itself to re-establish colonial rule the 
primary concern of the servicemen under its control was demobilisation and return home. 
One report, compiled and circulated by Headquarters Allied Land Forces, South East Asia, 
in March 1946, noted that: ‘Disappointment over the slow rate of release is gradually 
lessening, although it is still the most potent factor affecting morale.’502 The delayed release 
date became a factor in what became an infamous incident involving the 13th Parachute 
Battalion in Malaya. Service personnel rallied against their slow demobilisation and 
unhygienic living conditions, and in protest, refused to soldier. Although convicted these 
convictions were ultimately overturned due to irregularities with the trial. This prompted an 
exchange among senior officers over what to do with these personnel. There was both a 
reluctance to accept the servicemen concerned back into operational units over concern than 
indiscipline may spread, but also a determination to see further punishment in the form of 
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continued service overseas.503 While some form of punishment was considered necessary, 
length of service had become recognised as a factor in disciplinary breakdowns.     
 
As Britain moved into the postwar period there appeared to be little motivation among those 
deployed during the war to continue with Britain's colonial endeavours. The March 1946 
report, mentioned above, also noted that the 22nd East African Brigade were in Burma 
‘mainly engaged in internal security duties.’ Among these troops ‘Morale was generally 
reported to be satisfactory, but fears were expressed that it might drop as repatriation was 
delayed.’504 The psychological effect of knowing one’s release date was illustrated in a letter 
to the Lancet from a doctor stationed in the Far East. ‘There is nothing more depressing than 
to watch one’s group going home and be left behind.’ wrote the Doctor. ‘On the other hand, 
there is little more stimulating than to look forward to release at a given time.’505 Importantly, 
the conscription of the next generation of soldiers under the National Service Act entailed 
some idea of when they would be demobilised. Many of the British soldiers who would serve 
in the Malayan Emergency would do so while on their National Service. That they would 
have an idea of when their tour would end was in contrast to their Regular counterparts.   
 
Robert Cassidy has argued that ‘the success of the British Army in small wars has been 
Britain’s almost exclusive reliance on professional soldiers instead of draftees.’506 By the 
time of the Malayan Emergency National Service had dramatically changed the composition 
of the British Army. Following the Second World War, it had become evident that the British 
government would have to continue to conscript citizens into service in order to fulfil the 
country's postwar commitments. In the UK, conscription was debated in the House of Lords 
in 1947. Lord Moran raised the issue that Venereal Disease was a concern among British 
troops stationed abroad, citing 141 cases per 1,000 troops in Burma and Malaya. He used 
these figures to argue against the idea that conscription, in the form of the proposed National 
Service Act, was a ‘people's university, teaching citizenship to men’. Instead, he argued that 
further conscription would be used to support armies of occupation abroad which were 
undemocratic and would ultimately prove deleterious to health and morale.507 While Lord 
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Moran raised concerns over the moral legitimacy of Britain's postwar agenda, a military 
psychiatrist, Harry Pozner, suggested that British youth were resistant to conscription on the 
grounds of duty. ‘Basically, it seems to me,’ writes Pozner ‘the teen-age conscript exhibits 
an ambivalent attitude towards his Service. Conscription is only a comparatively recent 
innovation in British history and is still regarded in peacetime as an intrusion on the private 
life of the average citizen, who stolidly maintains that he knows his duty when he sees it.’508  
 
At the first meeting of ‘The War Office Military Personnel Research Committee Sub-
committee on Information and Ascertainment of Problems’, 20th September 1948, Captain 
Butterfield (RAMC) outlined the work of The Army Operational Research Group. He stated 
that it ‘was mainly concerned at the moment with training of the National Service Soldier, 
his morale, and his reactions to his job and Army life in general.’509 On 9th May 1949, 
Butterfield raised concerns about the ‘increasing complexity of the weapons and equipment 
… which required soldiers of higher intelligence and morale than was possible to find under 
present day conditions.’510 Pozner was also unimpressed with National Service personnel in 
the Army, complaining that the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy tended to pick the brightest 
recruits.511  
 
On 15th September 1950 the call-up period of National Service was extended.512 The 
National Service Act of 1948 had mandated 18 months service, but this was raised to 24 
months as a result of the Korean War.513 The efficacy of National Service personnel was 
also debated amongst officers in Malaya. While senior officers recognised they were needed 
to bolster under strength battalions some doubted conscripts’ ability to perform to the 
standards of their Regular counterparts.514 Nevertheless, by 1952 most British Army 
battalions serving in Malaya were comprised mainly of National Servicemen. ‘The majority 
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of subalterns were National Service officers, and in some battalions 90 per cent of lance-
corporals and 50 per cent of corporals were National Servicemen. About 60 per cent of 
private soldiers were conscripts.’515    
    
This was an ongoing problem for the security forces. Maurice Tugwell worked as a General 
Staff Officer in General Headquarters Far Eastern Land Forces and then at HQ Malaya, 
during 1951 and 1952.516 He later wrote ‘It is not easy to maintain a battalion at peak fighting 
efficiency during a three year tour of jungle operations in Malaya when, during that time, 
there is a turnover in officers of 120% and in other ranks of 150%.’517 Further, the personnel 
under their command, the majority of whom were National Servicemen, meant that platoons 
and companies were also in a constant state of flux. Travel, training and acclimatisation 
would also eat into the amount of time where these personnel were operationally available 
to their battalion.518 National Service was found to create problems with group cohesion in 
Malaya. In 1955, Major T.C.R. Archer, ‘medical personnel research officer to the Army 
Personnel Research Committee’, made a six-month survey of the problems facing the 
infantry soldier in Malaya. Following training in jungle warfare at the Far East Land Forces 
Training Centre, Kota Tingi, he went out on several operations in the jungle.519 Archer 
reported that:    
 
The problem of National Service affects the campaign in Malaya as elsewhere. 
Jungle warfare demands team work by every platoon engaged if it is to be successful. 
The British platoon is always changing as men leave for demobilisation and are 
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The challenges posed by National Service were as apparent among officers - who were 
tasked with transmitting regimental values and maintaining morale - as they were among the 
other ranks. The Scots Guards, for example, arrived in Malaya towards the end of 1948. By 
the end of their two and a half years in the country ‘[n]o less than fifty-three subalterns had 
commanded platoons.’ An official history of the regiment, published in 1956, stated that 
after Cadet training, ‘the Battalion was lucky if it got six months’ useful service’ from their 
junior officers in Malaya, once they had really got to grips with their men and the situation. 
Walter Schwarz, a National Service officer, confessed in his diary that he and his platoon 
were under the command of the platoon sergeant for his first few operations, a time in which 
he made ‘many mistakes’.521 The problem appeared to be mirrored at the higher rank of 
major. As Len Ives, a rifleman noted, ‘after a series of temporary’ company commanders 
they had a veteran of the Second World War who, Ives stated, they would follow ‘literally 
anywhere!’522 It was, in addition, recognised that ‘it was these junior officers who had to 
bear the main burden of responsibility on patrol, responsibilities that were greater - if that 
were possible-in this remote jungle warfare than in European warfare’.523 As Ian Gibb noted, 
‘I was in charge of thirty men, a platoon. It was a platoon commander’s war. It was very 
basic.’524      
 
John Baynes, a platoon, and later company commander with the 1st Battalion the 
Cameronians (1950-53) in Malaya, thought active service underwritten by regimental 
culture mediated differences between regulars and National Service personnel. ‘Because we 
were on active service’ wrote Baynes ‘the morale of the Jocks was extremely high, and the 
keenness of young national servicemen [sic] was just as great as that of regulars.’525 The 
inferences being that regimental spirit persisted while the individual members of the 
regiment were rotated through, and again, that morale was maintained through active service.                                                    
 
The British Army regimental system has been said to be a strength of its prosecution of 
counterinsurgency. ‘In the early nineteenth century,’ writes Eliot Cohen ‘British statesmen 
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created the quasi-tribal regimental system, in which enlisted men and officers (all volunteers) 
served together for long periods of time, alternating between duty overseas and duty at 
home.’ Cohen goes on to write that it was this system which ‘sustained the fighting spirit of 
soldiers stationed for years in the remote and alien locations’.526 For the postwar generation 
of practitioner-scholars the regimental system also became intimately linked with the 
production and maintenance of morale. Major-General Frank Richardson lectured on morale 
at the Staff College in Camberley as British forces were engaged in their postwar 
counterinsurgency campaigns.527 ‘During the post-war years’ wrote Richardson, ‘morale 
was the chief topic discussed in military training’.528 As described in his book Fighting 
Spirit, the ‘god’ of the British Army ‘is Regimental Spirit’ which, along with comradeship, 
is ‘an essential element of high morale’.529                        
 
Sandhurst lecturer John Keegan, who went on to become a prolific military historian, 
meanwhile, found that regimental ideology continued to be a presence both at the Academy 
and beyond. 530 For Keegan, regimental ideology was essentially the regiment’s ‘self-image’ 
and this self-image, derived from their history and locality, was ‘crucial to an understanding 
of the British army’s character and behaviour’. The Guards, for example, derived their 
identity ‘from their constant proximity to the sovereign’ and ‘the Highlanders’ from their 
semi-savage origins and now grossly exaggerated tribal character.’ The younger county 
regiments, recruited and trained in their respective regions, supposedly took on the local 
character.531  Keegan was working toward the point that the regimental system limited 
regimental ambition to inter-regimental competition rather than ascension to political power. 
This inter-regimental competition, this chapter will suggest below, also had a significant 
impact on the prosecution of the Emergency. 
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While Keegan was critical of some of these assumptions, they nevertheless continued to 
condition the thinking of senior officers. In his Memoirs, published in 1958, Field Marshal 
Montgomery wrote:    
            
It is essential to understand that all men are different. The miners from Durham and 
Newcastle, the men from the Midlands, the Cockneys, the farmers from the West 
Country, the Scot, the Welshman - are all different. Some men are good at night; 
others prefer to fight in the daylight. Some are best at the fluid and mobile battle; 
others are more temperamentally adapted to the solid killing match in close country. 
… Once I had grasped this essential fact of difference, I used to match my troops to 
the job.532                       
 
The Regiment and its recruiting ground and policy continued to shape its battalions when 
they deployed in countries such as Malaya. When deployed to colonies, the regiment 
continued to derive its strength from the home county, both ideologically and more literally, 
with replacements being sent from a sister battalion stationed in the UK. The regimental 
system allowed a degree of self-sufficiency, and the ‘sense of difference’ and ‘cultivated 
separatism’, argued Keegan, which enabled ‘admirable composure’ during Britain's postwar 
period of decolonisation.533      
 
This ‘sense of difference’ and ‘cultivated separatism’ could be instrumentalised toward a 
military end. Brigadier Shelford Bidwell argued that, through ‘suitable conditioning’, 
soldiers ‘can be induced to fight any other “group”.’534 Bidwell supposed that ‘we have a 
habit (which we are reluctant to admit because it exposes us to the charge of hypocrisy) of 
splitting up the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ in our natures and fastening the ‘bad’ qualities on some 
external person.’ Deviations from what is ‘normal’ or ‘socially accepted behaviours’ are met 
with ‘horror’. Conversely, for Bidwell, morale was the ‘common purpose’ for which 
individuals would make ‘sacrifices’.535 The regimental system was fundamental in shaping 
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this common purpose.536 For Bidwell then, cultivating a sense of regimental spirit 
simultaneously bonded soldiers together while reducing the status of the opposing group. 
This chapter will suggest that regimental identity, including in the form of inter regimental 
competition, became a motivating factor in Malaya.  
 
 
3.3. Counterinsurgency and Morale: Postwar, Pre-Malayan Emergency     
 
Following the Second World War, British service personnel soon found themselves engaged 
in operations to restore not only British colonial rule but that of their European wartime 
allies. Morale reports on this period thus offer an insight into the morale of service personnel 
as they began participating in what would be their predominant role in South-East Asia 
during Britain's postwar period of decolonisation: counterinsurgency. In the immediate 
postwar period British Forces were deployed to the colonies of French Indo-China (FIC) and 
Netherlands East Indies (NEI). In Indonesia, British forces became engaged in suppressing 
an armed uprising as Nationalist groups, reluctant to again accept Dutch colonial rule, sought 
independence. Interestingly, a 1946 report on morale noted that the British forces deployed 
there had registered concern over the inappropriate use of force among Dutch forces during 
the conflict:    
 
British Troops [sic] opinion of the French Forces has improved with the arrival of 
better class French Troops [sic] in FIC. The troops, however, still view with concern 
service in NEI and the feeling that we are doing a job which should be done by the 
Dutch is growing. The morale and behaviour of Dutch Troops [sic], who are said to 
be “trigger happy,” does not help.537       
 
The report appeared to be making the inference that the inappropriate or excessive use of 
force had a deleterious impact of morale. As well as the use of force, the specific role that 
troops were engaged in was thought to have a determining effect on morale, with offensive 
operations being preferable to defensive duties. ‘All formations are agreed that morale is 
high whenever a Unit is engaged on active operations; it always goes up when t[roo]ps are 
 
536 Ibid, p.103.        
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moved from a static guarding role.’538 In short ‘Operational Commitments’ were thought to 
‘have a most favourable effect on morale.’539        
 
While confirming that contact was good for morale the report also revealed concerns that 
have become typical of those engaged in a counterinsurgency role:         
 
The opinion held by many is that no one gives us any credit for doing our duty in 
Indonesia. The Dutch, because we are not offensively minded enough towards the 
Indonesians; the Indonesians, because they allege we are here to re-instate Dutch 
Imperialism; the World Press, for many reasons; irresponsible MPs, through 
ignorance; and the Indian Press, with their familiar cliches and rantings about 
nationalism.540 
 
The idea was beginning to emerge that complex or obfuscated political objectives 
represented stresses particular to counterinsurgency, which, in turn, could have a deleterious 
impact on morale. Nevertheless, a subsequent report reiterated the earlier finding that 
‘Operational Commitments’ ‘Always continue to have a good effect on morale and many 
troops would like to have a proper show down with the Extremists.’541 While reiterating the 
earlier finding this last point also revealed the further, perhaps fundamental, characteristic 
of an insurgency for those on the ground. Even on offensive operations, within this 
asymmetrical form of warfare insurgents would seek to avoid prolonged confrontations with 
front line troops, preferring instead softer targets.  As the Malayan Emergency got underway, 
a significant proportion of service personnel would be tied up on guard duties.  
 
 
3.4. Morale and the Malayan Emergency 
 
As a later report would state, the ‘whole peninsula’ of Malaya was considered an ‘operational 
area’.542 General Sir Neil Ritchie also thought that ‘British National Service soldiers, who 
 
538 ‘Morale Report No1 Feb-Apr 46’, p.1, TNA WO 203/6033.  
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show their distaste for the more normal static types of duties, for instance guards on 
establishments in such places as Singapore, change entirely once up country on operations. 
There they are keen, active, interested and display a high standard of intelligence.’543 One 
British officer found that operations upcountry came with a unique set of pressures. Major 
Ian Gibb, mentioned earlier, served as a platoon commander with the Seaforth Highlanders 
in Malaya. His unpublished memoir, written nearly 40 years afterwards,544 offers an insight 
into ‘those first few weeks and months of the Emergency that were both chaotic and 
unique’.545 Gibb drew a comparison with conventional warfare to illustrate that 
counterinsurgency was ‘[p]sychologically … difficult sometimes.’546                  
 
In the war people went into a combat zone and there you stayed for a bit and maybe 
had heavy action and maybe not, then out of the line for a time. … Instead of getting 
absorbed into a war atmosphere we could be playing tennis and get an emergency 
call out. A couple of hours later in the rubber or jungle you could be engaged in 
battle. Your tennis partner could then be a casualty. It was all so sudden. And by 
evening we could be back to the base eating our evening meal beside the court and 
wondering what life was all about.547  
 
In the opening months of the Emergency as British forces reacted to incidents, this sharp 
transition between rest and kinetic operations characterised a stress of counterinsurgency. 
Another officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. Stephens, in reference to the Gurkha Regiment 
stationed in Johore in August 1949, agreed with Ritchie’s narrative but worried things could 
eventually change. His note ‘Morale’ stated: ‘At present the men still prefer the jungle to the 
unamenable conditions of Ulu Pandan [their basic base camp in Singapore] and the various 
guards and duties which become their lot when … there.’548  
 
Also, in the opening months of the Emergency, a selection of veterans of guerrilla warfare 
in Malaya and Burma during the Second World War proposed a special force to go and ‘beat 
 
543 General Sir Neil M. Ritchie, ‘Report on Operations in Malaya - June 1948 to July 1949’, p.12, (1949), TNA 
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the bandits at their own game’ and on their own ground.549 The General Officer 
Commanding Malaya decided on ‘Ferret Force’ as an appropriate name for this new group, 
because the ‘work of a ferret, from the standpoint of its owner, is to go down a rabbit-hole 
and chase the rabbit out.’ Richard Broome, one of its founders, felt ‘Cuckoo Force’ would 
be a more appropriate name as they planned to ‘go and live in the jungle in the same haunts 
as the bandits and thus make the jungle uninhabitable for them.’ This, wrote Broome, was 
the ‘mot juste’ for the work of Ferret Force.550 The ‘bandit problem in Malaya’ wrote Broome 
‘is not a purely military problem. It is a police and administrative problem also’.551 
Comprised of personnel armed with knowledge of the local language and customs, the Ferret 
groups could spend extended periods out on the ground.552        
 
Despite this local knowledge, a lack of intelligence meant the Ferret groups were often 
reduced to ‘jungle bashing’. As one of their operational reports noted: ‘The rest of the story 
is of incessant and gruelling patrol work with no positive results to show. Only once in a 
while could we carry out an operation as a group with a specific objective. This apparently 
aimless patrolling throws a great strain on the men, and no troops can be expected to do it 
indefinitely at the pressure the Ferrets worked at.’553 The gruelling jungle operations were 
mediated by expectation of contact with the insurgents. ‘In spite of this morale was very 
high throughout, and this was helped by the great prevalence of bandits in the area, which 
enabled the Group to maintain a high rate of contacts and avoid excessive boredom.’554 As 
delineated in the previous chapter Ferret Force was disbanded with the aim of inculcating its 
values into the infantry. There is some evidence that this was the case from memoirs. Ron 
Miles was deployed to the Emergency in its opening years, as a National Serviceman with 
the Coldstream Guards. In his memoir he wrote: ‘The different patrols of soldiers were 
searching out the enemy, trying to find them to kill, or capture and get more information to 
try to beat the Communists at their own game.’555     
 
 
549 ‘Ferrets Organisation: Special Jungle Force for Suppression of Terrorism’, Colonel J.L.H. Davis papers, 
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554 Broome, ‘Ferret Force’, p.6.   
555 R.W. Miles, ‘The Adventures of a Coldstream Guardsman’, (2008), pp.124-125, IWM 11/15/1.           
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Captain John Woodhouse, who was recruited to the Malayan Scouts by Michael Calvert, 
noted: ‘Now at that time there were theories particularly strongly held in the Royal Army 
Medical Corps that after two weeks in the jungle a soldier should come out because the 
stresses and strains were so bad for them.’556 The extended jungle operations of the early 
years were thought to dispel this myth. One such operation launched by the Scots Guards 
with supporting elements from the Coldstream Guards and the Suffolk Regiment ‘proved 
that European troops are able to spend weeks on end in the jungle without relief when 
supplied from the air.’557 A functioning line of supply became a major advantage of the 
security forces over the insurgents, as will be described below. Locating the insurgents, 
however, proved a difficult and time-consuming task.   
 
‘There were’ wrote Gibb ‘hours and hours of patrolling without contact at times. True in the 
early days the bandit concentrations were larger and much nearer civilisation, but 
nevertheless some soldiers went through a tour without seeing an enemy.’558 It was later 
reported that it took an average of 1,000 hours to capture an insurgent and 1,600 hours to 
make a kill. The average ambush, depending on intelligence, could expect a wait of 350 
hours before making contact.559 These figures were more generally boiled down into the 
belief that it took ‘1,000 hours of patrolling for every contact made with the enemy.’560 
Within the context of gruelling jungle operations a contact with the insurgents, and the rush 
of adrenaline which it brought, temporarily alleviated the strain. In 1955, Major T.C.R. 
Archer, mentioned above, reported the jungle was deleterious to mental health whereas 
contact with the insurgents was considered good for morale. ‘Working in the jungle demands 
a high standard of physical and mental fitness … Mentally, jungle operations are depressing 
by reason of their monotony, apparent lack of success (the rare contacts with the enemy 
always raise morale sky-high)’.561  
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It was these extended periods of sustained alertness without meeting the insurgents which 
characterised the stress of jungle work. As Gibb stated:                      
 
We always had to be alert. Especially dangerous was the time on getting back to base 
when everyone was tired. Once or twice patrols got caught off guard at this stage and 
were wiped out or very badly mauled. The strain came by having to be constantly on 
guard, day and night, in areas of obvious danger but also in rubber and in areas of 
potential safety.562             
 
J. Thompson Rowling, a National Service surgeon, conceptualised the problem of ongoing 
vigilance as a battle between ‘courage and cowardice’:563  
 
It is not for nothing that the satellites of Mars [, the God of war in Greek mythology,] 
are Phobos [fear] and Deimos [terror]. I suppose that everyone in the army in Pahang 
at that time was frightened. I found, like so many others before me, that transitory 
fear was a stimulus, while continued fear was a burden of the spirit.564  
 
Thompson Rowling’s brief meditation on the psychology of fear again spoke to the constant 
fear engendered in participation in counterinsurgency. It also suggested transitory fear was 
useful.        
 
The fear and stress of the counterinsurgency operations that followed closely on from the 
war offered the Army’s Operational Research Unit the opportunity to ‘place the phenomenon 
of morale on a firmer basis’, as ‘current views on morale rest on no secure factual 
foundation’.565 In 1949, the Director of Army Health agreed, writing:   
 
Morale. The other way in which a soldier’s life on active service differs from his 
civilian existence is the stress, anxiety or uncertainty in which he lives. This must be 
irrevocably bound up with fatigue and efficiency. The whole, the morale of the force, 
is also a vital factor calling for investigation. There is therefore an urgent need for 
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field tests suitable to assess morale - how much they will be concerned with fatigue 
and how much with anxiety or other factors remains an urgent but unsolved 
problem.566 
     
In Palestine this took the form of a field study into fear or anxiety among the soldiers and 
police stationed there.567 The underlying theory of fear mirrored that of psychiatric 
casualties. Illogical fears were seen as the result of early life experiences and heredity, and 
just as with psychiatric illness, fear was thought to be contagious.568 Fear was thought to 
impair judgement, exaggerate dangers and lead to ‘wild’ behaviour, instead of cool 
considered action.’569 The study returned some interesting results, for example, non-
combatant clerks who had not witnessed any casualties displayed a tremor thought sufficient 
to have been classified by a psychiatrist as suffering mild anxiety. The explanation for this 
result was the stories that incoming soldiers would hear about the deployment. Further, that 
familiarisation with the environment or exposure to mild stress was thought to inoculate 
soldiers against fear.570 Another finding was that individual levels of fear related to the group 
level of fear.571                                              
 
The results, however, were speculative and the concluding remarks largely concerned with 
reiterating the research methodology. The only recommendation was that the study should 
be expanded into the Canal Zone and Cyprus. As such it lacked clear directives that could 
be put into practice. Perhaps the main implication that a senior officer would draw from the 
conclusions was that longer periods of rest were needed. Lieutenant General Macmillan, 
General Officer Commanding British Troops in Palestine and Transjordan, was less than 
impressed, stressing that ‘What we want is to know how to prevent fear or dispel it. I consider 
this is a matter of morale.’572 For Macmillan, morale was equated with the prevention of fear 
and anxiety in line with Second World War thinking. This definition reflected his need to 
keep troops in the field in the face of the peculiar stresses of countering insurgency.                 
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While the results were speculative, the research acknowledged that fear could have an impact 
on the use of force. The confusion of operations could exacerbate this fear. Ron Miles, a 
rifleman who was engaged in making a sweep of the jungle looking for insurgents, stated: ‘I 
was terrified in case the man on my right or the man on my left should suddenly not realise 
that I had wandered on ahead of him and that he may shoot me in the back. This was a 
soldiers [sic] biggest fear I think, being shot in the back by one’s comrades.’573  The research 
also noted that morale was poorly defined. During the Emergency it came to be defined in 
relation to the operational requirements and hardships of insurgency. A note on troop 
leadership, circulated to officers of the 12th Royal Lancers in Malaya, used a mixture of 
metaphors in explanation of the intangible concept of morale and the officer's role in 
monitoring and managing it:      
 
Always to be watched - more fickle than the weather - you must foretell it as a 
weather prophet. One or two unsuccessful actions may cause a cloud  - one success 
and the sun will shine brilliantly, scattering the mists. The boredom of inactivity will 
bring down the fog of depression. Generally speaking the British character is such 
that if you explain to a soldier why he is being asked to do a certain thing, and the 
results it is intended to achieve “unpleasant though it may be”, you will keep the 
barometer at “set fair” - It is the “NOT KNOWING” that saps morale just in the same 
way as the “UNKNOWN” saps courage - once both are made “KNOWN” morale 
and courage return - Remember this and let it be your guide ; and one other thing - 
never talk about morale - it is intangible, therefore do not treat it as concrete - Finally, 
morale is very infectious - success breeds the healthiest germs and boredom the most 
deadly.574         
 
The note was at once a salient commentary on the stress of participation in 
counterinsurgency and an insight into the concerns faced by senior officers. It emphasised 
the boring, at times unpleasant, and unknown characteristics of counterinsurgency. The 
meteorological metaphor emphasised vigilance while the disease metaphor revealed a fear 
that was uppermost in the officer’s mind. Morale was an ineffable concept and specifically 
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low morale, like communicable disease, was thought to spread. The problem of defining, 
creating and monitoring morale was again attempted in a publication for Sandhurst Cadets 
in 1959. The booklet reinforced the importance of leadership on morale, and outlined the 
components it thought contributed to morale, but again cited the rather ineffable quality of 
the concept.575        
  
 
3.4.1. Ambushes and their Aftermath          
 
The major fear in counterinsurgency was being caught in an ambush. Service personnel were 
perhaps most vulnerable while in transit. J.T. Warden was deployed to Malaya as RAF 
ground crew, crossing the causeway by rail in 1953. Before leaving Singapore, he was 
briefed by an Army officer that the train was ‘susceptible to ambushes which do happen 
frequently’ and to ‘be vigilant at all times.’ The talk highlighted the vulnerability of their 
position, ‘now we are in a war zone waiting to be ambushed!’576       
 
Road travel was also dangerous. On the 6th October 1951 Sir Henry Gurney was killed when 
his convoy was ambushed at a bend on the Fraser’s Hill Road, approximately 60 miles North-
East of the capital Kuala Lumpur. Robert Jackson would later argue that ‘[m]orale was 
exceptionally low after the killing of Sir Henry Gurney’, which was in part attributed to a 
lack of armoured cars.577 The killing of such a high profile figure meant the roads around 
Fraser's Hill had become synonymous with the more general possibility of ambush and 
reinforced the vulnerability of road travel in the minds of the British. L.S. Ives, who served 
from 1949 to 1951, wrote ‘that in particularly troublesome areas scrub and light forestation 
encroaching near the roadside was cut right back.’578 A campaign of ‘roadside defoliation’ 
was in operation at the time, with the aim of reducing the risk of ambush. This was carried 
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out by hand, although, by the end of 1951 chemicals were being experimented with as a 
more efficient and lasting form of defoliation.579     
 
The road up to Fraser's Hill became a physical and psychological obstacle. For example, 
John Butler, a senior N.C.O. attached to the King’s African Rifles, described the battalion’s 
move to Bentong, noting that to get there they would have to pass through ‘the notorious 
Bentong gap’.580 Eric Mullender did his National Service with the REME. He was posted to 
the 19th Field Ambulance, in Taiping, where he maintained the vehicles and learnt to drive. 
In his memoir he described travelling along the road where Gurney was ambushed. ‘The 
road was a series of ‘S’ bends and ‘U’ turns with a steep incline throughout thus restricting 
the travelling speed to a minimum. The jungle as always, was very dense, making it easy for 
terrorists to conceal themselves, and thus in a position to surprise any target.’ Mullender, 
who served in Malaya between 1955 and 1956, travelled to Fraser's hill approximately five 
years after the Gurney ambush, and detailed the extended security measures that had been 
put in place. One convoy per day, escorted by armoured cars at the front and rear, were 
allowed to go up and down the hill. The leaving times were changed each day to avoid a 
predictable routine.581 By 1955, the vulnerability that came with road travel, particularly for 
Very Important People had been addressed. ‘Armoured cars were extensively employed,’ 
noted the January 1956 report, ‘mainly on escort duties for food convoys and VIPs. One 
regiment alone did some 50,000 miles on escort duty.’582  
 
Some of the heaviest security forces losses were due to road ambushes. On 22nd October 
1951, for instance, a platoon of the Royal West Kent Regiment was ambushed on the Ulu 
Caledonian estate. It resulted in the deaths of eleven British servicemen and three Iban 
trackers. This was later reported as the heaviest loss of life sustained by a platoon since the 
Second World War, 583 and would remain the heaviest loss due to one incident during the 
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Malayan Emergency.584 Even as the Emergency was ongoing the incident was dramatised 
by Maurice Tugwell in his book The Quiet Peace, first published in 1957. Tugwell had 
transferred to The Queen’s Royal West Kent Regiment following his wartime service with 
the Parachute Regiment. During 1951 and 1952 he worked as a General Staff Officer in 
General Headquarters Far Eastern Land Forces and then at HQ Malaya.585 Lieutenant 
General Sir Hugh C. Stockwell, wrote a forward to the book, in which he stated: ‘How  many 
of us realise while we go about our daily lives here in Britain, … that there are so many of 
our fellow countrymen being subjected to the strains, excitements and stresses of war or near 
war in so many corners of the world?’ These experiences of predominantly National Service 
personnel were likened to the wartime experiences of their fathers and brothers. ‘These 
experiences’ writes Stockwell, ‘have made us men’.586 The reality of National Service in 
Malaya, however, could prove more traumatic.                                    
    
Norman Martin described the aftermath of the incident in his unpublished but often quoted 
memoir ‘The Day The Sun Stopped Shining’. Although written in the 1990s the memoir was 
based on diaries and letters written at the time of service. The title of the memoir alluded to 
the incident which had left a permanent mark on his psyche:                                
 
Until my dying day I will never forget the sight that met us when we go to the scene 
of the ambush … I couldn't really believe that I was looking at what a few hours ago, 
was a truckload of young men. … There were the dead laying in all sorts of twisted 
positions. There were pieces of hair and skin and bone stuck to the side of the truck, 
the truck itself was like a sieve. It was shot to pieces, there was not a square foot of 
it without a bullet hole in it, that first hail of bullets, did all the damage. There was 
no escape from that hail of bullets, we were told by the survivors that most had no 
chance. There was so much blood, it was everywhere, by this time, there were a lot 
of us there.587    
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The experience of dealing with the dead appeared more disturbing than dealing with 
wounded, ‘we looked after the wounded as best we could … The hardest job of all was to 
get the dead from out of the back of the truck’, and the events of that day had both an 
immediate and long-term impact on Martin. ‘There were only about three or four of us left 
out of our original platoon, now we who were not in the ambush were shattered, we just 
couldn't take it.’ ‘I went to see them in hospital that night, I broke down, I just couldn't help 
it. ‘That day has stuck in my mind until this very day. I still have nightmares seeing all that 
carnage.’588                                       
 
Martin was impressed by the effectiveness of the insurgent tactic and their professionalism 
in carrying it out. ‘They had been well prepared [concealed in a dug-in position overlooking 
their target] … The twin bren guns on the scout car were the first target, and they were 
knocked out of action.’589 Lieutenant Farmer of the Suffolk Regiment attributed the 
effectiveness of the ambush, not to Communist tactics but to inferior trade craft on the part 
of the Royal West Kent Regiment:  
 
We were a very experienced regiment, with a high reputation for our jungle craft, 
and the terrorists normally avoided attempting to ambush us, in contrast with a 
terrible ambush suffered by the Royal West Kent Regiment who lost 12 killed, 
simply because they refused to remove the canvas cover which shielded the troops 
inside of the 3 tonne trucks from the sun and the rain, which meant that when 
attacked, they all came out the back of the truck and were easily targeted, whereas 
we invariably travelled without out canvas cover, which enabled us to leap out from 
all four sides of the truck.590  
 
ATOM subsequently delineated a set of drills for reducing lethality of ambushes, such as 
being alert and ready to return fire, as well as being prepared to bail out on command.591 For 
Farmer, belief in these drills engendered a sense of confidence and regimental spirit. When 
encountering the results of an ambush some used humour to cope.          
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J. Beasley completed his National Service with the RASC in Malaya between 1948 and 1949 
as a driver attached to the 16th Field Ambulance. He had also been impressed by the efficacy 
and brutality of the insurgents when called out to recover the bodies of those caught in an 
ambush:       
 
The C.T’s had also done a very professional job. The drivers cab and wind-screen 
had been well stitched by machine gun fire and with the driver dead or dying the 
truck had slewed to a halt right in the middle of the cutting. If anyone had jumped 
clear there was not a scrap of cover to be found.592     
 
Beasley also had to deal with dead servicemen following an ambush. Where Martin was 
traumatised by his experience of dealing with his dead comrades, Beasley revealed that he 
preferred dealing with the dead rather than the wounded and offered an explanation which 
invoked the subconscious:         
 
Back at the hospital I helped to get the bodies into the morgue. I remember feeling 
ashamed as I carried out the grisly task for I had difficulty to keep the smile off my 
face, in fact there were times when I almost felt like laughing. Many years later when 
discussing my conduct, and further confessing that subsequently I had discovered 
that handling bodies bothered me far less than handling injured and wounded, I was 
told by a nursing sister it was most likely a natural reaction that my subconscious 
mind was relieved that I was not dead, and that I was fully aware of the suffering 
caused by the necessary movement of injured and wounded. When I think of it I 
suppose it makes sense.593                       
    
The morbid humour Beasley displayed in dealing with bodies was a feature of his memoir 
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3.4.2. Medical Cover and Morale  
 
The availability of medical care was an important additional factor in the morale of service 
personnel deployed on jungle operations. When casualties occurred in the jungle, they were 
often isolated and the time between injury and sustained medical care made complications a 
serious concern. When these casualties came, they could have a serious impact on the morale 
of both other ranks and officers. ‘A particularly sad loss for me’ wrote Platoon Commander 
Ian Gibb, ‘was a Corporal who was badly wounded and in fact didn't initially want to live. I 
did all I could to rally his morale, using his mates and everything I could think of. I came 
out of the jungle and rushed along to the local hospital where he had been taken; I began to 
feel more heartened. Not only had he started to fight back but he wanted to live and medically 
there seemed to be a good chance. He was evacuated to Singapore. There he either got 
gangrene or paralysis of the spine or both and died some weeks later.’594        
 
The increased risk of illness and injury during jungle operations could affect morale. A 
practice known as ‘jungle jumping’, for example, entailed parachuting into the jungle in the 
belief that the parachutist would punch through the jungle canopy leaving the parachute to 
become entangled in the trees. If all went well the parachutist would then lower a knotted 
rope and climb down to the jungle floor. Surprisingly enough, all generally did go well if the 
relatively low casualty statistics are accurate. It was however, like all parachuting, a practice 
which created a high ‘mental strain’ and required an unerring faith in the equipment, which 
if questioned, was thought to adversely affect morale.595     
 
The knowledge of rapid evacuation if injured was considered an obvious boost to morale. In 
September 1949, General Sir Neil Ritchie stated: ‘The evacuation of casualties from the 
jungle has caused me the greatest anxiety. The use of Helicopters for this purpose is probably 
the solution, but no suitable type for the task is yet in service. From the morale point of view 
it is important that they are made available as soon as feasible.’596 It was also suggested that 
aircraft would make large advanced base hospitals unnecessary, particularly in conflicts like 
Malaya where casualties are light. In opposition though was the ever-present fear that 
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providing too easy an escape would be readily accepted and result in a reluctance to go back 
to operations. In remedy, the importance of forward treatment was propounded.597        
 
Helicopters were gradually employed for casualty evacuation, although the number of 
airframes available for this role was generally in flux. As the DOO report stated, the available 
helicopters ‘dwindled away’ during 1954 and by October was ‘hopelessly inadequate’. Then 
in November the Bristol Sycamore was introduced and in December some of ‘the Royal 
Navy S.55 helicopters became available again in useful numbers.’598 Nevertheless, 
helicopters had made a significant contribution. During its four years in Malaya the Royal 
Navy’s S.55’s of No.848 Squadron made 746 casualty evacuations.599 By August 1956, 
No.194 Squadron RAF, equipped with the Bristol Sycamore, had ‘evacuated its 1,500th 
casualty in the Malayan theatre.’600          
                  
The Quarterly Historical Reports from the opening years of the Emergency reveal general 
concern over the shortage of qualified medical personnel and by extension the need for 
training. Demobilisation meant there was a shortage of qualified medical personnel as 
FARELF began reorganising for peacetime.601 This would become a feature of the postwar 
years. A June 1947 report from Johore Bahru read, ‘The biggest administrative difficulty 
encountered is the acute shortage of officers and senior N.C.Os.’602 The Emergency meant 
the RAMC had to adapt and in response acted to decentralise medical practice. For example 
an absence of Field Ambulance personnel meant British Other Ranks were used as stretcher 
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bearers on operations.603 There were also initiatives to train soldiers in first aid.604 This was 
important as ‘The effect on morale of personnel of jungle patrols having trained R.A.M.C. 
Orderlies with them is greatly increased.’605 By the opening months of 1950, incoming 
inexperienced medical officers were first attached to 16th Field Ambulance to complete 
further training before continuing on to their postings.606 
 
The availability of medical cover was an important factor in sustaining the morale of service 
personnel. Conversely, the heath of service personnel was taken to be an indication of their 
morale. Major Fane Gladwin was a Company Commander in 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in 
Malaya. He later went on to become Second in Command, ‘in which capacity the main 
weight of the Battalion’s training fell to him.’607 When the Scots Guards arrived in Malaya 
one of their objectives, as stated by Fane Gladwin, ‘was to achieve the highest degree of 
endurance in the jungle so that time was no object on our operations.’ For Gladwin, this 
endurance was evidenced ‘by the almost “rampaging” morale of the Battalion throughout 
the tour, and by a sickness rate so low as to be considered phenomenal in any climate and 
under any conditions.’608 Conversely, as Arthur Campbell noted, morale was low after an 
unsuccessful operation and that as a result attendance on sick parade increased.609         
 
There was also an emphasis on hygiene and the immediate use of modern medicines in 
response to disease.610 Lieutenant-Colonel O’Dwyer of the RAMC advanced the definition 
of Hygiene put forward by the A.C.I. 605 of 1948 as, ‘The maintenance and enhancement 
of mental and physical and health and efficacy, and the prevention of disease.’ He also 
included an extract from the personal notes of Viscount Montgomery, sent to all 
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commanders in attendance on a medical exercise, which in part reads, “Personal hygiene and 
the taking of drugs is a matter of unit discipline and esprit de corps…A lack of heath 
discipline is a sign of a fall in morale”’.611 Thus prophylaxis was best achieved by 
encouraging high unit morale and hygiene.612 Morale was thought to contribute to a quicker 
recovery from illness. A study investigating the efficacy of tinea treatments put forward the 
restoration of morale as being the primary reason for recovery in one case.613 E.T. Renbourn, 
an RAMC officer who was conducting research into the physiological problems faced by the 
soldier in tropical warfare, reported that soldiers were reluctant to wear a helmet, preferring 
instead a jungle hat or beret. The reason was that a ballistic helmet proved uncomfortable 
and unwieldy in the jungle, but wrote Renbourn, ‘the morale value of the beret’ could not be 
discounted.614 Medical officers themselves were not immune from regimental culture. John 
S.G. Blair reported ‘those working in large training depots were least happy’ whereas 




3.4.3. Rest, Recreation and Morale  
 
Ian Gibb described a jungle patrol in which events compounded each other: ‘We had had a 
bad day. My morale was low. We had had the worst of a clash with the enemy. I was none 
too sure where we were. The rain was falling, night was coming and we had no food left.’616 
As well as fear of the insurgents service personnel were scared of the environment and 
accidents. Ron Miles, mentioned earlier, stated that ‘one night we got totally lost in the jungle 
and at night it is a terrifying place.’617 The jungle continued to be considered a drain on 
morale within the RAMC. One Patrol Doctor remarked that the ‘most depressing days were 
those when it rained as the patrol was bedding down, which made it difficult to get dry and 
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made for a long night.’618 Norman Martin, the infantryman who narrowly avoided the 
ambush of the Royal West Kent Regiment, wrote: ‘All the jungle bashing was getting us 
down, our morale was very low. We just finished nine patrols in as many days, we just never 
seemed to get any rest, we even saw the New Year in, out in the jungle.’619       
 
When leave came, a change of environment was considered essential for the rehabilitation 
of service personnel. Corporal Rowland Owen, who served as a sanitary assistant and 
medical orderly with RAMC during his National Service in the opening years of the Malayan 
Emergency, reported that: ‘The officers had a rest camp bungalow by the sea’ and that 
‘eventually a corrugated iron hut was provided for other ranks to have 48 hours leave.’620  
Maurice Cutler, a British NCO who served with the 39th Field Ambulance, RAMC in 
Malaya, 1956-1958, spoke more generally of the Cameron Highlands being a destination 
where soldiers could go for ‘rest-bite [respite] treatment’ to regain their energy in the 
‘rarefied atmosphere’.621 Norman Martin was ‘sent up to the Cameron Highlands, for that 
change of air leave.’ ‘It was a long, slow journey up there, and of course we still had to be 
vigilant,’ noted Martin, ‘for as we knew, an ambush can come at any time.’ Once up there, 
however, weapons and ammunition were handed in for the duration.622 Eric Mullender, a 
craftsman with the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) who was 
stationed with 19th Field Ambulance, had two ‘Change of Air Leaves’ over the course of his 
18 months in Malaya. One was in the Cameron Highlands over the New Year period 1955-
56. ‘The air was cool and refreshing’ wrote Mullender, ‘...“just what the doctor ordered”’. 
The other was to ‘Sandycroft Leave Centre on the island of Penang … with only the 
“blinding” white sandy beach between our quarters and the ocean.’623     
 
Periods of rest and recreation became fundamental to troop morale. L.S. Ives wrote that the 
extra food provided by the ‘charwallah’ was a good source of morale. As was sport, which 
wrote Ives, was also a ‘morale boosting activity’. ‘That sport had the capacity to improve 
morale,’ concluded Tony Mason and Eliza Riedi in their recent study of sport in the British 
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armed forces, ‘both in peace and war, seems certain.’624 But, Ives continued, ‘mail from 
home was still the most moral[e] boosting thing of all.’625 There was some effort to bring 
cinema to operational areas where screens were improvised by the AKC. Cinema became a 
source of morale. Ron Miles, a Guardsman, wrote: [W]e would occasionally have the 
Cinema which visited us, the Army Kinema; don’t know why they pronounced it like that 
but the Army Kinema Corporation - A.K.C. - visited troops all over Malaya which did a lot 
to help morale too. It meant that we had Cinema wherever we went, not all the time but quite 
often and in Kampah [sic, Kampar], in Perak they would put the screen up in the NAAFI 
building … the screen was a kind of sheet, in fact I think it was just a bed sheet.626 Miles 
went on to write ‘in fact it was the Cinema during the two years in Malaya that really helped 
me to keep going I think’.627 Some of the films, although considered unrealistic, appeared to 
reflect and reinforce the themes of the counterinsurgency. The obvious example is the The 
Planter’s Wife, which tells the story of a rubber planter and his wife living in fear of being 
attacked by the Communist insurgents. 
 
One reviewer thought it topical but ultimately simplistic: ‘The terrorists are just “they”, the 
unquestioned enemy, and the climax, a Boy's Own Paper-cum-Western shooting match, 
resolves everything purely in terms of simple minded action.’628 R.G. Thwaite wrote a letter 
to his parents dated 10th April 1954. ‘I saw the Planters Wife again (the one on Malaya) what 
a giggle so true and yet far fetched in little ways.’629 John Bourne, a Mechanical Transport 
Officer with the 2nd Battalion King's African Rifles, also reviewed the film in a letter home 
dated 11th July 1954: ‘We stayed … in the rest house and saw an AKC film called the “The 
Planters Wife”. I was far more critical about it this time. It was not really authentic.’630 
Bourne also offered comments on other films shown by the AKC in his letters home. These 
included, The Naked Jungle ‘a rather feeble film’ about a jungle plantation under attack by 
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killer ants631 and The World in His Arms, which centres on an American poaching seals in 
Russian waters in the mid-1800s. ‘The Askaris loved it as it was rough and tumble.’632        
 
While rest and recreation were important for morale, some officers, such as Major Arthur 
Campbell, were keen to emphasise the resilience of British soldiers. His book Jungle Green 
(1953), which was an influential text and will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter, emphasised good leadership and group recreation in the production and 
maintenance of morale. Indeed, Campbell thought one of his subalterns ‘was worth more to 
the men’s morale than the whole of the Army Welfare Organisation.’633 When one of his 
subalterns noted that the men were getting ‘browned off’ after weeks of ‘jungle bashing’, 




3.4.4. The Hunting Metaphor in Action 
 
In The Door Marked Malaya (1958), British infantry officer Oliver Crawford, illustrates 
how the training and its overarching narrative framed the soldiers’ experience of jungle 
operations, directed their behaviour and primed them for action:        
                 
Like big-game hunters in Africa, we no longer looked at what we could see. Instead 
we kept visual stereotypes in our mind - the picture of a head with a jungle-hat on it, 
the thatched roof of a hut, the pattern of tracks in mud. If the vague unfocused mass 
of jungle happened to contain a head with a jungle-hat on it, then the stereotype 
clicked, the nerve jumped, the shock brought the rifle snap into the shoulder, and the 
legs slowing to a halt - even before one realised one had seen something.635             
 
Kevin O’Sullivan, a 2nd Lieutenant with the Loyal Regiment, went through the Jungle 
Warfare School in Johore towards the end of the Emergency in 1957. The jungle he described 
as central to their lives: ‘It was a No Mans Land. The only people to be found in it were 
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security forces (us), and CT (them). … It was all-enveloping.’636 His memoir highlights the 
behavioural nature of the training. By repeatedly taking attendees through realistic scenarios 
the aim was to install the appropriate behavioural response in soldiers. The training, 
however, had to overcome competing affective responses that arose while under the stress 
of a contact:      
 
We learned these routines till we knew them by heart, and almost by instinct. That 
was important, as I realised later. So shocking is the experience of being shot at close 
quarters that you need some standard behaviour patterns to fall back on, otherwise, 
like a rabbit in the headlights, you’d be paralysed.637                   
 
Then later, acting on intelligence he led a patrol out ‘hunting’ after their ‘quarry’. The 
engagement when it came was characteristic of those experienced by servicemen during the 
Malayan Emergency; brief, confused and at close quarters:  
             
Then something moved. A shadowy silhouette behind the rocks. I looked over the 
gunsight. The shape of a head in a cap, and shoulders, dodging from side to side, 
looking my way. CT, not British. Everything was happening in high-definition slow 
motion. I fired. Smoke obscured everything for a second, and then there was another 
shot from somewhere and a bullet blasted past my cheek. … Instinct made me clutch 
the ground, but the training said attack them and the training had become another 
instinct.638      
 
The behavioural training and conceptualisation of jungle operations as a hunt which had 
been inculcated at the Jungle Warfare School informed O'Sullivan’s decision to fire.  
 
The hunting metaphor persisted on operations. Walter Schwarz arrived in Malaya as a young 
subaltern with the Manchester Regiment in October 1952. Schwarz recorded his initial 
impression of his comrades in his diary. ‘Mess talk is unashamedly “shop”’ wrote Schwarz, 
which included an anecdote by one of the company commanders concerning a recent contact. 
‘It struck me as  sporting anecdote rather than a military one; there was just good humoured 
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annoyance at the bandits escape, and just scientific interest in his self-preserving skill, as if 
he had been a grouse in Derbyshire or, at most, an elephant in Kenya.’639 It was a metaphor 
that dehumanised the insurgents and minimised the military threat that they posed.                                                       
 
Ian Gibb, a platoon commander who served in the opening years of the Emergency, stated 
that framing counterinsurgency as a hunt and having an uncomplicated view of its 
prosecution lent resiliency to service personnel. ‘I don’t think we were insensitive to the 
brutality of a jungle war.’, wrote Gibb. ‘Nevertheless we were resilient and also being young 
we tended to see the issues in black and white. We were on the side of right, they were in 
the wrong.’ Gibb also gave insight into the racial epithets that were used to denote the 
insurgents. ‘This name calling, plus the fact that the operations were somewhat regarded as 
a hunt, and even hunting terminology came into it, wasn't so much of an insensitivity as a 
sort of cover up for the possibility of being killed.’640 For Gibb, the dehumanisation of the 
insurgents was a defence which minimised the insurgents military efficacy and by extension 
the possibility of being killed. An effective insurgent ambush certainly challenged this belief.  
 
What, however, did this conditioning and training do to soldiers faced with captured or dead 
insurgents? The next few paragraphs focus on treatment of the enemy dead, a topic that 
exploded into the news in 1952. In April and May 1952, the Daily Worker newspaper printed 
a number of images, one of which, showed a Royal Marine holding the severed heads of two 
Communist insurgents. The photographs were initially assumed to be fake - an example of 
Communist propaganda. An admiralty investigation, however, confirmed that the 
photographs were taken a year earlier during an operation in April 1951.641 When General 
Templer was contacted for an explanation he emphasised the purpose was evidential - the 
insurgents had to be identified - which reinforced the idea that it was criminal action that 
was being prosecuted. Templer also emphasised the nature of the terrain, which exhausted 
service personnel and impeded justice. The following comes from a telegram to the Colonial 
Secretary Lyttleton:   
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The viewpoint of others who may criticise, and who have no possible inkling or 
understanding of conditions or terrain or physical exhaustion of operations, is not 
understandable to the security Forces who have the task of tracking down armed 
communist murders and producing evidence for necessary identification.642 
 
The diaries and letters which reference the practice mirror Templer in emphasising the 
jungle. J.P. Macdonald, a Second Lieutenant with the Suffolk Regiment, recorded his patrols 
beheading of a communist in April 1952, ‘We contacted and killed one bandit … We tried 
to carry him out… but couldnt [sic] so we took of his head.’643 While Macdonald appeared 
to remain stoical in the execution of his orders the sight of Communist dead elicited physical 
reactions in another officer, a later diary entry noted, ‘6 Pl[atoon] killed a bandit on excellent 
info. Major Dewar was sick when he looked at the body.’644 Dealing with dead insurgents 
was a particularly gruesome aspect of the counterinsurgency in Malaya which could 
physically affect British service personnel. John Chynoweth, a National Service subaltern 
attached to the Malay Regiment in 1953 and 1954, agreed with Templer. He wrote the 
following in a letter home in February 1954:           
 
I should like to have some of our MPs and Times letter writers out here to see the 
atmosphere in a New Village, and to carry a dead bandit five miles through primary 
jungle. The alternative is unpleasant, but not so exhausting.645       
 
Chin Peng, however, has stated that the mistreatment of Communist dead contravened 
Article 15 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949: ‘At all times, and particularly after 
an engagement, Parties to the conflict shall … search for the dead and prevent their being 
despoiled.’646 Herbert Andrew, another British serviceman, was in no doubt that the Geneva 
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Convention did not apply. Instead, he described a conflict where neither side could expect 
mercy from the opposition.647          
 
The practice was said to have been stopped and The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations 
in Malaya gave instructions on how to correctly deal with dead insurgents. Identifying the 
body had become fundamental to intelligence gathering as it enabled the security forces to 
know which MCP group was operating in the area. As such, the body had to be recovered, 
either being carried out by hand or by helicopter. If these were not viable options the manual 
gave instructions on how to photograph the body for identification, ‘The face should be 
washed and hair brushed’ and ‘eyes should be forced open’. ‘A full face photograph should 
be taken.’648  
 
Nevertheless, as Karl Hack writes, ‘the degree of dehumanisation of the enemy implied by 
a willingness to use decapitation for identification demands further analysis.’649 The 
suggestion here is that the dehumanising hunting metaphor along with the remoteness of the 
jungle contacts facilitated the practice.           
 
 
3.4.5. Regimental Culture and Competition 
 
Montgomery’s thinking on regional differences that underlined regimental culture persisted 
during the Malayan Emergency. Robin Farmer was a National Service subaltern with the 
Suffolk Regiment in Malaya. ‘My platoon’ wrote Farmer ‘consisted mainly of 18 year old 
Suffolk boys, and some from other East Anglian counties although [for] some reason, we 
had posted to us, Private Large, a “scouser” short, and a bit stout, who was really a fish out 
of water, and was no match for the resilience of the farmer boys.’650 Regimental culture was 
developed through inter-regimental competition that sometimes had an obvious application 
to operations. The Far East Land Forces Training Centre, for example, held a shooting 
competition. David Wadey, a civilian engineer attached to the military in Malaya, was in 
charge of setting up the course:      
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Each year the Training Centre held the Far East equivalent of Bisley. … Units came 
from Hong Kong, Brunei etc to participate and we had to provide special ranges in 
jungle surroundings. The ‘running man’ target was operated by a bicycle wheel and 
signal cable … A team could not be allowed to re-use a range which they had fired 
on before - not on jungle ranges!!651     
 
The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards were one of the first regiments sent to reinforce the security 
forces already in Malaya as the insurgency broke out. As such, they developed their own 
training separate from the FTC. They were deployed at the time when the Army were 
reacting to incidents. ‘Although we killed a considerable number of bandits’ wrote an early 
regimental history of the campaign ‘the main result was to keep the bandits on the move and 
to prevent them gaining the initiative.’ A year later, Major P. F. Fane Gladwin, mentioned 
above, attributed the ‘ever greater percentage of “kills” to “contacts”’ to training and the 
standardisation of patrol and ambush techniques. Ultimately, morale became conflated with 
regimental spirit. ‘This constant patrolling of jungle, rubber and swamp for over two and a 
half years called for great powers of endurance and morale. There is no doubt that the spirit 
of the company throughout the whole period was in the highest traditions of the 
Regiment’.652                        
 
These ‘kills’ became an affirmation of the training and a way to measure the success of 
patrols. Captain N.A.J. Anderson, of the 6th Battalion Gurkha Rifles wrote to his old 
headmaster in March 1955 describing an intelligence led patrol which resulted in ‘the killing 
of 6 out 6 bandits’. ‘It was’ wrote Anderson ‘a very good show, a kill of above 3 bandits is 
considered exceptional in this country and of course 100% success is very unusual.’653 
Conversely, a patrol that returned without having made a ‘kill’ was considered a failure. 
Michael Rugman was a young National Serviceman with the King's Royal Hussars in 
Malaya. In a letter home to his parents, dated the 19th September 1955, he described the 
outcome of an ultimately unsuccessful jungle patrol. ‘The week before last’ wrote Rugman 
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‘I went into the ulu (jungle) on a jungle bash. But we returned with no notches on our rifle 
butts! … It [was] rather like a ‘live’ Scout wide-game, the type that flop.’654          
 
As well as denoting the success of patrols, keeping a record of the insurgent body count 
inevitably resulted in inter-regimental competition, which took the form of keeping a 
scoreboard of kills. John Stanley Poole was deployed in 1950, with the Royal Marines to 
Perak. In his unpublished memoir Poole suggested little restraint or fire discipline when in 
the jungle in pursuit of kills:       
 
We did, however, keep a scoreboard. It’s not exactly a case that we were trigger-
happy, although nine months in the jungle did help a bit!’ It was better ‘to fire first, 
and that's what everybody was doing, not waiting for a shot, just firing first. 
Consequently our scorecard began with so many monkeys, wild pigs, snakes, in fact 
anything that moved.655   
 
‘The Green Howards scoreboard of terrorists eliminated’, L.S. Ives wrote ‘was gradually 
rising to equal that of other regiments, as training and experience began to pay off.’656 Then, 
as regiments neared the end of their tour increasing their total became an aid to motivation. 
A small booklet printed by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards stated that ‘in a last all-out final 
effort the score was brought to 110 killed’657 Len Spicer wrote that the final days of the 1st 
Battalion the Suffolk Regiments tour was quiet but that patrols were sent out ‘hoping to top 
the two hundred’. The regiment did not reach its target being ‘finally credited with 198 
official kills.’ This, wrote Spicer, was ‘the highest total of bandits killed by any British 
Regiment who served in the Emergency.’658 The Second World War had demonstrated to 
British officers that African recruits made good infantryman. Although this acknowledgment 
generally came with caveats which invoked ‘martial races’ theory, such as whether these 
recruits could be disciplined. Captain J.S. Wilson, for example, noted, that recruits form 
Iboland, Nigeria, responded to discipline and so generally made ‘excellent soldiers’ while 
the majority of those from Yourubaland, Nigeria, were ill-disciplined and ‘apt to make 
 
654 M.J. Rugman, ‘Letters’, 19th September 1955, IWM 67/92/1.           
655 J. S. Poole, ‘Under Three Fags: An Old Soldier's Tale, p.37, IWM 62/220/1.   
656 Ives, ‘A Musket for the King, p.205. 
657 J.G. Gibson, ‘Scots Guards - Short Account of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in Malaya’, IWM 15/13/1.    
658 Len Spicer, The Suffolks in Malaya, (Peterborough: Lawson Phelps, 1998), p.131.    
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barrack room lawyers.’659 Nevertheless, the fact that non-British regiments attained the 
highest scores in Malaya again challenged the assumptions of some. John Butler, a senior 
N.C.O. attached to the King’s African Rifles, wrote, ‘Much to the surprise of the few 
Europeans in the B[attalio]n, it was found that the Askari took to the jungle very well and 
soon became proficient in hunting out terrorists and in short order their score of kills began 
to mount until eventually for the time spent in the country they became second only to the 
Gurkha in killing and capturing Communist Troops’.660 Others, however, were quick to 
explain away the higher scores of competing regiments.      
 
Comments by officers often typified regimental rivalry, which could overshadow wider 
strategic issues. John Baynes, who had served as an officer with the Cameronians in Malaya 
from 1950 to 1953,661 argued that his regiment only killed fewer insurgents than the Gurkhas 
because they had spent less time in the country.662 Baynes also used tactical differences 
underwritten by assumptions about regimental identities to diminish the Suffolk Regiment’s 
record. The Suffolks, argued Baynes, recorded more kills because they only sent ‘small 
selected patrols, often consisting largely of officers or senior NCOs.’ This, wrote Baynes, 
would be ‘unthinkable’ in a Scottish Unit. ‘No self-respecting Jock, however lowly his rank, 
would accept being left out of an operation’.663 As the Emergency progressed one 
commanding officer appeared to lose sight of the fact that declining numbers of insurgents 
indicated that the security forces were containing, if not defeating the insurgency. Instead, 
he complained that his regiment could not compete with earlier tallies because there were 
too few insurgents left in his area of operations. In late 1952 the 1st Somerset Regiment 
relieved the Suffolk Regiment in Malaya. Brigadier J.L. Brind, then the Somerset’s 
commanding officer, noted with some regret that ‘At the end of 1952, their “score” was 190 
odd as we were taking over, the double century was getting nearer and nearer … From our 
 
659 Captain J.S. Wilson, ‘Notes and Suggestions on the Tribal compositions of the R.W.A.F.F. in Nigeria for 
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point of view it was perhaps unfortunate that they were so successful, for by the time we 
took over, the number of CTs left in Selangor was not so great as we would have wished.’664                      
 
 
3.4.6. Morale and Minimum Force 
 
On 11th December 1948, a Scots Guards platoon, led by two NCOs, patrolled into a small 
settlement on the Sungei Remok rubber estate, near Batang Kali, Selangor. By 12th 
December, the Guards had left the settlement having killed 24 unarmed Chinese men over 
two days. The killings were initially reported as the culmination of a successful operation, 
the most successful since the Emergency had begun. Then, amid growing speculation, it was 
suggested that if the workers were not ‘bandits’ they were their supporters. Suspicions 
continued to mount when the manager of the rubber estate protested that the dead had a long 
record of good conduct. The army duly changed its version of events:  the 24 had been shot 
while trying to escape.665 Later evidence suggested this telling of events was also untrue. In 
2009 Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor published Slaughter and Deception at Batang Kali. It 
presented the testimony of survivors and perpetrators, which although contradictory, 
suggested unlawful killings has taken place.666 The earlier narrative, that those shot were 
suspected terrorists trying to escape, picked up on an important theme during the Malayan 
Emergency.         
 
In The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960, Anthony Short wrote that many of 
the incident reports at the beginning of the Emergency recorded that men were shot while 
running away. He also noted that incriminating evidence was rarely found.667 Short’s own 
experiences on National Service in Malaya in 1948-9 enabled him to articulate the soldiers 
‘perpetual dilemma’ in the counterinsurgency role: 
 
With incidents or information pointing unmistakably to the presence of guerrillas in 
a particular area, how, in the few seconds of confusion when figures are running from 
 
664 Brigadier J.L. Brind, ‘The Somersets in Malaya’, p.11, IWM 67/142/1.       
665 Christopher Hale, ‘Batang Kali: Britain's My Lai?’, History Today, 62:7, (July, 2012), pp.3-4.  
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huts into jungle does one decide to open fire or not? If one does not, the best that can 
happen is that a possible enemy might escape. With a small patrol, what is equally 
likely is that it will itself be attacked if it has, in fact, succeeded in surprising a 
guerrilla group. But, unless they are uniformed or obviously armed, there is no 
guarantee that the people who are running are guerrillas or wanted criminals rather 
than very frightened men and women who may or may not be willing or unwilling 
guerrilla supporters.668    
 
Political scientist Thomas Mockaitis has also examined the soldier's dilemma from an 
academic viewpoint. Soldiers were expected to act in accordance with the common law 
principle of minimum force when acting in aid of the civil power. This meant they were 
subject to legal action should they exceed what was considered to be the necessary amount 
of force. Conversely, a soldier could be questioned, if not subjected to disciplinary 
procedures should they fail to apply sufficient force to suppress the given situation.669 David 
French has argued that the concept of minimum necessary force within the Kings and Queens 
Regulations and the Manual of Military Law was not clearly defined and so did not provide 
a workable guide for those whose job it was to use force during Britain's postwar 
counterinsurgencies. Instead, those on the ground were left to decide what force was 
necessary and then wait to see if their actions would later be questioned by superiors. This, 
in turn, left soldiers feeling vulnerable should political expediency call for a scapegoat.670 
Conversely, Huw Bennett has highlighted 77 cases of suspected insurgents who were shot 
while trying to escape, between July 1948 and April 1949, in support of his argument that 
there was ambivalent regulation on the use of force during the opening years of the 
Emergency.671 Thomas Mockaitis recognised Bennett’s suggestion that the figures were 
incomplete, meaning further incidents may have gone unrecorded, but also makes the point 
that not all of those killed were innocent civilians.672  
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In August 1948 Headquarters Malaya Command gave instructions on the use of force. The 
formal instructions stated that an officer or other rank may use force when affecting an arrest. 
This force did not extend to causing death unless the person is suspected of being armed.673 
HQ Malaya Commands ‘Notes for the Guidance of Commanding Officers’ came, however, 
with a covering letter for officers, which created tensions within the document. The covering 
letter recounted an incident in which soldiers withheld fire because of ‘doubt’, and, as a 
result, were later fired upon by that same group. It was an anecdote that undermined the 
instructions by inferring that in cases of uncertainty force should be used. This was a 
sentiment that was effectively reinforced within the instructions, which stated that the soldier 
would be ‘protected’ in the event of civilian casualties. ‘In short,’ as Karl Hack has argued, 
‘the instructions attempted to encourage aggressive action and a willingness to make snap 
judgements about who was consorting with bandits, while straining to remain technically 
within ER limitations. Given the document’s internal tensions, the message that may have 
stood out most for soldiers was that, provided they could claim they were following these 
orders, they would not be prosecuted.’674 As the prosecution of these orders appeared to rest 
on suspicion, and invoked the notion of duty, it not unreasonable to suggest that there was 
negligible accountability and the concern was more with the prosecution rather than the 
delimitation of force in the opening  years. 
 
A 23rd July 1948 note from Johore District to 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders and 1st 
Battalion 2nd Gurkha Rifles was also concerned that too many insurgents were escaping, and 
that troops ‘must be quicker on the draw’.675 That said, later Emergency Regulations 
arguably sought to clarify and delimit the use of force. Emergency Regulation 27A of 
January 1949, for example, allowed weapons to be used when affecting an arrest or 
preventing an escape but insisted that weapons could be used only after calling ‘in a loud 
voice’ and giving ‘reasonable’ opportunity to stop and submit to arrest.676 Nevertheless, in 
January 1949 the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney gave the following, much quoted, 
 
673 ‘Notes for the Guidance of Commanding Officers’, with covering note from Brigadier i/c Administration, 
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statement: ‘[I]t is most important that police and soldiers, who are not saints, should not get 
the impression that every small mistake is going to be the subject of a public enquiry or that 
it is better to do nothing at all than to do the wrong thing quickly.’677  
  
General Sir Neil Ritchie stated in his September 1949 report that some lessons had been 
drawn from the Emergency, submitted to the War Office, and included in the Imperial 
Policing and Duties In Aid Of The Civil Power booklet dated June 1949.678 The booklet 
Imperial Policing stated that man-management, welfare, and a clear and ‘un-biased 
explanation’ of the conditions and objectives was essential. ‘The more troops understand 
what they are doing and why, the better will be their discipline and morale.’679 Captain Philip 
Head, an officer  with the Royal Artillery in Malaya 1953-1955, wrote that ‘“O[rder]” 
groups, briefings and the daily “morning prayers” were always under the chairmanship of a 
police officer.’680 While ‘morning prayers’ may have been reserved for officers, the situation 
was also explained to other ranks. Ron Miles, a rifleman in the opening years of the 
Emergency, gave an account of this explanation: 
 
We were given certain talks and had lectures from Chiefs of Police - Malay, Chinese 
and British came into the camp and they told us that this enemy is invisible, one never 
sees him but he is out there in the jungle: and these Officers giving the lectures would 
produce, like producing a rabbit out of a hat, an actual cap with a red star on it … 
We were told that our job in Malaya was to assist the [P]olice Force and we were to 
go into the jungle stay in as long as we could, follow all clues and leads as to where 
these Communist Guerrillas were hiding (and they were in camps and in regiments 
in the jungle) and we were to sort them out and kill them, bring back the bodies which 
would probably be put on view for other local citizens to see as a deterrent to them 
from giving information to these Communists.681         
 
677 FCO 537/4753: Statement by the High Commissioner for Malaya, Annexure ‘A’ to minutes of the 16th 
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681 Miles, ‘The Adventures of a Coldstream Guardsman’, pp.89-90.     




Taking Miles’s account as an example, explanations of purpose on jungle operations 
appeared to have emphasised the use of force rather than ideas about caution. An important 
further concern for the prosecution of force during the Emergency was the terrain over which 
operations would take place.  
 
As the Imperial Policing and Duties In Aid Of The Civil Power (June 1949) booklet had 
made clear that ‘no more force shall be applied than the situation demands.’682 In support of 
this principle the booklet noted that ‘[d]uties in aid of the civil power call for the highest 
standards of discipline.’ The discipline section certainly seemed to be derived from the 
jungle campaign in Malaya, reproducing the language used there. Discipline meant 
maintaining a good standard of dress to convey a sense of professionalism, and politeness, 
to give confidence to the civilian population. ‘In jungle and hilly bandit country’ however, 
‘smart turn out may not be practicable: here the conditions may be far nearer those of normal 
active service when certain latitude is inevitable; but such conditions must be regarded as 
exceptional.’683 Further, discipline meant patience, which the booklet recognised was ‘sorely 
strained’ in the face of these prolonged and ‘unpleasant duties’:    
 
Casualties among their comrades and acts of terrorists, who are to the soldiers no 
more than despicable murders, try their patience and naturally tend to embitter their 
outlook. The desire to hit back and the ordinary and quite natural motive of revenge 
will only be held in check by good, sound and humanely administered discipline.684               
 
The ‘civilised’ virtues that the booklet called for; cleanliness, politeness and patience, appear 
to have had no place in the hostile terrain over which the counterinsurgency in Malaya was 
taking place. Instead, the booklet highlighted the dual roles contained within 
counterinsurgency. On one hand, service personnel would prosecute a jungle campaign of 
patrols and ambushes in which the use of force was not delimited. On the other hand, they 
would be asked to conduct operations which brought them into contact with civilian 
populations, which required that the use of force must be controlled.                 
 
 
682 The War Office, Imperial Policing and Duties In Aid Of The Civil Power, (June, 1949), p.5, LH 15/8/221.       
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As ATOM stated there were controlled areas, in which civilian could reside only with special 
permission, and danger areas, which denoted areas where only authorised personnel could 
enter.685 The use of force was more likely in danger areas, as John Bourne, a young officer 
who was responsible for the motor transport of the King’s African Rifles (KAR), described 
in a letter to his parents, dated March 1954. ‘I … went to Tranum [Tras] ghost town, near 
where Sir Henry Gurney was shot.’ wrote Bourne. ‘The citizens of the town were involved 
and therefore in ‘C’ Coy’s village. Then up the gap which is the most dangerous road in 
Malaya. Twenty miles up over hair-pin bends, with drops on all sides up to 2,800’ and a 
similar 20 miles down the other side. … Every few hundred yards there is a notice:- “This 
is the Danger Area. Do not enter. Anyone entering this area is liable to be shot without 
warning.”686 
 
One account suggested there was little control over the use of force in some of these 
controlled areas. Walter Schwarz, a subaltern with the Manchester Regiment in 1952, 
implied that killing an insurgent was prioritised over ideas about caution in controlled places. 
In his diary he recounted the words of his senior officer before going out on patrol:        
 
We obviously cannot have a centrally controlled fireplan. Each of you has sufficient 
experience now to be able to open fire when you judge fit. Don’t be too cautious. 
You have had plenty of warnings about holding your fire until it is most effective but 
that can be overdone. We’re at the stage now when we want a bandit at all costs - 
and one in the hand is worth two in the bush. When you're certain of killing one, 
shoot and don't worry about anymore.687  
 
The diary insinuated that killing an insurgent took priority even at the cost of civilian life. 
Schwarz's officer went on to state:       
 
One last thing I want to make clear. Don't worry about the tappers. I don’t want 
anyone coming back saying: I couldn't shoot because a tapper was in the way. If a 
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tapper is in your line of fire it's just too bad. Remember he's probably a food supplier 
or something anyway. They're not innocent, not a single one.688  
 
A further account suggested limited accountability should civilians be killed in controlled 
areas. Brigadier C.N. Barker was a company commander in Malaya between 1953 and 1955. 
By this time the insurgents had learnt to exploit the gaps left by different state 
administrations, which in this instance meant occupying the border areas between states. 
Barker’s job was to patrol the state boundary between Negri Sembilan and Johore in southern 
Malaya. The jungle had been declared off limits, under the Emergency Regulations, to all 
except the security forces and those whose job it was to work the jungle’s edge. As Barker 
writes, ‘When we had jungle clearance from our political masters any contacts we made 
were deemed to be CTs.’ Further, the exigencies of the jungle meant service personnel were 
reluctant to challenge those encountered: ‘In the dense jungle there was no time or 
opportunity for formal challenging one shot first and asked questions afterwards.’ Therefore, 
in the minds of British service personnel, any other group encountered in the jungle were 
presumed to be guilty and by extension were subject to the use of force.                  
 
Barker goes on to recount an instance where his patrol opened fire on a group who were 
presumed to be insurgents preparing a meeting site but instead claimed to be rattan cutters. 
The contact was later deliberated upon by the local representative of the civil power:      
 
Our political masters immediately claimed that we should have challenged them. The 
Titi [C]hinese leaders also complained so I was summoned to the District Officer and 
interrogated. It was finally agreed that we had official clearance and were acting on 
authentic information and the so called rotan [rattan] cutters were quite likely CTs 
using cover to prepare the meeting site. It does indicate the delicate line that the 
soldier treads in these situations and how important it is to get ones authority if 
possible in writing to safeguard ones soldiers from unauthorised killing or worse. It 
is easy for those sitting in offices no where near the action to criticise and this was 
the type of incident where soldiery doing a hazardous task in extremely difficult 
circumstances can come under critical and sometimes hostile examination where 
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political considerations and expediency are paramount! Had one of the [C]hinese 
died things might have been very tricky.689            
 
The account is interesting as it suggests a degree of accountability, given questions were 
asked after political pressure was applied, but also suggests that accountability ultimately 
had very limited power against the bureaucratic process that legitimised the use of force. The 
patrol was authorised, the intelligence deemed to be good, therefore the group was guilty. 
The account also shows how that accountability, such that it was, was perceived by those 
charged with prosecuting the counterinsurgency. Service personnel remained leery of their 
‘political masters’ knowing that their actions were subject to interpretation that may be 
driven by a change of political agenda. Therefore, those whose actions were permitted under 
the regulations retained the fear that they would later be prosecuted. What was more, this 
fear was heightened by the thought that their potential prosecutors would not be soldiers who 
had some understanding of the space in which they were being asked to operate, but civilians, 
whose expertise was grounded in legal and moral certitudes. The confusion and stress of 
operations would not translate to the sterile atmosphere of the barracks or courtroom where 
their actions would ultimately be deliberated upon.                                  
 
In 1955, ‘troops were ordered to “shout before you shoot”’, even for suspect insurgents (as 
opposed to just escapees and those running in uncertain circumstances). This was to enable 
insurgents to surrender during the amnesty declared that year ahead of negotiations in 
December. But when large scale surrenders did not materialise, this policy ‘was ended soon 
after the peace talks.’690 In February 1956, ‘full scale Security Force operations against the 
terrorists were resumed and continued throughout the year.’ 691 By 1957 morale among 
soldiers was reportedly ‘very high’. This, noted the January 1957 report, was reflected in the 
‘enthusiasm’ and ‘eagerness’ with which soldiers were pursuing the insurgents. The earlier 
fears stated in the cover note appeared to have been overcome. ‘Cases of excessive caution 
are almost unknown,’ stated the report, ‘and where troops are blameworthy for unsuccessful 
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contacts, the cause has usually been recklessness and over-enthusiasm. Their fighting spirit 





The Second World War saw increasing importance placed on the concept of morale as way 
to prevent disciplinary and psychiatric breakdowns. As this chapter has showed, the morale 
of service personnel was considered something to be monitored by senior officers during the 
postwar period. In Malaya, during the Emergency, morale came to be conceptualised in 
relation to the operational requirements and hardships of the insurgency. A note on troop 
leadership, for example, which urged officers to be vigilant on the subject, warned that the 
boring, and at times unpleasant nature of counterinsurgency lowered morale and that high 
morale was created by success against the insurgents.693            
 
The population control measures, such as resettlement, were often regarded as punitive by 
service personnel, and the associated destruction of property as distasteful.694 The operations 
over hostile terrain were a significant stress, while the prospect of being ambushed was 
perhaps the greatest tangible stress of participation during the Malayan Emergency. The 
evidence of successful ambushes dispelled ideas about insurgent incompetence or inferiority 
and instead reinforced the efficacy of this tactic and of the insurgents as fighters.695 The sites 
of successful insurgent ambushes became infamous areas in the minds of service 
personnel.696 Narrowly avoiding an ambush or dealing with the immediate aftermath could 
prove a traumatic experience and be deleterious to morale.697     
 
As research emanating from Palestine had suggested, fear could impair judgement, 
exaggerate dangers and lead to ‘wild’ behaviour, instead of cool considered action.’698 The 
training and its overarching narrative framed jungle operations, reducing soldiers’ 
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perceptions to ‘visual stereotypes’.699 The behavioural training at the Jungle Warfare School 
sought to overcome fear and indecision by creating a conditioned response, or a pattern of 
behaviour to defer to, while under the stress of contact.700 Out on operations, the hunting 
terminology used to frame operations and provide a behavioural model for service personnel, 
lent resilience but at the unacceptable cost of dehumanising the insurgents.701  
 
Certainly, in the opening years of the Emergency, senior officers in Malaya appeared more 
concerned about soldiers not using force, and insurgents escaping, than delimiting force.702 
Subsequent Emergency Regulations sought to inhibit the use of force against people running 
and escapees by reiterating that a warning should be issued and allowed opportunity to 
surrender afterwards.703 This was even extended, very briefly, to suspected, armed insurgents  
in the 1955 ‘shout before you shoot’ initiative, though that was short lived.704 In controlled 
areas, however, where there was a presumption of guilt there appeared to be little concern 
over the use of force.705 Regimental culture drove inter-regimental competition which 
manifested itself in keeping a scoreboard of kills.706 By 1957, the earlier fears about solders 
being too cautious appeared to have been overcome. ‘Cases of excessive caution are almost 
unknown’, stated the Director of Operations.707 In short, the training, which sought to instil 
‘fighting spirit’, and regimental culture, perhaps most apparent in the inter-regimental 
competition, was weighted toward the use of force.            
 
This chapter has showed how the concept of morale was adapted to, and morale maintained 
during, the Malayan Emergency. The next chapter will turn to the incidence, 
conceptualisation and management of service personnel who did not conform to this model 
of morale and showed symptoms of stress.  
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Military Psychiatry and the Malayan Emergency 
 
 
4.1. Introduction    
 
There has to date been little research into the management of psychiatric conditions during 
Britain’s postwar period of decolonisation. Ben Shephard’s social history, A War of Nerves 
(2000), for example, moved from the Second World War to the war in Vietnam. The Vietnam 
War motivated research into a ‘post-Vietnam syndrome’ which in turn, Shephard argued, 
became instrumental in the inclusion of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the third edition 
of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980.708 Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely have described ‘a 
paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of post-trauma illness’ during the twentieth 
century.709 Up until the 1970s, those who displayed enduring symptoms of mental illness as 
a result of a traumatic experience were considered to be ‘constitutionally predisposed to 
mental illness’. The inclusion of PTSD in the DSM-III, however, transferred the main 
emphasis in explanations from individual susceptibility to the traumatic experience itself.710 
For most of the twentieth century prior to that point, by contrast, psychiatric casualties during 
war had been thought of mainly in terms of constitutional weakness.     
 
The Korean War (1950-1953) was the only major conflict in which British forces were 
engaged in during the postwar period. Jones and Wessely have argued that it ‘led to no major 
innovation in the conception or treatment of psychiatric battle casualties’.711 Situated 
between the Second World War and Vietnam, Britain's postwar counterinsurgencies have 
been thought to offer little to the history of military psychiatry, or trauma, and have been 
overlooked. This chapter will nuance this history by suggesting that just as the military 
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conception of morale had become orientated towards the low intensity warfare engendered 
within the Malayan Emergency so too did the management of psychiatric casualties. In order 
to do this, this chapter will first map out the system and psychiatric thought which had 
evolved during the Second World War to deal with psychiatric casualties in forward areas. 
It will then focus on the features of forward psychiatry which would become instrumental in 
the management of psychiatric conditions during the Malayan Emergency.  
 
 
4.2. British Military Psychiatry during the Second World War  
 
In 1942, Brigadier G.W.B. James, psychiatric consultant to Middle East Force in North 
Africa, recommended that ‘physical exhaustion’ be operationalised as the preliminary 
diagnosis for all psychiatric cases. Only if these cases persisted past 7-10 days was a 
diagnosis of neuroses to be made.712 The ‘Exhaustion’ label was applied to ‘acute conditions, 
wherein fatigue, fear, lack of sufficient sleep, water and food had overcome the normal 
resilience of the human mind.’713 These acute, or transient, symptoms became normalised. 
As Robert Ahrenfeldt stated, ‘however basically stable they may be, [soldiers] will 
ultimately break down, in direct relation to the intensity and duration of their exposure to the 
stress of battle’.714 In response to these conditions service personnel were given ‘simple 
psychotherapy’ consisting of ‘persuasion, explanation, firm encouragement and 
suggestion.’715 Sedatives were used to relieve distress ‘and prevent fixation of symptoms 
and further deterioration.’716 
 
The importance of treating psychiatric casualties in forward areas was to prevent these acute 
cases from becoming chronic.717 In turn, the chronicity of the disorder was thought to be, in 
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the Second World War, Arthur Salusbury MacNaulty and W. Franklin Mellor (Eds), (London: HMSO, 1968), 
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part, determined by the application of a psychiatric label. Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Evans, 
writing about the 1944-45 campaign in North Western Europe, put forward the logic 
underlying the term’s use. ‘All psychiatric cases were to be diagnosed ‘Exhaustion,’ with 
the object of choosing a label which would not suggest to the soldier an organic disability 
but rather something from which he might confidently expect to recover within a short 
time.’718 In 1945 Brigadier John Rawlings Rees published The Shaping of Psychiatry by 
War, in which he emphasised the impact of psychiatric terminology on the course of 
psychiatric conditions and elaborated on the intention underlying the use of the term 
exhaustion. Where ‘Shell shock’ or ‘anxiety neurosis’ implied a serious condition the term 
‘exhaustion’ acted as a euphemism for all psychiatric conditions avoiding the application of 
a particular diagnostic label. Without having a psychiatric diagnosis to fixate on, the 
serviceman, Rawlings Rees argued, could be returned to duty before realising the true nature 
of their condition.719  
 
While the system of psychiatric triage, encapsulated within the exhaustion label appeared 
effective in returning personnel to duty in the short term, the efficacy of this strategy for the 
longer term was questioned. One neurologist stationed at 39th British General Hospital in 
Belgium, in 1944, reported that: ‘Preliminary analysis of 107 cases received early on in 
operations shows that 43% had previously been treated elsewhere for “exhaustion”, returned 
to duty and relapsed.’720 The exigencies of the Second World War, however, meant these 
concerns were largely negated as forward psychiatry engendered a different standard of care 
than in civilian life. ‘If a sergeant can recover his poise for one month,’ said Lieutenant-
Colonel T. F. Main ‘it can be regarded as a satisfactory therapeutic result in an Army fighting 
for its very life’.721 Within this system, the management of psychiatric casualties was 
primarily concerned with conserving manpower. As one military psychiatrist put it: ‘his 
patient is the Army rather than the individual.’722      
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The emphasis on early treatment meant that the medical officer became an instrumental part 
of the successful application of forward psychiatry and needed to be trained accordingly. As 
Lieutenant-General Sir Neil Cantlie stated, ‘The R.M.O. who dabbles in psychiatry on the 
wrong lines, and without adequate experience is a danger to a unit, and should be 
removed.’723 In the Far East, as it came to be recognised that the ‘supply of psychiatrists was 
always less than the demand’, Medical Officers with civil experience of psychiatry were 
graded as specialists, and others participated in a programme of training under the tutelage 
of experienced psychiatrists. While not comprehensive, the training was thought sufficient 
to ‘carrying out specific tasks in the relatively homogeneous group of Service patients’724 
Major J. Matas, a divisional psychiatrist stationed in Burma, reported that his division 
‘organised a jungle school of medicine’ which included lectures in ‘forward Psychiatry.’725 
A further divisional psychiatrist in Burma, Major P.J.R. Davis, read the psychiatric reports 
generated in North Africa and reproduced their lessons in his own report, which he circulated 
to Regimental medical officers and field ambulances. He followed his report with a brief 
letter, circulated to MOs before going into action, stating that ‘the initial diagnosis on the 
Field Medical Card should in every case be “Exhaustion”.’726 He reported some success, 
with Regimental Medical Officers taking the initiative, providing brief periods of rest and 
sedation, preventing evacuation further down the line.727   
 
By October 1944, Brigadier E. Phillips, Director Medical Services 21st Army Group, had 
decided on the policy that all medical officers under his command receive some level of 
psychiatric training in psychiatry in forward areas. He proposed ‘short 4-day courses of 
instruction in psychiatry for all R.M.Os. and longer courses (probably a month) for selected 
M.Os. who will be able to run Div. Centres.’728 The proposed location was at 32nd British 
General Hospital, located at Wavre Notre Dame between October 1944 and March 1945.729 
It was thought this ‘arrangement will be productive of much good in the handling of the 
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“exhaustion” cases.’730 Medical officers, however, could be leery of psychiatry and appeared 
to prefer a simple system of diagnosis and referral. Lieutenant Eric Cole was sent to the 32nd 
British General Hospital to attend one of these courses in January 1945. A series of letters 
home revealed his frustration at the course, the people and psychiatry in general. To keep 
himself sane he reduced the complex system of symptoms, conditions and theory to 
doggerel.731 On completion of the course he was posted to the 35th Field Dressing Station 
under the command of a psychiatrist, where a much simpler classificatory system was in 
operation. ‘In this unit’ writes Cole, ‘I am nominally looking after four wards (about 70-80 
patients), but they are all exhaustion cases ie. neurotics or psychotics or just plain 
exhaustion’.732  
 
In 1944 the instructional film ‘Field Psychiatry for the Medical Officer’ was produced by 
the War Office. It codified the preferred nomenclature and method of treatment but also 
made an effort to destigmatise psychiatric casualties. The film follows the case of ‘Wragge’, 
a fictional soldier who succumbs to a nervous condition after a sustained period under fire. 
Following accusations of cowardice and malingering, Wragge is dispatched to the MO. 
There he is diagnosed with ‘exhaustion’ and the initial treatment - a form of psychiatric first-
aid - which takes the form of hot tea and a period of sedated rest. The MO then goes on to 
engage Wragge’s platoon commander on the issue of stigma. Over a glass of beer, he says 
that any man can ‘crack up’ given enough stress. When challenged with becoming overly 
interested in psychiatry the MO replies, ‘I’m no bloody psychiatrist, it's just common sense.’ 
Just as the MO was attempting to distance himself from psychiatry the army was attempting 
to reduce the stigma surrounding psychiatric conditions by de-medicalising them. To 
underline the message, in the closing scene, the roles are reversed as the Medical Officer 
himself becomes the subject of examination by his Commanding Officer, found to have a 
stress reaction and told to take a short period of rest, with sedatives. The film normalised 
psychiatric conditions but did so under the proviso that these were transient reactions.733     
 
In September 1944 the film was reviewed in the Lancet under the heading ‘Field Psychiatry 
on the Screen’. It was, as the Lancet’s reviewer described, a ‘human sensible little 
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document’, with the repeated message of tea and sedatives becoming almost a ‘mystic rite’, 
which presented what was to be the ‘routine treatment of acute anxiety’. The reviewer also 
saw the film’s potential as both a ‘scrimshanker’s guide’ and a warning against the use of 
such terms, ‘we cannot afford to bandy about such words as “yellow” and “scrimshanker” 
in a world where anybody is liable to have his bluff called at a moment’s notice.’734  This 
encapsulated the tension within military and medical thinking. On one hand simulation was 
expected while on the other it was accepted that breakdowns were inevitable. This tension 
was to some extent resolved through the expectation that breakdowns had to be earned. 
Breakdowns then, were being thought of along moral as well as medical lines. One MO 
described the term ‘physical exhaustion’ as a replacement for ‘Shell Shock’. These he further 
subdivided into true cases, meaning those who were ‘shaken up’ after an extended period in 
the line; those who were ‘Bomb happy’, these would be referred to a psychiatrist and often 
downgraded; and ‘Nerves’. This final category included those cases who may not have been 
genuine, an indication of which was reporting sick before battle.735   
 
Colonel F.M. Richardson, an RMO during the war, thought ‘exhaustion’ had become a 
catchall among RMOs and de-stigmatised breakdowns among soldiers. Instead, in an effort 
to re-stigmatise breakdowns Richardson used ‘Fear Neurosis’ because it was a ‘diagnosis 
which the average soldier would not want to label himself.’736 Nevertheless, exhaustion was 
more generally considered to be effective as a label. Major Davis, for example, thought it to 
be a useful label for the medical officer, and that ‘labelling all cases “Exhaustion” did justify 
itself’ as a preventative measure. ‘Although, naturally enough, many of the troops soon 
tumbled to the fact that the term was synonymous with what they thought of as “Shell-
shock”,’ wrote Davies, ‘it was apparent to me that not a few of them did accept the term at 
its face value, and did regard their condition from the beginning with an optimism and a will 
to recovery that would, I think, have been dispelled if they had been allowed to regard 
themselves as “shell-shocked”.737      
 
In summation, nomenclature came to encapsulate the system of psychiatric triage in 
operation during the Second World War. It was, in effect, a preventative measure which 
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sought to arrest the course and duration of psychiatric illness. The nomenclature also sought 
to normalise and destigmatise psychiatric breakdowns. As Major Kenton wrote, although 
mediated by preventative measures, ‘it is still axiomatic that wherever fighting is in progress 
casualties of a psychiatric nature will occur, and that when the fighting is severe, the number 
of these casualties becomes such as to constitute a military problem.’738 This chapter will 
suggest that the particular level of intensity of fighting in counterinsurgency, the application 
of nomenclature, and the issue of stigma all played an instrumental role in the 
conceptualisation and management of psychiatric casualties in the Far East during the 
Malayan Emergency. Firstly, however, this next section will address the selection of service 
personnel before they deployed to Malaya.    
 
 
4.3. The Selection of Service Personnel for the Far East  
 
One of the most urgent questions concerned what role, if any, psychiatry should play in the 
selection of military personnel. In the aftermath of the Second World War a reaction against 
the use of psychiatry became evident within the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps. 
Captain L’Etang, a regimental medical officer during the war, charged psychiatrists with 
having wasted manpower and reduced fighting efficiency.739 The concern was that 
psychiatrists were too quick to downgrade or discharge service personnel. As Lieutenant-
Colonel Harry Pozner, an Adviser in Psychiatry, put it ‘Army psychiatry is once again 
experiencing the downward swing of the pendulum.’740 Official figures reflect this 
downward swing. Between 1948 and 1958, with the Berlin airlift and the upswing in what 
came to be called the ‘Cold War’, the Army grew from 418,000 to 450,000 service personnel. 
Conversely, the number of civilian and military specialists in psychiatry employed by the 
Army was practically halved, from 82 to 42.741 Despite this downturn, rates of psychiatric 
discharge during the twentieth century peaked in 1950 at 44% of all medical discharges.742 
The National Service Act, which ‘brought in a larger miscellany of individuals’, as well as 
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stricter medical standards were put forward in explanation of this postwar psychiatric 
morbidity trend.743    
 
The new  medical standards were codified in the PULHEEMS system, a method of selecting 
personnel based on physical, mental and emotional capacity.744 After a period of trial and 
revision the PULHEEMS system was introduced officially in 1948, following a War Office 
guide to its application and a revised instruction manual for the guidance of medical 
boards.745 Despite the apparently waning influence of military psychiatry, the new medical 
system of classification firmly embedded psychiatric thought, and by extension the 
psychiatrist, within its administration. Psychiatric unfitness, particularly psychosomatic 
symptomatology, meaning physical illness with a psychological cause, was emphasised as a 
drain on both morale and the administrative capability of the military.746  
 
The emphasis placed on the role of inheritance in the causation of mental illness meant an 
extended family history assumed greater importance. Professor D.K. Henderson, however, 
noted that exactly recording family history came with methodological concerns:      
 
Human families with their long interval between generations and the small number 
of their members do not lend themselves to studies of heredity. Moreover, it is often 
necessary to collect data about ancestors on a hearsay basis only. Such terms as 
nervousness, irritability, and so on, especially as given by lay persons, can have little 
value. Yet in spite of the inevitable lack of exactitude, we are certain that the 
hereditary factor is of great importance.747              
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The psychiatric history and psychological fitness of service personnel took a prominent 
position within a system that was designed with the defence and administration of Britain's 
overseas territories in mind. As a guide to the PULHEEMS system stated, the fittest 
personnel were graded as: ‘Men whose emotional stability has not been questioned by the 
medical officer or personnel selection officer or men who on psychiatric examination show 
neither significant history nor present signs or symptoms of psychiatric or psychosomatic 
illness. Fit for full service in any part of the world.’748  By contrast, men with slight question 
marks could be retained for service in the UK.  
 
The high number of incoming recruits and a lack of psychiatric specialists raised serious 
questions about how effectively such standards could be implemented. Following the mass 
demobilisation of service personnel after the war, the number of medical boards had been 
reduced. Some, however, had to be reopened temporarily to deal with the number of 
examinations conducted by National Service Medical Boards. The latter peaked at well over 
300,000 in 1952.749 It is unknown how many of these examinations involved a psychiatrist 
or would result in a referral to one, but by 1956 the Army Psychiatry Advisory Committee 
had recognised that a continued shortage of experienced military psychiatrists meant that 
they could not adequately deal with their existing commitments to selection and clinical 
work.750  
 
Harry Pozner, meanwhile, used the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps (JRAMC) to 
argue, in 1950, against the old criticism that army psychiatry had in the past been used to 
dispose of problem soldiers.751 Selection could, however, save the significant costs and 
complications of having to treat them later on. The use of psychiatry in this way became 
more plausible during the National Service era which saw whole cohorts recruited again, 
rather than just volunteers. In practice, the psychiatric discharge rate, which peaked in 1950 
at 44% of all medical discharges, suggested several things could have been going on. 752 The 
psychiatrist, faced with a high number of recruits and guided by the strict standards of 
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selection, may have erred on the side of caution when it came to service personnel with any 
hint of a psychiatric history. What is perhaps more likely, given the shortage of psychiatrists, 
the psychiatric standards set by the system of selection were being utilised by non-
psychiatric selection officers to discharge recruits who posed a potential problem. Both 
eventualities made it almost inevitable that service personnel would be miscategorised as 
either unfit for service, or, more germane to this thesis, as unfit for service abroad in active 
theatres such as Malaya.         
 
Others were mindful that using psychiatric interviews to make predictions about a recruit’s 
suitability was not within the psychiatrist’s capability and would bring them into conflict 
with their professional ethics. Desmond Curran, who was the first Consultant Psychiatrist to 
the Royal Navy during the Second World War, speaking in October 1951, thought 
psychiatrists would be overstepping the limits of psychiatric knowledge were they to start 
selecting personnel for specific roles. Instead, Curran thought the psychiatrist should be 
limited to negative selection, which he defined as ruling a potential officer recruit out on 
medical grounds. Positive selection, picking the right recruit for the job, should be left to 
non-medical officers. To cross the boundary into positive selection, based on a psychiatric 
assessment of the recruit, would be to enter into a professional dilemma. If the recruit is 
made aware that the aim of the psychiatric interview was to assess their suitability to a role, 
the recruit would be reluctant to answer questions honestly, and assessment would be 
compromised. Conversely, if the recruit was not told and then the results of his interview 
shared with non-medical officers, this would constitute ‘a gross breach of professional 
confidence’. In short, for Curran the psychiatrist should be limited to a simple statement 
concerning the existence of a medical condition.753 An extract of the address was circulated 
to trainee psychiatrists by the Assistant Professor of Army Psychiatry at Millbank.754           
          
As mentioned above, the PULHEEMS system was oriented toward service abroad, with only 
those deemed to be psychologically fit, to be deployed. Evidence of psychiatric or 
psychosomatic conditions could be enough to prevent service personnel from being sent 
overseas. In 1952 for instance, Lieutenant Walter Schwarz, when he was preparing to be 
deployed to Malaya, sought medical attention for a persistent skin condition. As the 
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condition had resisted treatment it carried the implication that its cause was psychological. 
The length of treatment and the tropical climate of his destination put his deployment in 
doubt. In fear of becoming the ‘Depot Ghost’, Schwarz protested his fitness and was referred 
to the psychiatrist whom he light-heartedly claimed (in his diary) to have ‘placated with brief 
character studies’ of his ‘father, sister and super-ego’. After a further consultation with the 
dermatologist he was eventually referred back to the MO, who he had recently ‘befriended’, 
and was cleared for deployment.755 As an educated, affable officer, and one apparently 
conversant in psychiatric language, Schwarz was able to lobby for his deployment and 
negotiate the limitations imposed by the suspicions of a psychiatric condition. That he 
completed his tour of Malaya dismissed any medical concerns about his fitness for service 
abroad and, in one case at least, implied that the suspicion of presumed psychosomatic 
symptoms engendered in the system of selection could be overstated.     
 
The suspected over-implementation of psychological selection raised an interesting concern 
for the military, particularly in the case of officers. An early report on selection noted that 
‘it is difficult to say what degree of instability is allowable in an officer. If we were to take 
out all the unstable, we might lose many geniuses and potential V.C.s [Victoria Cross 
winners]’.756 Further, officers were held to higher standards, given that they had the 
additional responsibility of leadership. The officer recruit had been selected and trained in 
leadership, as stated in the training chapter. However, as one officer researching the medical 
problems faced by soldiers in Malaya stated: ‘The jungle soon discovers those who are 
unfitted to lead; luckily these are few, but they do occur in spite of the present extensive 
personnel selection procedure.’757 Selection contained a further limitation. It could not 
account for future environmental variables, such operational intensity and morale, that could 
most reliably predict psychiatric attrition during a campaign, and which of course remained 
unknown prior to selection.758 In short, the stress of counterinsurgency in Malaya could not 
be controlled for by selection and those apparently healthy individuals who would succumb 
to its stresses could not be accurately predicted.  
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In Malaya, however, selection, based on the principles codified in the PULHEEMS system 
continued to be used in a more informal way.  This can be seen in Major Arthur Campbell’s 
book Jungle Green, first published in 1953. It was an influential text, which by design was 
a characterisation of events in Malaya with Campbell as its protagonist.759 In effect it picked 
out the salient points of a tour of duty while changing names and shaping them into a semi-
fictionalised narrative. It was criticised, perhaps most vehemently by Victor Purcell, who, in 
his official capacity as head of the Chinese Protectorate was engaged in championing the 
rights of the Chinese population, regarded it as a synthetic account of heroism aimed at 
stimulating ‘British fighting morale’.760 General Templer recognised the military memoir as 
a powerful propaganda tool, reportedly authorising the use of public money to purchase and 
circulate Campbell’s book among the armed forces.761 Colonel J.B. Buckmaster, an officer 
with 1st Battalion Royal Hampshire Regiment in Malaya (1953-1955), reported it to be a 
valuable account of the methods and dangers of jungle operations.762 Given the design of the 
book, and General Templer’s endorsement, the further argument is that the book acted as a 
training manual used to propagate ideas about stress and resilience.  
 
In the opening chapter, as the troop ship arrived in Singapore, the narrative turns to which 
of the men could be relied on and who would break down. Those who had an unstable 
childhood were taken to be vulnerable to psychiatric conditions, or as Campbell wrote, 
‘would crack up when things were going badly’. This reflected the psychiatric thought that 
was in operation during the Second World, and would later be codified in the PULHEEMS 
system of selection in which constitutional factors, either innate or early life experiences, 
were understood to predict psychiatric conditions.763 This was borne out within the narrative 
as one of the predicted soldiers, who was orphaned at a very young age became ‘a constant 
source of anxiety’ with a ‘haunted look’ in his eyes. In response Campbell ‘decided to send 
him to some job which kept him out of the jungle.’ In effect, Jungle Green became a field 
manual for officers whose responsibility it was to identify and dispose of soldiers who ‘could 
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not be relied on’.764 It was a narrative which again appeared in the unpublished memoir of 
2nd Lieutenant R.L. Farmer, who was the platoon commander for 12th Platoon, D Company, 
1st Battalion the Suffolk Regiment in Malaya. In much the same way as Campbell, Farmer 
lists the characters of the men under his command, including a rifleman whose early life 
experience made him unsuitable for the jungle. He was, wrote Farmer, ‘a timid public 
schoolboy from Clifton who had been torpedoed during the war in the Atlantic as a refugee, 




4.4. Postwar Military Psychiatry in the Far East   
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the priority for psychiatrists under 
South East Asia Command (SEAC) was the recovery of 122,970 prisoners of war and 
civilian internees.766 One psychiatrist was even parachuted into a prisoner of war camp.767 
In addition, they attended to  the convalescence of psychiatric casualties from the Burma 
campaign.768 It was initially decided that soldiers with further psychiatric conditions which 
arose in the command would be evacuated back to India. Things did not go entirely to plan. 
An unexpected rise in the incidence of psychiatric conditions meant these cases had to be 
treated in Malaya and Burma. This was in part due to the concern that a delay in treatment 
would lead to the symptoms becoming fixed. The rise in psychiatric conditions revealed little 
infrastructure to deal with cases, which in turn led to impromptu treatment centres being set 
up.769  
 
The psychiatric cover in Southeast Asia was initially thought sufficient given the scaling 
down of British forces there. All of the psychiatrists, however, were under the commander 
of General Headquarters in India. As it became obvious, from early 1946, that Indian 
 
764 Ibid, p.43.           
765 2nd Lieutenant R.L. Farmer, ‘National Service’, p.21, IWM 08/118/1.  
766 J. T. Robinson, ‘Medical Arrangements for the Contact and Relief of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees 
in South-East Asia’, JRAMC, 87:6, (1946), p.266.     
767 Lt. Col. R.F. Tredgold, ‘Medical Quarterly Report: Adviser in Psychiatry ALFSEA. Jan - Mar 46’, p.2, 
TNA, WO 222/1319.  
768 Ibid, p.6.       
769 Ibid, p.6.   
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independence would be accelerated, this raised the question of what would happen to these 
psychiatrists, and how the psychiatric needs of ALFSEA could be met after Indian 
independence. The lowest estimate put forward to cover this area was five psychiatrists. Of 
further concern was that the psychiatric services were being reorganised for peacetime 
commitments.770  
 
Back in the UK, the Army were aware that the release of its wartime psychiatrists would 
result in a loss of knowledge. To mitigate this loss, and to keep in touch with progress in 
civilian psychiatry, the Army Psychiatry Advisory Committee was established in 1945. Its 
chairman, the Director of Army Psychiatry, was to preside over four or five eminent civilian 
psychiatrists.771 Entering into the postwar period then, there was concerns over a lack of 
psychiatrists and whether the psychiatric experience gained during the war would be 
preserved.  
 
In 1948, the opening year of the Emergency, Maurice Silverman was one of two 
psychiatrists,  stationed at the base hospital in Singapore, who ‘dealt with the vast majority 
of the psychiatric casualties that occurred in the Far East’.772 He noted that ‘Not a single 
psychiatric casualty was seen by the writer as a result of the bandit activity up-country in 
Malaya.’773 In explanation of this he alluded to the established correlation between 
prolonged, intense engagements and the incidence of psychiatric casualties. ‘One of the 
characteristic features of the period under discussion’ wrote Silverman ‘is the virtual absence 
of large scale enemy action.’774 As Robert Ahrenfeldt stated, ‘however basically stable they 
may be, [soldiers] will ultimately break down, in direct relation to the intensity and duration 
of their exposure to the stress of battle’.775                
 
 
770 Ibid, p.8.  
771 ‘Army Psychiatry Advisory Committee (July 1945 to December 1966)’, TNA, WO 32/13462.    
772 Maurice Silverman, ‘Causes of Neurotic Breakdown in British Service Personnel Stationed in the Far East 
in Peacetime’, Journal of Mental Science, 96:403, (1950), p.494.                 
773 Ibid, p.497.            
774 Ibid, p.497.         
775 R.H. Ahrenfeldt, ‘Military Psychiatry’. In Arthur Salusbury MacNaulty and W. Franklin Mellor (Eds), 
Medical Services in the War: The Principle Medical Lessons of the Second World War, (London: HMSO, 
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One indication of intensity was the number of casualties which had been taken. In June 1948, 
when the Emergency was getting underway, the medical services were reluctant to predict 
the number of casualties that would be incurred.776 As it would turn out, by the end of the 
year, the cost in killed and wounded had been relatively low at 360 casualties among the 
security forces. This number would steadily increase over the coming years (see figure 4 
below). Instead, Silverman explained the psychiatric conditions that were seen at the base 
hospital as being precipitated by the absence of enemy activity, which he argued, ‘creates a 
rallying point which helps to cannalize the troops’ latent energies.’777  It was an explanation 
which deferred to earlier research conducted by R.F. Tredgold, who was at that time Adviser 
in Psychiatry to South East Asia Command.  
 
Tredgold had used psychiatric conditions seen in base areas during the war as an analogue 
for the conditions that would be seen during Britain's postwar peacetime commitments.778 
From a survey of officers Tredgold reported that the absence of an enemy lowered morale, 
which by extension, became a contributory factor in the incidence of psychiatric conditions. 
‘There is general agreement among officers that the further troops are away from the enemy 
the lower is their morale;’ wrote Tredgold ‘although probably apparent distance is more 
important than real.’779 This last point did seemed germane to the Malayan Emergency in 
which the distance between the security forces and the insurgents was at times more 
‘apparent’ than ‘real’. More generally, it was research that both corroborated the morale 
reports presented in the previous chapter and gave medical authority to the militarised 
conception of morale as being dependent on having a coherent enemy. The combination of 
intermittent and brief contact with the insurgents and that these contacts were thought good 
for morale suggested the psychiatric cost of insurgency would not constitute a significant 
problem for the medical services. Across the causeway, however, psychiatric casualties were 
now increasing.  
 
 
776 D. Bluett, ‘Medical Arrangements in Malaya during the Emergency 1948-49’, JRAMC, 95:1, (1950), p.16.               
777 Silverman, ‘Causes of Neurotic Breakdown in British Service Personnel Stationed in the Far East in 
Peacetime, p.497.         
778 R.F. Tredgold, ‘The Mental Health of British Troops in the Far East’, Journal of Mental Science, 94:395, 
(1948), p.351.  
779 Ibid, p.370.  
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The entire peninsula of Malaya, approximately 50,000 square miles, was considered an 
‘operational area’.780 This meant the forward psychiatry practised during the war could not 
be fully instituted. There was, however, a network of functioning medical units which 
mediated the distance between breakdowns and the base hospital in Singapore. At the start 
of the Emergency there were four military hospitals, including a convalescent hospital in the 
Cameron Highlands, five medical reception stations and one Field Ambulance, spread 
mostly across the western side of Malayan peninsula.781 On big operations, where large 
numbers of troops were relatively concentrated, it became possible to establish an aid post.782 
A series of quarterly historical reports dating to 1949 showed that the Adviser in Psychiatry 
was travelling to see psychiatric patients at the British Medical Hospitals and Field 
Ambulances stationed throughout Malaya.783  On 20th June 1949, for instance, the ‘Adviser 
in Psychiatry visited to see patients.’ at the Military Hospital, Kuala Lumpur.784 Then on 24th 
June 1949 Lieutenant-Colonel John McGhie, who was the Adviser in Psychiatry, was listed 
as visiting the Military Hospital in Kamunting, Perak State in north western Malaya.785 In 
the Quarterly Historical Report from 1st Field Ambulance that was stationed at the ‘Old 
Convent’ in Taiping (undated) the ‘Adviser in Psychiatry GHQ FARELF’ was listed under 
‘Visits and Inspections’.786 The visitor lists of the quarterly historical reports show that 
service personnel with psychiatric conditions were being seen in Malaya and that some effort 
was being made to retain these cases in forward medical units. The specialist travelled to 
them, as opposed to being evacuated early to specialists in Singapore. Before returning to 
 
780 Lieutenant- Colonel J.M. Forster, ‘Comparative study of the emergencies in Malaya and Kenya’, (1957), 
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783 ‘Quarterly Historical Report Of The Military Hospital, Kuala Lumpur. And H.Q. 34 Coy R.A.M.C. For The 
Quarter Ending 30th June. 1949’, TNA WO 268/636: ‘Military Hospital Kamunting, Quarterly Historical 
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the management of psychiatric conditions at the base hospital in Singapore then, this next 
section will look at how psychiatric casualties were being treated in Malaya.      
 
 
4.4.1. Military Psychiatry and the Regimental Medical Officer 
    
The first medical figure the psychiatric casualty would meet would be the Regimental 
Medical Officer (RMO), who would decide whether he would be referred to a psychiatrist. 
As a result of the war, the relationship between medical officers and psychiatrists was being 
examined within the Royal Army Medical Corps both in its journal and on exercise.  
 
In November 1948, the medical services held ‘Exercise Medical Bamboo’ at Mytchett 
Barracks in Surrey. Its setting was Northern Thailand and Malaya. Its aim was to apply the 
lessons of the war to an imagined conflict. Given the timing and setting of the exercise and 
that many of the officers who took part were veterans of Burma, the underlying motivation 
appeared to be applying the lessons of Burma to the Malayan Emergency. The psychiatry 
section of the exercise resulted in a discussion that highlighted the interrelated nature of 
medicine and psychiatry. On one hand, there was a feeling that the divisional psychiatrist 
should have gained experience as an RMO before progressing to senior command. On the 
other, it was recognised that the Medical Officer was important in the recognition and 
treatment of psychiatric disorders. As the first point of contact, the RMO was in a position 
to arrest the progression of psychiatric conditions.787 The apparent success of the system in 
operation in Burma – with its emphasis on rest so as to return men quickly to the frontline - 
had convinced senior figures of the importance of the need for early intervention.788 In 
Malaya, however, a shortage of medical personnel and lack of psychiatric training raised 
questions about how well medical officers could have performed  this duty.    
 
The Quarterly Historical Medical Reports reveal general concern over the shortage of 
qualified medical personnel and by extension the need for training. Postwar demobilisation 
meant there was a shortage of qualified medical personnel as FARELF began reorganising 
for peacetime. This would become a feature of the postwar years. A June 1947 report from 
 
787 ‘Duplicated report on the War Office exercise "Medical Bamboo", set in Siam (Thailand), Malaya and 
Burma’, p.113, RAMC/1166:Box 260.      
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Johore Bahru read, ‘The biggest administrative difficulty encountered is the acute shortage 
of officers and senior N.C.Os.’. The Emergency meant the RAMC had to adapt and in 
response it decentralised medical practice, emphasising basic training in specialist functions 
for rank and file. For example, an absence of specialist Field Ambulance personnel meant 
that British Other Ranks were used as stretcher bearers on operations. There were also 
initiatives to train soldiers in additional first aid.789 This was important as ‘The effect on 
morale of personnel of jungle patrols having trained R.A.M.C. Orderlies with them is greatly 
increased.’790 At the opening months of 1950, incoming, inexperienced medical officers 
were first attached to 16th Field Ambulance to complete further training before continuing 
on to their postings.791 
 
In May 1952, General Templer sent a letter to Field Marshal Sir William Slim concerning 
the medical services in Malaya. His contention was that he had only 61 of the 82 allotted 
strength of doctors. Malaya then was 25 percent short, and because of this, 30 percent of 
those Medical Officers deployed to Malaya had themselves been hospitalised ‘on account of 
strain and over-work.’792 Slim contacted the Director General Army Medical Services for a 
draft response. The reply came that reinforcements were being sourced for FARELF but no 
comment would be made on their deployment within the theatre, it would be left to local 
command to re-deploy officers from Singapore, the primary British Medical Hospital in the 
Far East. Slim mediated the draft, acknowledging the shortage and offering assurance in 
typescript with the handwritten addendum, ‘Ill [sic] keep an eye on this we really are 
tragically short of doctors.’793  
 
The shortage of medical personnel was compounded by the nature of counterinsurgency and 
the terrain it was fought over. The remoteness of jungle forts built to support the orang asli 
or jungle peoples, for instance, was compounded by poor communication and a dispute as 
to whose jurisdiction they fell under. This meant that the medical situation there was largely 
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790 Lieutenant-Colonel K.H. Clarke, ‘Quarterly Historical Report of the 16 Field Ambulance, for the quarter 
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unknown.794 Some Medical Officers took an interest in the social work connected to the New 
Villages, for example providing neonatal care.795 However, the government did not have the 
personnel to administer adequate medical care to those who had been resettled, a 
fundamental part of the ‘hearts and minds campaign’, instead relying on teams from the Red 
Cross.796 By the fifth year of the Emergency these reinforcements had arrived, the strength 
now ‘averaged approximately 78’. Although with 50 percent of these having been admitted 
to hospital during the year, in all likelihood the majority of these admissions would have 
been for relatively minor illnesses, there remained serious questions about the service which 
they were able to deliver.797      
 
The Medical Directorate sought to facilitate recruitment into the services by removing a 
geographical and bureaucratic obstacle. By December 1954 the Director of Medical Services 
Far East Land Forces, Brigadier D. Bluett, had posted a notice in The Medical Journal of 
Malaya.798 Bluett’s 1954 notice stated that it was no longer necessary for civilian doctors to 
return to the United Kingdom should they wish to put themselves forward for a permanent 
commission into the Royal Army Medical Corps.799  
 
As well as the shortage of medical officers, those who were deployed had only received 
basic psychiatric training. Back in the UK, at the undergraduate level there was wide 
variance in the content and time spent on teaching psychiatry across universities, and no 
 
794 The Stockwell Papers 7/8/1-7, HCS/5/53, LHCMA.  
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standardised testing of the subject in end of year exams.800 On 9th October 1951, Desmond 
Curran delivered his Presidential Address to the Section of Psychiatry, The Royal Society of 
Medicine, in which he reported that the public would be astonished to learn how little 
psychiatric training had been given to medical students in the postwar years.801                                 
 
As the medical student was contacted for National Service in their last clinical year, the 
newly conscripted graduate might have received little or no prior psychiatric training. After 
a brief period of military instruction, the prospective MO was then deployed to the Royal 
Army Medical College at Millbank for two weeks of further training, and then on to Mytchett 
for two weeks, one at the Army School of Health and one at the Field Training School. 
Deployment followed soon afterwards. A period of pre-registration was introduced in 1953 
to allow the new doctor to gain experience, but prior to this there was no obligation to have 
gained working experience and the graduate entered the RAMC without further selection.802 
 
At Millbank, a programme of lectures on psychiatry evolved throughout the Emergency 
years. At first entitled ‘Psychiatry’, they came to be renamed ‘Military Psychiatry’, 
suggesting a more focused, occupationally specific approach. They also came to include 
films and were complemented by day visits to Netley Hospital.803 The Royal Victoria 
Hospital in Netley occupies a significant place in the history of military psychiatry as the 
site of a pioneering film concerning the treatment of battle casualties returned to England 
from the Western Front, which was in part created as a teaching aid.804 It would also be the 
final destination of psychiatric casualties from the Far East during the Emergency. Dr W.S.B. 
Loosmore was conscripted and deployed to Millbank in 1957 before going to Malaya soon 
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after. His diary recorded being more amused than educated by one of his psychiatry 
lectures,805 and he was unimpressed by ‘a poor film on battle psychiatry’.806  
 
When medical officers were deployed to the Far East their perfunctory psychiatric training 
sometimes left them inadequately prepared to deal with service personnel experiencing 
psychiatric conditions. Patrick Weaver, for example, was a National Service Medical Officer 
with FARELF, stationed in Hong Kong. He was deployed to provide medical cover for the 
dumping of ammunition at sea. ‘There were no misadventures with the dangerous 
ammunition’ wrote Weaver ‘but on the way to Korea I encountered one problem which my 
training had left me ill prepared for. One of the ship’s officers suffered an acute psychiatric 
illness. … I had no suitable drug, but fortunately the acute phase passed off’. 807 This 
unpreparedness was also apparent in Malaya as service personnel were succumbing to 
psychological problems due to the rigours of jungle operations.               
 
J. Thompson Rowling had qualified and taken some house appointments prior to joining the 
RAMC. He asked for home service to retake the final exam to become a Fellow of the Royal 
College of Surgeons and was posted to the British Medical Hospital at Catterick. This was 
soon to change.808 In December 1949, a letter of concern was published in the Lancet. It was 
in reference to an earlier statement by the Secretary of State for War, noting that only four 
Army Surgeons were deployed in Malaya and Singapore Island.809 A concise response came 
from the War Office. To the concern that ‘early surgical treatment was not being afforded to 
those who were wounded in operations against the bandits’ the Director-General Army 
Medical Services Neil Cantlie gave the vague assurance that the medical lessons of war had 
not been forgotten and that the campaign in Burma formed the basis for the medical strategy 
in Malaya.810 Nevertheless, some effort was now made to increase the numbers of doctors 
in Malaya and Singapore. Rowling was soon posted to the British Military Hospital in 
Singapore.  
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Some time after that initial posting, Rowling crossed the causeway to join a field surgical 
unit in Malaya. There he reported a consultation with an officer: 
  
I was consulted by a young lieutenant with a variety of symptoms which did not fall 
into any particular clinical pattern. I examined him and could not find anything amiss. 
I explained to him that I could not find anything organically wrong. He said, rather 
hesitantly, that he could not face taking another patrol into the jungle again. I 
understood just how he felt and sympathised. There was no surgical remedy and all 
I could do was to suggest that he saw a psychiatrist. I knew of no solution to such a 
problem.811 
 
The more prolonged and intense long-range jungle operations were testing some service 
personnel to breaking point. On one 82-day operation one man requested to see a 
psychiatrist, reporting headaches, nausea and vomiting. His request led the Medical Officer 
to believe the symptoms to be psychogenic in origin.812 Lieutenant-Colonel K. H. Clark, had 
earlier noted that, ‘It will be appreciated that only absolutely fit men were permitted to set 
out on an operation of this nature, after a very thorough examination by the R.M.O.’813 Even 
the fittest service personnel, however, might succumb to the stress of these operations.  
 
The Special Air Service had been reformed in 1952 to combat the communist insurgents in 
Malaya, taking over much of the personnel of the more experimental Malayan Scouts of 
1950-52. The SAS took pride in selecting resilient personnel.814 One study investigating the 
health of the SAS compared their hospital admission rates, between 1959 and 1965, to that 
of the British Army deployed with FARELF. The study reported significantly higher rates 
of injury, malaria and gastro-intestinal disease among the SAS. The greater incidence of 
gastro-intestinal disease was explained by greater environmental exposure than their regular 
counterparts. Interestingly, despite the more comprehensive training and selection, 
psychiatric admissions were comparable between the SAS and the regular British Army.815 
 
811 Thompson Rowling, A Time to Kill and a Time to Heal, p.82.    
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813 Lieutenant-Colonel K. H. Clark, ‘Some Account of an Operation in the Malayan Jungle’, JRAMC, 94:6, 
(1950), p.308.    
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As with gastro-intestinal findings this may also be explained in terms of environmental 
exposure. While rates of psychiatric admissions were comparable, the harsh routine of 
special operations was not controlled for, and so not reflected in the figures.  
 
One deep jungle operation in Northern Malaya in 1952, for example, comprised three 
squadrons of the SAS and resulted in approximately a quarter of them being admitted to 
hospital.816 The medical report, written by Captain Copley, mentioned ‘several cases of 
exhaustion’ among ‘the ashy types of case’ which occurred in the early stages of the 
operation.817  Copley may have been referring to exhaustion caused by the climate. However, 
further accounts from Malaya in 1952 state that in these cases ‘heat exhaustion’ and ‘heat 
incapacitation’ were specified. 818 That Copley qualified his use of the term with ‘ashy’ 
instead suggests a psychological cause. As mentioned above, the term exhaustion had 
become the preferred nomenclature for psychiatric casualties in forward areas during the 
Second World War, which implied a mild transient condition that would get better with rest. 
It was a report that appeared to contradict earlier claims that service personnel could stay in 
the jungle indefinitely.    
 
A further medical officer described the system he used for dealing with the psychiatric 
casualties which resulted from the stress of jungle operations. Derek Tacchi served as a 
Medical Officer towards the beginning of the Emergency, from 1949 to 1950. He wrote 
about his experiences in The University of Durham Medical Gazette, published in June 1951. 
The article was reprinted later that same year in the Journal of the Royal Army Medical 
Corps (JRAMC), the official organ of the RAMC. Tacchi was Regimental Medical Officer 
to a Royal Artillery unit that was acting as infantry. The RA and Tacchi’s area of operations 
was a 4,000 square mile section of the southern state of Negri Sembilan. The area was 
bisected by a mountainous jungle range, with the different elements of his unit divided and 
approximately 50 miles apart. Along with the British soldiers under his care he also acted as 
doctor to neighbouring Gurkha and Malay units who did not have their own RMO. He 
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described this as a ‘roving commission’.819 ‘[S]ome of the men’, wrote Tacchi, ‘developed 
a “Tropical Neurasthenia” due to the nervous strain of constant patrols in a dangerous terrain 
and an exhausting climate.’820     
 
Tropical neurasthenia was a diagnosis thought to have disappeared from the medical 
discourse of the colonies in the early years of the Second World War. Historically it was 
considered an ennui caused by the stress of the tropical environment and predominantly a 
diagnosis for white male colonists. Epidemiologically incidence peaked in the earlier years 
of the twentieth century, being recorded in greater numbers than both malaria and cholera.821 
By October 1947, the spectre of Tropical Neurasthenia had been raised at a meeting of the 
Central Division of the Malaya Branch, British Medical Association, where Dr Lamprell 
gave a paper on the topic. Following the paper, a resolution was carried:  
 
That this Division believes Neurasthenia is of very considerable importance in 
Malaya and recommends the Branch Council appoints a small Select Committee to 
consider and report on its cause and best methods of reducing its incidence.822     
 
A select committee was convened with Dr B.F. Home, medical superintendent of the mental 
hospital in Singapore,823 Dr A. Viswalingam, an Ophthalmic specialist, and the first Asian 
doctor to ascend to the higher echelons of the Malayan Medical Service,824 Dr. Ong Chong 
Keng and Dr B.A. Lamprell, as its members.825 The select committee would meet with the 
increasing political violence. On 1st September the Malaya Tribune reported that Dr. Ong 
Chong Keng had been shot and killed the previous night after being called out on an alleged 
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case.826 Later newspaper reports confirmed that he had been murdered by Communist 
insurgents.827 In September 1948, the paper was published in The Medical Journal of Malaya 
(MJM). Tropical Neurasthenia was put forward as an explanation for a rash of suicides and 
nervous conditions among civil servants and planters following the war. 828 It was a 
disturbing trend which appeared to continue as the Emergency progressed and illicit further 
concern. A 1954 edition of the MJM reported a much higher rate of suicides among European 
civilian males than in the UK.829     
 
Within military psychiatry, however, this sort of  diagnosis was being questioned, if not, 
disregarded: ‘In the opinion of those with large experience, the label “tropical neurasthenia”, 
applied to a common type of peace-time tropical case, concealed a variety of psycho-
neuroses which showed little different from those found elsewhere’.830 Military psychiatrists 
were keen to dispel the idea that the climate could be a cause of breakdowns, a belief that 
would be problematic if it took hold among service personnel. Instead, these cases were to 
be considered neurotic, which shifted the cause onto constitutional weakness. Neurasthenia, 
nevertheless, continued to be a part of the medical discourse in the Far East. It was raised 
again at the Annual Pan-Malayan Meeting of the Alumni Association of the King Edward 
VII College of Medicine in Singapore, in August 1950.831  
 
By 1958, tropical neurasthenia had been renamed as ‘heat neurotic reactions’ and remained 
a controversial diagnosis. A joint subcommittee of the Medical Research Council and of the 
Registrar General's department produced a memorandum titled ‘A Classification of Heat 
Illness’ which aimed to clarify the myriad of heat illness available for diagnosis in the 
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830 Emanuel Miller, A.T.M. Wilson, Eric Wittkower, ‘Clinical Case Studies and their Relationships, including 
the Psychosomatic Disorders’. In Emanuel Miller (Ed), The Neuroses in War, (London: Macmillan and Co 
Ltd, 1940), pp.82-83.   
831 A. Somasundaram, ‘Man, Mind and Medicine’, Proceedings of the Alumni Association of the King Edward 
VII College of Medicine in Singapore, 3:3, (1950), p.244.           
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International Classification of Diseases. The British Medical Journal report on the 
memorandum, in June 1958, noted:          
 
There will be some who will regret the spurious validity given to a highly 
controversial condition, “tropical neurasthenia,” or, as it is called in the 
memorandum, “heat neurotic reactions.” At least one author with long practical 
experience has suggested that the incidence of tropical neuroses is associated with 
the availability of psychiatrists to diagnose them.832   
 
The author referred to was F. P. Ellis, Surgeon Commander, Royal Navy and Director of the 
Medical Research Council’s Royal Naval Tropical Research Unit at the University of 
Malaya, Singapore. Writing earlier, in 1952, his scepticism was directed at the patients from 
which the psychiatrists drew their findings: 
      
When mental breakdown occurs, psychiatrists often find that the hot climate is a less 
important factor than family separations, failure to readjust to new domestic and 
social circumstances, economic worries, and over-indulgence in alcohol; but they 
derive this information from the histories of persons who have already succumbed to 
the circumstances of their tropical environment - the less robust personalities, the 
overworked, the convalescent, the unhappily married, and the misfits.833 
 
Despite military medical reservations about attributing psychiatric conditions to the 
environment, both the environment and resulting ‘neurasthenia’ were codified in The 
Manual of Army Health, published by the War Office in 1959, as being deleterious to the 
mental health of service personnel and the cause of psychiatric conditions. Where temperate 
climates were considered to be optimal for ‘thought and action’ and ‘man’s fullest 
development’, ‘impairment of memory, mental irritability and neurasthenia must all be 
ascribed directly to the effects of a prolonged stay in hot climates.’834    
 
 
832 ‘Annotations - Heat Illness’, British Medical Journal, 1, (1958), p.1531.    
833 F. P. Ellis, ‘Hot-Climate Fatigue in the Royal Navy: A Review of Lay Opinion’, The Lancet, 260:6733, 
(1952), p.527.    
834 The War Office, The Manual of Army Health, (London: HMSO, 1959), p.37, IWM LBY WO 1083.       
  189 
 
 
Ultimately, the 1948 paper, which was concerned with preserving manpower, recommended 
better selection to reduce incidence of the condition and referral to a temperate climate to 
treat cases that had occurred.835 In this sense it was workable diagnosis for an RMO who 
appeared to have deferred to a colonial, instead of military, diagnosis to deal with cases of 
stress. Tacchi, the RMO described above, prescribed a period of convalescence in response 
to any ‘tropical neurasthenia’, instead of referral to a specialist:     
 
I usually sent such cases down to the Regiment's rest camp at Kampong Tanjong 
Bidara, on the West coast just North of Malacca. Here a bungalow, on the edge of a 
long stretch of palm lined beach, housed the men and they spent their days 
swimming, sunbathing and generally being lazy. After a week or two here they 
returned to duty bronzed and fit and once more mentally alert.836            
 
As with the diagnosis Tropical Neurasthenia, convalescence was an artefact of the colonies 
and had a very recent history of use for treating war related stress. As the Second World War 
abated convalescent depots were set up for Other Ranks in Burma while officers in Malaya 
were sent to the Cameron Highlands, where psychoneurotic patients were said to have done 
very well.837  The Cameron Highlands continued to be used for convalescence throughout 
the Emergency.838                   
 
Further evidence that psychiatric casualties were being send to the Highlands comes from 
Ronald Harper, a British private with 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment in Malaya, 
1952-1953, describes the use of the Cameron Highlands. Harper spoke about a soldier who 
had ‘folded up’ due to nerves before a jungle patrol, and who ended up in a rehabilitation 
centre in the Cameron Highlands.839  As mentioned in the morale in action chapter the 
Highlands as well as the regimental rest areas by the sea had become well used as place of 
leave. Corporal Rowland Owen, who served as a sanitary assistant and medical orderly with 
RAMC during his National Service in the opening years of the Malayan Emergency, also 
 
835 Lamprell, ‘Tropical Neurasthenia’, pp.38-39.           
836 Tacchi, 'Jungle Medicine', pp. 276.  
837 Lt-Colonel R. F. Tredgold, ‘Medical Quarterly Report Advisor in Psychiatry ALFSEA Jan- Mar 46’, TNA 
WO 222/1319.  
838 Lieutenant-Colonel D.T. Swift, ‘Quarterly Historical Report Of The British Military Hospital, Kinrara And 
H.Q. 34 Coy. R.A.M.C. For The Quarter Ending 31st March, 1950.’, p.1, TNA WO 268/634.        
839 Ronald William Harper, IWMSA, 17224, reel 1.          
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reported that: ‘The officers had a rest camp bungalow by the sea’ and that ‘eventually a 
corrugated iron hut was provided for other ranks to have 48 hours leave.’840 All of this 
suggested an informal system was being used to manage cases of mild stress resulting from 
participation in the Emergency.   
    
In medical units, however, medical officers continued to struggle with the more complex 
psychiatric conditions. Dr W.S.B. Loosmore was a Regimental Medical Officer in Malaya 
towards the end of the Emergency. When he arrived, he was stationed at Sungei Besi Camp 
close to Kuala Lumpur, where he administered to a Gurkha Regiment and a small 
detachment of British troops.841 Dr Loosmore suggested there was still a chronic lack of 
medical care, particularly for soldiers stationed in remote areas. He complained that the 
extended list of responsibilities prevented Medical Officers from travelling to jungle camps 
to see the soldiers stationed there.842 He saw a range of psychiatric cases with specialist 
consultation or referral being used in the more pressing.843 He reported only one neurotic 
case and was horrified when an officer asked him what was wrong in front of the patient.844 
Psychogenic symptoms (physical symptoms thought to have an underlying psychological 
cause) were more common, being indicated by regular attendance at sick parade and carrying 
a bleak prognosis. His diary noted, with a certain fatalism, ‘I have a regular clientele of 
Gurkha soldiers now who turn up with all sorts of neurotic pains and sprains which will not 
get better.’845      
 
Despite the frustrating nature of these cases, their diagnosis and referral remained a delicate 
matter. Regimental culture remained an influence with referral on suspected psychological 
grounds carrying the danger of a reduction in rank. In one case a Gurkha Lance Corporal 
lost his stripe as a result of being referred due to ‘a psychological pain in his leg’.846 Illness 
with no observable organic cause represented a major concern for the medical services, in 
large measure because the symptoms were conceptualised as functional, meaning they 
provided a means of escape from the given environment. To arrest this process the MO had 
 
840 Corporal Rowland Owen, ‘The National Service Reminiscences Project’, IWM Miscellaneous 4071.  
841 Loosmore, ‘Diary’, 25th October 1957. 
842 Ibid, 30th January 1959. 
843 Ibid, 15-16th January 1958. 
844 Ibid, 4th December 1957.       
845 Ibid, 5th December 1957. 
846 Ibid, 21st November 1957.    
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to rule out organic disease and make a correct referral. The primary diagnostic tool was 
taking a history.847 Here the MO was better placed than the psychiatrist, given their regular 
contact with the patient.848 However, one senior MO thought a six to twelve month period 
of intensive psychiatric training was needed to ‘examine a case properly and make a true 
psychogenic assessment of every case’.849 This sort of training was reserved for specialists 
and not practical for MO’s.    
 
This next section will look in more detail at what happened to service personnel who were 
referred to a psychiatrist stationed at the base hospital in Singapore. There was a general 
suspicion of malingering that came with illness and injury in Malaya. J. Beasley, a driver 
with 16th Field Ambulance (1948-49), for example, wrote that a regular part of his routine 
was transporting the ‘sick, lame and lazy’.850 In Singapore, recognition of stigma played a 
role in the management of psychiatric casualties.     
 
 
4.4.2. Psychiatry at the British Military Hospital in Singapore  
 
In 1951, a survey of service psychiatry was carried out in the Far East, based on that year’s 
patients. In the same year as the survey was being conducted the Malayan Emergency, taking 
place across the causeway, was reaching its peak. 1951 saw over 6,000 incidents, which 
resulted in well over 1,000 casualties among the security forces (see figure 4). General 
Bower, who would later become Director of Operations, wrote: ‘This period with its peak of 
Communist violence and widespread expectation of wholesale Communist occupation of 
South East Asia was undoubtedly the most dangerous of the Emergency.’851   
 
 
847 J. P. P. Bradshaw, ‘Fears, Fits and Faints’, JRAMC, 97:5, (1951), p.340.      
848 Ibid, p.345.    
849 J. Mackay-Dick, 'Views on the Use and Abuse of Psychiatry', JRAMC, 95:2, (1950), pp. 88-89.        
850 J. Beasley, ‘The Malayan Emergency (Communist uprising)’, p.82, IWM 67/53/1.   
851 Director of Operations Malaya, ‘Review of Operations Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957’, (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1957), p.9.     




Figure 4: Civilian and security forces casualties and insurgency incidents.    
Source: Adapted from figures presented in ‘Comparative study of the emergencies in Malaya and Kenya’, 
(1957), TNA WO 291/1670. 
 
 
The 1951 report’s lead author, Lieutenant-Colonel John McGhie, was then the senior of three 
psychiatrists operating across Far East Land Forces. McGhie, Jones and Wessely note, ‘had 
originally trained in obstetrics and had run a forward treatment unit for malaria in Burma.’ 
It was only on his return to the UK John McGhie qualified in psychiatry, which for Jones 
and Wessely questioned his ability to transfer wartime psychiatric practice into the postwar 
military.852 The earlier concerns about the shortage of psychiatrists were realised, with three 
rather than the minimum recommended five psychiatrists. The transfer of knowledge, 
however, appeared more successful. As mentioned above, Burma was a theatre where 
psychiatric knowledge was disseminated among medical officers. McGhie then, arguably 
had a better understanding of forward psychiatry than his CV initially suggested.  
 
Furthermore, the two World Wars, and more specifically the work of the wartime 
psychiatrists, would continue to influence the conceptualisation and treatment of 
psychological trauma throughout the postwar period. This is typified within Henderson and 
 
852 Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War, 
(East Sussex: Psychology Press, 2005), pp.117-118.         
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Gillespie’s Textbook of Psychiatry which contained a dedicated chapter on ‘Psychoses and 
Neuroses in War’ into its ninth edition (1962).853 The textbook advocated simple 
psychotherapy and retaining service personnel in forward areas. ‘For neurotic reactions of 
minor intensity simple explanation and persuasion are sufficient, at least in individuals of 
good morale. Very often it is not desirable to remove such people, even temporarily, from 
the scene of action.’854 A review of the textbook in a 1950 edition of the Journal of the Royal 
Army Medical Corps stated: ‘For the Service psychiatrist this is a valuable book of reference, 
and one that should be included in his personal travelling library.’ Signed ‘H.P.’, the review 
was almost certainly written by Harry Pozner, one of the more influential postwar military 
psychiatrists and a regular contributor to the journal.855 It continued to reviewed and 
recommended in the JRAMC.856 One military psychiatrist, writing about his deployment to 
the Far East in 1953, stated ‘I took only one psychiatric work, Henderson and Gillespie’s 
Textbook of Psychiatry.’857   
 
The role of Adviser in Psychiatry, meanwhile, was expansive. As an earlier War 
Establishments report noted, his advice should be sought ‘on all matters pertaining to the 
mental health of the Army’.858 More specifically, the report states, ‘he should supervise the 
management of … psychiatric cases during action, and be responsible … for the avoidance 
of indiscriminate evacuation and for the proper election for treatment on the spot.’859 In this 
role, McGhie was responsible for the management of psychiatric conditions at British 
Military Units across the Far East. The second author of the survey, Major D. J. McConvell, 
was in charge of the psychiatric block at the base hospital in Singapore. This was the location 
of the survey, and as the survey noted ‘the only service hospital in the theatre where such 
therapeutic facilities are available and cases arrive by air, road, sea and rail almost daily’.860         
 
 
853 Henderson and Gillespie’s Textbook of Psychiatry for Students and Practitioners Ninth Edition, Revised 
by Sir David Henderson and Ivor R.C. Batchelor, (London: OUP, 1962), p.466.  
854 Henderson and Gillespie’s Textbook of Psychiatry for Students and Practitioners Ninth Edition, p.479.   
855 ‘Reviews: Textbook of Psychiatry’, JRAMC, 95:4, (1950), p.252. 
856 H.P., ‘Book Reviews: Textbook of Psychiatry’, JRAMC, 103:2, (1957), p.105.  
857 Leslie A. Bartlet, ‘A National Service Psychiatrist’s Story’, JRAMC, 156:4, (2010), p.273.                
858 Lieutenant-Colonel T.F. Main, ‘War Establishments’, (1944), WC RAMC/408/3/6.     
859 Main, ‘War Establishments’.  
860 J. McGhie and D. J. McConvell, ‘A Survey of Service Psychiatry in the Far East in 1951’, JRAMC, 99:5 
(1953), p.173-4.     
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Prolonged service due to the Emergency and ‘traumatic battle experience’ were near the 
bottom of a list of environmental factors in the causes of psychiatric breakdowns. The 477 
British army personnel seen throughout 1951 were grouped into four diagnostic categories. 
‘Psychoneurosis and Psychopathic Personality’ and ‘Psychosis’ accounted for 253 cases. 
These two categories were used for psychometric simplicity and subsumed a range of clinical 
diagnosis in operation at that time. Three cases were classed as ‘Other Diagnosis’ and 221 
were recorded as having ‘No Gross Psychiatric Disability’. This last group were thought to 
have only ‘minor forms of psychiatric disability’. They were returned to ‘full combat duty’ 
with only a ‘single session of psychotherapy’ consisting of ‘explanations, persuasion and re-
assurance’. As the report stated ‘it is wise not to award a diagnosis of mild neurosis in these 
cases. A psychiatric label once applied has the habit of sticking to the soldier for the rest of 
his service.’861      
 
In comparison, we can look to an incomplete series of monthly returns which recorded the 
psychiatric admissions to 25th Field Dressing Station during the war in Korea between May 
1952 and June 1953. The eight surviving monthly returns show that of the 483 service 
personnel recorded the majority, 271 or 56 percent, were diagnosed with psychoneurosis. A 
further 104 cases, or 22 percent, were awarded a diagnosis of ‘No significant disorder’.862  
This was arguably comparable to the ‘No Gross Psychiatric Disability’ being utilised in 
Singapore. The higher percentage of psychoneurosis being seen in Korea suggested greater 
stress in that theatre. Conversely, in Singapore, there was a higher percentage of ‘No Gross 
Psychiatric Disability’, or ‘mild neurosis’. In line with the low-intensity warfare being 
conducted in Malaya then, there was a significant number of service personnel experiencing 
mild stress conditions as a result of participation in the counterinsurgency being conducted 
there.      
 
 
861 Ibid, pp.174-175. 
862 Edgar Jones and Ian Palmer, ‘Army psychiatry in the Korean War: The Experience of 1 Commonwealth 
Division’, Military Medicine, 165:4, (2000), pp.257-258.   
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Figure 5: Comparison of Psychiatric Admissions in Singapore and Korea.  
Source: Adapted from figures presented in McGhie and McConvell, ‘A Survey of Service Psychiatry in the 
Far East in 1951’, p.174; Jones and Palmer, ‘Army psychiatry in the Korean War’, p.256.      
 
 
The heightened awareness of psychiatric nomenclature within the military also suggested 
that the no diagnosis was a preventative measure. The psychiatric casualty, it was thought, 
would fixate on a positive diagnosis which in turn would be both prolong and worsen the 
condition. The classification of service personnel experiencing mild conditions, as having 
no gross disability, certainly facilitated their return to duty. In turn, a steady return to duty 
rate would have reinforced the utility of psychiatry, particularly within a command 
conducting a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign.  
 
As relapse rates were not presented in the survey the efficacy of the strategy remains 
unknown. A subsequent relapse would have undermined the original diagnosis, or lack of, 
suggesting a more serious condition. This also raises the concern that the category concealed 
more serious conditions and prevented access to a more comprehensive course of treatment. 
McGhie and McConvell noted the ‘monotonous frequency’ of patients referred with a 
‘suicidal tag, whether genuine or hysterical, pseudo-suicidal attempts’. 40 of these cases 
were found to have ‘no gross psychiatric disability’. This figure was not specific to the 477 
British Army Personnel seen but instead refers to 40 of the 861 Army, Navy, RAF and 
civilians accounted for in the survey. It was not stated how many, if any, of these cases were 
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accounted for within the 221 British Army personnel given the non-diagnosis. It is probable, 
however, that the majority were army cases, given the proportion of army service personnel 
to others in the survey. The survey noted that one of these cases was a National Serviceman 
who ‘held the record for hospital admissions because of pseudo-suicidal attempts.’ He was 
found to have ‘[n]o psychiatric disorder’, ‘charged with self-inflicted injuries, rendering 
himself unfit for duty’ and ‘awarded 18 months’ detention’. A suicidal attempt, ‘whether 
genuine or hysterical’, suggested a more serious condition than the non-diagnosis 
conferred.863  
 
A similar case, reported in the press, suggested that ‘hysterical’ suicide attempts may be 
concealing the stress of participation in the counterinsurgency. As Tommy Atkins, a veteran 
of the Second World War and senior NCO with the Queen's Royal Regiment in Malaya, put 
it: ‘By the time our own regiment became involved the security forces had got the measure 
of the CTs but there was still much hard Jungle Bashing to be done before the final curtain 
came down.’864 In 1955, under the headline ‘The soldier who was scared of the jungle’ The 
Straits Times reported the ‘suicide bid’ of a 19 year old soldier from the Queen's Royal 
Regiment. At the court martial in Singapore his defending officer said the soldier’s case was 
related to his ‘fear of the jungle’ and an incident in which he nearly killed a fellow soldier 
by accident. The defending officer also noted that the soldier had ‘had an unfortunate 
experience at the age of 10 when he was sent to an approved school.’ By 1955 Lieutenant 
Colonel J. J. McGragh had taken over as advisor in psychiatry.865 McGragh, adviser in 
psychiatry to GHQ FARELF, found the soldier to be of low intelligence and his attempted 
suicide a ‘hysterical gesture’. The soldier was found not guilty on the charge of attempted 
suicide but sentenced to detention for 112 days.866    
 
Ultimately, the concerns raised above over the non-diagnosis must be weighed against the 
significant stigma of a psychiatric diagnosis at that time. The stigma of a psychiatric 
diagnosis will receive further attention in a later section.     
 
863 McGhie and McConvell, ‘A Survey of Service Psychiatry in the Far East in 1951’, p.177.    
864 H. Atkins, ‘Final Instalment, Post War Service 1950-1959. (Tommy Atkins).’, p.130, IWM 92/28/1.      
865 Surname misspelt in source: ‘Other arrivals of note are ... Lieut.-Colonel J. J. MacGrath [sic] as adviser in 
Psychiatry’. ‘Notes from the Stations – FARELF’, The Army Medical Services Magazine, 7:3, July 
(1955), p.88.    
866‘‘Suicide Bid’ was a pose, court told: The soldier who was scared of the jungle’, The Straits Times, 7th June 
1955, p.13. https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/. Accessed 11/02/19.   




4.4.3. National Service Personnel, Regulars and Officers  
 
In 1948, the opening year of the Emergency, Maurice Silverman, one of the psychiatrists 
stationed in Singapore,867 argued that conscripted service abroad was also a determining 
factor in psychiatric conditions:     
  
When it is remembered that the personnel being considered were mainly young 
conscripts with no fundamental interest in service life as a career; that they were 
stationed overseas, thousands of miles from home, in a strange country; and that they 
had not even an “enemy” to talk about - it will be realized that fertile soil existed for 
the growth of neurotic symptoms.868 
 
In short, conscripts deployed to Malaya were thought to lack the discipline and motivation 
of their professional counterparts. In 1951, however, McGhie and McConvell instead found 
that young National Servicemen were more resilient than regulars. National Servicemen 
were young, selected and unencumbered by responsibility. Separation anxiety was thought 
to have been resolved in basic training and their short service engagements meant they could 
bide their time ‘without resorting to symptoms of neurosis.’ Indeed, their shorter National 
Service tours were seen as a contributing factor in the psychiatric instability of Regulars, the 
latter having to soldier on whilst their National Service counterparts returned home after 
approximately 18 months, ‘in the highest possible state of morale’.869 The 1951 survey 
suggested that training was effective in conditioning conscripts for service abroad while their 
short service engagement delimited the stress of service. Further, the PULHEEMS system 
of selection was taken to be an effective preventative measure, which ensured only the more 
resilient National Service personnel were deployed abroad.  
 
McGhie and McConvell’s 1951 survey of psychiatry in the Far East contained a notable 
omission. It neither recorded any psychiatric conditions among officers nor provided any 
commentary on their absence. While these omissions preclude a definitive statement 
 
867 Silverman, ‘Causes of Neurotic Breakdown in British Service Personnel Stationed in the Far East in 
Peacetime’, p.494.             
868 Ibid, p.497.         
869 McGhie and McConvell, ‘A Survey of Service Psychiatry in the Far East in 1951’, p.176.  
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concerning psychiatric conditions among officers, contemporaneous psychiatric reports 
establish the significance of this omission. Firstly, it is worth noting that officers and other 
ranks were routinely recorded in separate categories in psychiatric reports relating to both 
the First and Second World Wars. It is not necessary, however, to return to these reports. 
Instead we can look to a further report which John McGhie co-authored. This was a clinical 
survey of psychiatric conditions admitted to the Royal Victoria Hospital, Netley, in the first 
six months of 1954. Of the 618 admissions over this period 9.6 percent, or close to 60, had 
arrived from Far East Land Forces command. In contrast to McGhie’s earlier FARELF 
report the admission of officers was recorded, with 44 of the 618 being officers.870 The report 
did not specify whether any of these officers had arrived from the Far East but is suggestive 
of admissions being roughly in proportion to the overall ratio of officers to men.         
 
Further, officers had previously been the subject to dedicated research. Roger Tredgold, 
Psychiatric Adviser to ALFSEA, co-authored a paper on serious psychiatric conditions 
among officers in India, published in 1946. For Tredgold, these psychiatric conditions 
assumed greater importance than conditions among other ranks: 
 
It can scarcely be denied that the wastage of officers on this scale is serious in its 
military effects and, possibly, in its medical and social implications. This must be the 
excuse for discussing such a statistically small number and for venturing to draw 
conclusions and suggesting proposals to counteract the existing factors.871 
 
The routine categorisation of officers in psychiatric reports in tandem with the greater 
importance placed on their psychiatric conditions again makes the omission notable in the 
1951 survey. While it is possible that there were no psychiatric conditions among officers 
during 1951 this seems improbable. Further research published in a 1954 edition of the MJM 
reported a much higher rate of suicides among European civilian males than in the UK, and, 
a higher percentage of suicides in officers over other ranks in Singapore during the postwar 
 
870 J.T. Robinson and J. McGhie, ‘Endocrinological Investigations of the Psychiatric Casualty in the Army’, 
JRAMC, 101:2, (1955), pp.130-131.       
871 R. F. Tredgold, H. N. Heffernan, G. Kelly, and P. R. W. Leigh, ‘Serious Psychiatric Disability Among 
British Officers in India’, Lancet, 248:6417, (1946), p.261.          
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period. This suggests a high level of social or occupational stress among officers.872 Further, 
attempting suicide was conceptualised as a psychiatric problem.   
 
As illustrated above, there was a somewhat informal system of infrastructure to deal with 
officer patients should there be reticence concerning their entry into the medical system. 
There was precedent for disparity between the treatment of psychiatric casualties among 
officers and other ranks. As Peter Leese has argued, during the First World War, officers 
encountered more lenient attitudes among regimental medical officers and privileged access 
to psychiatric care.873 Then, as mentioned above, following the Second World War 
convalescent depots were set up for Other Ranks in Burma while in Malaya officers were 
sent to the Cameron Highlands.874 Stigma was mentioned as a concern in the psychiatric 
survey, which may have been a reason for omitting officer patients. As will be shown in the 
following section, stigma was a real concern once a psychiatric label had been applied, and 
in the UK, there was further effort to avoid the stigma of a psychiatric diagnosis.          
 
 
4.4.4. Serious Cases and Stigma  
 
A small number of cases appear to have been dealt with administratively, with either leave 
or a home posting.875 The Australian contingent, deployed to Malaya in 1955, were said to 
have adopted an administrative approach to their psychiatric casualties. They initially 
reported very few cases although it was later found that many went unrecorded. In dealing 
with these cases administratively rather than medically ‘the figures represented an 
understatement of the true incidence of ‘psychiatric’ problems overall.’ Their policy has 
been attributed to a reluctance in pathologising normal transient reactions to the conditions, 
a lesson learnt from previous wars.876 The exact nature of the Australian administrative 
 
872 H.B.M. Murphy, ‘The Mental Health of Singapore. Part 1 - Suicide’, The Medical Journal of Malaya, 9:1, 
Sept. 1954, pp.13-15.             
873 Peter Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World War, (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.103-104.     
874 LT.Col. R. F. Tredgold. RAMC. Medical Quarterly Report Advisor in Psychiatry ALFSEA Jan- Mar 46 
TNA WO 222/1319 
875 McGhie and McConvell, ‘A Survey of Service Psychiatry in the Far East in 1951’, p.176.  
876 Brendan O'Keefe and Francis Barrymore Smith, Medicine at War: Medical Aspects of Australia's 
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approach in Malaya is unclear. However, a higher rate of evacuating psychiatric cases than 
the British suggests this to have played a role. The proximity of Malaya to Australia would 
have eased the logistical problem of evacuation.877 Conversely, the 1951 survey suggested 
the British meant to keep their psychiatric cases in theatre, with only the most severe 
constitutional cases being invalided back to the UK.878 While 351, or 75 percent, of the 477 
British Service Personnel dealt with in the 1951 survey were returned to full duty 78 were 
downgraded and reallocated to ‘non-front-line’ service in Malaya. A further 45 
(approximately 9 percent) were invalided back to the UK and 3 discharged from the Army.879 
 
The serious cases were treated with the physical methods advanced during the Second World 
War. A Directorate of Army Psychiatry memorandum (1944), concerned with the 
application of psychological medicine during the Second World War stated definitively ‘that 
psychoanalytic technique has not at any time during this war been used in the treatment of 
psychiatric cases’. This position was in deference to the 1922 War Office Committee, which 
questioned the efficacy of psychoanalysis and its practicality in the treatment of service 
personnel. While it had been used, for example in the UK, it was not applied in forward 
areas. One reason for this was that a course of treatment psychoanalysis was measured in 
months.880  
 
Instead, more generally confidence was placed in the physical methods of treatment which 
William Sargant and Eliot Slater had codified into a set of principles and practices for 
instruction. The methods contained in their manual, which included chapters on chemical 
techniques and therapies, had been tested in the ‘exigencies of war’ which conferred a sense 
of legitimacy onto their postwar use.881 Importantly, physical treatments produced 
immediate results,  without recourse to theoretical models which, for Sargant and Slater, 
 
877 O'Keefe and Barrymore Smith, Medicine at War, 15.      
878 McGhie and McConvell, ‘A Survey of Service Psychiatry in the Far East in 1951’, pp.176-7.    
879 Ibid, p.180.  
880‘Summary of Memorandum on Army Psychiatry’ (1944). In ‘Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the 
Services’, p.2, TNA CAB 21/914.       
881 William Sargant and Eliot Slater, An Introduction to Physical Methods of Treatment in Psychiatry, 
(Edinburgh: E.&S. Livingstone,1944), Preface, pp.vii-viii. Preface reproduced in William Sargant and Eliot 
Slater, An Introduction to Physical Methods of Treatment in Psychiatry, (Edinburgh: E.&S. Livingstone, 1948). 
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alienated medical practitioners.882 Leslie Bartlet, a Royal Army Medical Corps psychiatrist 
‘posted to the home of army psychiatry, The [R]oyal Victoria Hospital, Netley’, stated that: 
‘I gained experience in assessment, categorization, abreactive techniques, deep narcosis and 
simple psychotherapy. At that time (1953) the work of the service was much influenced by 
the school of Sargant and Slater with particular to physical therapeutic methods’.883 The 
pharmacologically based treatments advanced in the Second World War continued to be 
employed in Malaya.884 In short, the management of psychiatric conditions at the base 
hospital was derived from wartime thinking and geared toward returning service personnel 
to duty.  
  
By 1954, however, McGhie had returned to the UK where he co-authored a clinical survey 
of psychiatric conditions admitted to the Royal Victoria Hospital, Netley. It revealed the 
psychiatric casualties were being evacuated from the Far East in significantly higher 
numbers than in 1951. Of the 618 admissions in the first six months of 1954 9.6 percent, or 
close to 60, had arrived from FARELF.885 Once these more severe cases were diagnosed and 
repatriated, they became subject to the stigma of a psychiatric label. John Poole was tasked 
with escorting psychiatric casualties from Singapore to Southampton. ‘I was’ Poole noted in 
his memoir, ‘to look after three “nut cases”.’886  
 
Back in the UK there was some effort to avoid the stigma of being admitted to the psychiatric 
ward. Rob Holley, who was posted to the Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley (1952-1953) on 
National Service, wrote: ‘In the extensive grounds of the Hospital was a building known at 
that time as P Wing, a psychiatric unit which served all three of Britain's armed forces.’887 
Previously the building was known as ‘D Block’, a moniker which had become notorious 
among soldiers during the Second World War. It was for this reason that by August 1949, 
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'"D" Block', which was being used to treat ‘officer patients suffering from the psychoses and 
the psychoneuroses’, had been renamed ‘“P” Wing’. As R.G. Anderson, inspecting officer 
for the Board of Control,  noted in his 1949 report, 'it was felt that officers returning to their 
units might be at a disadvantage if it was realised that they had been treated in “D” Block 
which was widely known throughout the Army as a centre for patients suffering from mental 
illness.’888 The previous year, in October 1946, the other ranks being treated at “D” Block 
had been transferred and the unit evacuated for refurbishment. When the unit was reopened, 
the following month, it was to treat officers.889 On 8 August a further unit, named "E" Block, 
was opened for neurotic patients.890 By August 1951, ‘“P” Wing’ was being used to treat 
psychotic patients of both officers and other ranks and “E” was used for psychoneurotics of 
all ranks.891 By September 1953, the earlier refurbishments had been all but undone with 
'leaking roofs, rotten floors, and crumbling plaster in many parts of the building.’892 Then, 
by August 1955, ‘P’ had come to mean ‘Psychotic Wing’ and ‘E’ had become known as 
‘PN’ or ‘Psychoneurotic Wing’.893 Despite the rebranding its reputation would persist into 
the National Service era. One RAMC recruit, for example, referred to it as the ‘nutters’ 
hospital at Netley.894     
 
One psychotic soldier patient arrived at Netley by troopship from the British Medical 
Hospital in Singapore. He would ultimately be diagnosed as schizophrenic and discharged 
after undergoing a course of unsuccessful electrical therapy. While at Netley his case would 
come to the attention of a young psychiatrist named R.D. Laing.895 Laing would go on to be 
a leading figure in the anti-psychiatry movement during the 1960s and probably the most 
vocal critic of postwar British military psychiatry. As a newly qualified psychiatrist he had 
been conscripted for National Service and posted to the psychiatric ward of the Royal 
Victoria Hospital, Netley. He later described a world of isolation and brutal treatment 
regimes. At the time of service, however, Laing demonstrated suspicion toward his 
psychiatric patients: ‘I developed an intense desire to be able to ferret out the differences 
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between deception, malingering, self-deception (hysteria), neurosis and psychosis, 
functional and organic.’896  
 
Further research suggested that more personnel were being evacuated with medical 
conditions that may have been concealing psychiatric conditions. Major D. Gill of the 
RAMC found ringworm was common in those new to Malaya. It was expected to be a 
transient condition which would clear up once a degree of resistance had developed. When 
chronic, ‘the great majority of long-term effects were attributed to constitutional or 
psychocutaneous breakdown in which the ringworm had played an accidental part.’897 A 
later study by the same author found evidence of a range of psychiatric symptomatology in 
troops being returned to the UK as a result of skin disease. Where orthodox therapy had 
failed, being invalided by a medical board had resulted in remission with no obvious further 
change to their situation. The conclusion was clear to Gill, these types of cases had ‘all the 
characteristics of an escape from an intolerable situation.’ For Major Gill, persistent 
symptomatology moved the explanation from a purely somatic understanding of disease to 
a psychogenic one, with the underlying reason being secondary gain. His proposed solution 
was not directed at the individual, whose resistance to established treatment was 
demoralising for both patient and doctor, but instead at the group. This took the form of 
medical propaganda, promoting the idea that service in the Far East carried with it little 
serious risk of incurable skin disease.898 The above raises the possibility that disease 
concealed psychiatric conditions.              
 
 
4.5. Dependents and Service Psychiatry in Singapore  
 
As described above, military psychiatry had undergone a process of simplification. It had, 
particularly in forward areas, taken the shape of a system of psychiatric triage, the aim of 
which was to return service personnel to duty. Soldiers were generally sedated for a period 
of rest and then given ‘simple psychotherapy’ consisting of ‘persuasion, explanation, firm 
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encouragement and suggestion.’899 Within this system, medical officers received training in 
forward psychiatry. The system, and particularly the psychiatric training of medical officers, 
had evolved to deal with the relatively homogenous group of soldiers experiencing 
battlefield stress.900 The end of the war, however, brought a different set of commitments for 
the British Army which meant the medical services would be dealing with a less 
homogeneous population. Major General John Irvine, Director of Medical Services, British 
Army on the Rhine (BAOR), noted 1 British Corps came with 76,000 dependents. This 
represented ‘a formidable task’ for the medical services, ‘because’ stated Irvine, ‘we are 
endeavouring to provide a[n] NHS for them with backing very far short of that service’.901 
The number of families being allowed in Malaya during the Emergency was lower. As 
General Sir Neil M. Ritchie stated, by March 1949, ‘The number of officers and other ranks 
wishing to bring their families to FARELF is very small, being confined largely to those in 
ancillary units who have applied to remain and complete a full overseas tour’.902 
Nevertheless within this number psychiatric conditions would emerge.  
 
This section will address the management of female psychiatric patients under Far East Land 
Forces, a population military psychiatry and medical officers had not been accustomed to 
dealing with in forward areas during the Second World War. It will suggest that the 
management of female patients was in contrast to that of soldiers and that this contrasting 
management in turn helps to highlight what was distinctive in the treatment of soldiers.  
 
Lieutenant-General Roger Bower later wrote, as Director of Operations, ‘The Europeans 
(excluding Government servants) are divided into two completely distinct categories. On the 
one hand there are those who live in the large towns, who do not go about in danger of their 
lives, and on the other there are the planters and miners who have been at the forefront of 
the battle since 1948.’903 ‘Of all the civilians in Malaya’ wrote Graham Greene in his 1951 
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article for Life magazine, ‘the planter is in the position of greatest danger.’904 Extracts from 
the Desk Diary of the Sabai Estate in Kerak, which listed a series of incidents between 31st 
August and 9th December 1950, included the ambush and killing of Planters.905 1951 saw 
over 6,000 incidents, which resulted in more than 1,000 casualties among civilians.906    
 
Wives of service personnel, meanwhile, were vulnerable to attacks while travelling by rail 
and road. The most high-profile incident of this nature was the ambush of High 
Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, on 7th October 1951, who was travelling with his wife 
Lady Isabel Weir. The wives of service personnel were, however, more generally insulated 
from the worst of the political violence. When one National Service Officer, for example, 
was posted to ‘a village deep in the jungle in the midst of bandit country’, his wife and 
another officer's wife moved to a town, approximately 40 kilometres away.907  
 
The 1951 survey of service psychiatry included a section on the psychiatric health of the 
families of service personnel, published in October 1953. In the survey, the stress of living 
in Malaya, during the Emergency, was only indirectly recognised in the aetiology of 
psychiatric conditions in female patients, through participation of the husband. Significantly 
though, ‘Frequent separations from husband and worry over husband fighting in jungle or 
guerilla [sic] warfare’ was listed as the most frequent precipitating cause of psychiatric 
conditions among the wives of service personnel, followed by ‘Financial worries’, ‘Inability 
to accept the culture and climate’, ‘Dislike of hotel or boarding house life’, ‘Intermarital 
disharmony’ and ‘Excessive alcoholic indulgence’.908     
 
McGhie and McConvell’s 1951 survey had found that the incidence of psychiatric conditions 
among officers’ wives was a subject of note. As most of the wives in-theatre were thought 
to be those of the other ranks, it was found that officer’s wives were overrepresented, 
comprising 51 of the patients.909 One explanation of this, put forward in the survey, was 
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‘Too much leisure - usually officers’ wives with two or three servants and too little to occupy 
their interests or attention.’910 ‘The idle memsahib’, writes Dane Kennedy, ‘is one of the 
most enduring stereotypes of the British Empire.’911 The survey assented to this trope in 
explanation of psychiatric conditions among the wives of service personnel. The emphasis 
on wives of officers again highlighted the omission of officer patients among service 
personnel in the earlier section of the survey.  
 
McGhie and McConvell deferred to traditional beliefs that western women were prone to 
mental illness in the colonies. ‘Individuals, and especially the female sex,’ stated the authors 
‘become completely hypochondriacal. In time it is hoped that just as the spine pad and the 
topee have quietly disappeared, so too will this over-emphasis on mental ill-health follow 
suit. Perhaps by then the term “tropical fatigue” will be realized to be an excuse for 
laziness.’912 The psychiatrists thought this preoccupation with climate concealed a further 
reason for psychiatric conditions: ‘Another important factor’, they wrote, ‘is, of course, the 
fact that there is no stigma in having been treated by a psychiatrist in this part of the world. 
In fact it is fashionable - it is the done thing - the mental breakdown is easily attributed to 
the “terrible climate.”’913  
 
McGhie appeared reluctant to award a diagnosis, such as tropical fatigue or tropical 
neurasthenia, which validated the climate as a precipitating factor in breakdowns. Instead, 
the term psychoneurosis, which had been adopted by British military psychiatrists during the 
Second World War, was employed. Importantly, the diagnosis implied ‘a pre-existing 
neurotic constitution’.914  The survey reported that 82 wives of service personnel were seen 
in 1951. Of these, 6 were thought to be suffering from psychosis, 15 from ‘a severe form of 
psychoneurosis’ and 56 were diagnosed as ‘mildly psychoneurotic’. The remaining 5 cases 
were thought to have ‘no true psychoneuroses’.915 ‘Psychotherapy was, of course, the main 
 
910 Ibid, p.230.   
911 Dane Kennedy, ‘Diagnosing the Colonial Dilemma: Tropical Neurasthenia and the Alienated Briton’. In 
Durba Ghosh and Dane Kennedy (Eds), Decentering Empire: Britain, India and the Transcolonial World, 
(London: Sangam Books Limited, 2006), p.172.    
912 McGhie and McConvell, ‘Section III’, p.229.         
913 Ibid, p.228.  
914 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p.238.       
915 McGhie and McConvell, ‘Section III’, p.230.  
  207 
 
 
course of treatment’ for female patients, stated the survey. In approximately ‘half of the cases 
seen this was supplemented by at least one drug abreaction.’916 
 
Figure 6: Stacked bar chart comparing positive and negative diagnosis in British Army Personnel and the wives 
of service personnel.     
Source: Adapted from figures presented in McGhie and McConvell, ‘A Survey of Service Psychiatry in the 
Far East in 1951: Sections I-III’. 
 
 
As Figure 6 shows, in contrast to the approximately 46 percent of the British Army Personnel 
found to have no gross psychiatric disability, only 6 percent of the wives were found to have 
the comparable diagnosis of ‘no true psychoneurosis’.917 The fundamental difference then 
was that mild neurosis in servicemen was categorised as a negative diagnosis whereas mildly 
neurotic female patients were given a positive diagnosis. The statistics demonstrated that 
service psychiatrists had a tendency to award a positive psychiatric diagnosis to wives and 
not to service personnel. This classification bias revealed the instrumentalisation of service 
psychiatry. McGhie and McConvell had demonstrated concern over stigmatising service 
personnel with a psychiatric diagnosis, which was ostensibly to prevent a psychiatric label 
inhibiting future career prospects. With the negative diagnosis came perfunctory 
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psychotherapy and a swift return to service. Conversely, as the wives of service personnel 
had no immediate military utility the same concern was not expressed. Instead the perceived 
lack of stigma was considered fundamental in the genesis of psychiatric conditions among 
female patients. Further, regulars were thought more susceptible to psychiatric conditions 
due to familial responsibilities and long service engagements.918   
 
 
4.5.1. Military Psychiatry, Medical Officers and Female Psychiatric Patients    
 
The survey reported that families came into contact with a psychiatrist much earlier than in 
the UK. This assertion was largely a criticism of the Regimental Medical Officer who was 
conceptualised as the military equivalent of a general practitioner and seen as the gatekeeper 
to psychiatric care. ‘Such a practitioner, a trusted friend and father confessor,’ wrote McGhie 
and McConvell ‘would listen to their tale of woe and then give his reassurance, help and 
advice, and probably prevent an adventure into mental illness.’ Instead, they complained that 
the RMO was generally young, newly qualified and subject to frequent postings and 
transfers. These circumstances, thought McGhie and McConvell, inhibited the RMO’s 
ability to develop relationships while his youth and lack of experience undermined his 
medical authority.919 In short, the psychiatrist’s criticism of the RMO was that they failed to 
represent a sufficiently paternal figure to arrest a decline into a mental ill-health.       
 
As mentioned above, the RAMC was understaffed in Malaya and their MOs overworked. 
Further, the limited number of lectures received at Millbank, which focused on the military 
applications of psychiatry, would have done little to prepare the MO to treat the families of 
service personnel in the Far East. The diary of Dr Loosmore suggested overwork and a lack 
of psychiatric training rather than an insufficient display of medical paternalism 
characterised the doctor-patient interaction. Dr Loosmore complained that the RMO had far 
more duties than a GP,920 and because of this he was failing to provide adequate cover to 
those within his jurisdiction. Once Loosmore was deployed to Malaya, his diary entries, 
which referred to psychiatric symptoms among his female patients, were characterised by 
indecision, incomprehension and frustration. On 21st June 1958, for example, a woman was 
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admitted to the hospital under his care with what he suspected was ‘hypochondriac 
depression’. ‘I don’t know what to do with her’ wrote Loosmore, ‘Decided to keep her 
tonight.’921 Then two days later, on 23rd June, a further diary entry confessed: ‘The woman 
with depression is as bad as ever. I don’t understand these cases. They are perfectly logical 
and know they are being absurd, and yet don't, or cannot do anything about it. I sometimes 
feel annoyed by them but it must be wrong to do that. I decided to discharge her and we shall 
see what happens.’922             
 
 
4.5.2. Referral and Evacuation of Female Psychiatric Patients 
 
While the survey implicated the RMO, there was, however, a more pressing reason why 
female psychiatric patients were being evacuated to Singapore.  As mentioned, a series of 
quarterly historical reports dating to 1949 showed that the Advisor in Psychiatry was 
travelling to see psychiatric patients at the British Medical Hospitals and Field Ambulances 
stationed throughout Malaya.923 On 24th June, for example, Lieutenant-Colonel John 
McGhie was listed as visiting the Military Hospital in Perak State, north western Malaya. 
Conversely, over 50 percent of the female cases referred to in the survey were treated at 
Singapore.924 This high percentage was attributed to a lack of facilities in Malaya which 
meant many who could have been treated as outpatients instead had to travel up to two or 
three days to the psychiatric block at the base hospital. The base hospital was itself lacking 
in dedicated facilities for its female patients which in turn meant accommodation and 
treatment facilities had to be improvised. Female psychoneurotic patients were admitted to 
the ordinary family’s ward and the more serious psychotic cases, together with those under 
observation or awaiting treatment, were housed in a small separate ward adjoining the main 
male ward. ‘Burglar-proof wire netting’ intended to negate ‘the effect, of a barred ward’ was 
used to ensure the safety of these female patients.925 In contrast to the management of 
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psychiatric conditions among service personnel, the survey noted that invaliding back to the 
UK when used judiciously was ‘a most powerful therapeutic weapon’.926  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Wawman later wrote that the structure of the psychiatric services 
was largely derived from the requirements of the Second World War and National Service, 
with psychiatric care orientated towards the serviceman.927 After National Service had come 
to an end the Armed Forces changed in composition from young conscripts to career 
servicemen and the percentage of married men increased.928 As a result, Wawman, argued 
for the reorganisation of the psychiatric services to include better provision for families.929 
There is some evidence that this came to pass as a later survey of psychiatry in the Far East 
in 1968 saw a drop in admissions. This was explained by an emphasis on treating cases 
within the community, facilitated by additional welfare services.930 In Malaya during the 
Emergency these facilities were not in place.  
 
Meanwhile, 1950s perceptions of female psychiatric patients would persist into the sixties. 
A 1968 study of 50 military wives referred to a psychiatrist in Singapore and what had 
become Malaysia emphasised personality as the primary aetiological concern. A history of 
instability predating deployment was found in 70 percent of these referrals, with 46 having 
received previous psychiatric treatment. While the author recognised environmental stress 
as a contributing factor, this was seen as secondary compared to an inability to adapt 
ultimately due to character, which emphasised a constitutional cause. The husband's 
profession was now minimised as a stressor, Wawman emphasising that ‘it should be 
remembered that the Far East in 1968 was a relatively stable theatre with little separation or 
danger and virtually no financial hardship.’931    
 
The management of psychiatric conditions in the Far East was orientated towards 
servicemen.932 The psychiatric survey conducted in 1951 marginalised the insurgency within 
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the aetiology of psychiatric conditions among female psychiatric patients. Instead, the 
psychiatrists deferred to constitutional weakness in their conceptualisation of these 
conditions and in response promoted a form of medical paternalism to prevent what they 
saw as ‘an adventure into mental illness’.933 The psychiatrists attitude toward female patients 
was manifested in their propensity to award a positive psychiatric diagnosis for mild 
symptoms. In the end, the wives of service personnel had no immediate military utility and 
as such were treated as an additional pressure on the overstretched military medical services, 
and their husbands, in Singapore and Malaya.   
 
 
4.6. Comparative Research     
 
Perhaps the most effective method of ascertaining the true psychiatric cost of participation 
in the Malayan Emergency is by looking at comparative research. In the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War, the end of operations in the Far East saw a slow decline in the 
incidence of psychiatric conditions. Then, due in part to an outbreak of manic states among 
officers, the incidence again began to rise. The cause of these manic states was uncertain 
with debate over whether it was primarily physical, the result of malaria for example, or 
psychological.934 Roger Tredgold, Psychiatric Adviser to South East Asia Command, would 
go on to publish these findings in the British Medical Journal the following year in 1947. 
By the time of publication, he had concluded that these manic states, typified by over-activity 
and paranoia, were ‘thought to be the sudden release of tension and the consequent change 
in the tempo of work.’935 Publication prompted a concise response from one reader with an 
idea of how to test the thesis. Dr Harris of Surrey wrote: ‘It might be of interest and value to 
analyse statistically the relative incidence of manic reactions in the general community after 
V J day.’936 The comparison of military and civilian populations would have been revealing 
as a significantly higher incidence among the military population would have implicated 
military service as being the cause of these states. Conversely, a comparable incidence 
between groups would suggest that conditions within the military were not outside of the 
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normal range of conditions seen in civilians. Following the logic of Dr Harris, using a series 
of annual reports on the health of the army, this section will compare the total number of 
psychiatric conditions across FARELF to UK command, and then to the UK civilian 
population, in order to understand whether service in the Far East, during the Malayan 
Emergency, was a significant cause of psychiatric conditions.                                    
 
Sidney Rosenbaum built his PhD thesis on analysing data for the Army Medical Statistics 
Branch of the War Office.937 ‘Compared with equivalent civilian groups’, wrote Rosenbaum,  
‘the Army is an extremely favourable position for the ascertainment of disease, for controlled 
observation and treatment, above all for preventative medicine. It has an envied facility for 
measuring sickness, and a wide scope for study.’938 He reported that illness and injury was 
most closely associated with geography across Britain’s postwar commands. The ‘jungle 
patrolling in Malaya’ and the war in Korea, were described as ‘accidents of contemporary 
history ... superimposed on the more permanent features of climate’.939 While disease rates 
generally conformed to this thesis, the yearly rates of psychiatric morbidity suggested a more 
complex aetiological picture.    
 
Figure 7 charts the number of psychiatric conditions per 1,000 service personnel per year in 
FARELF and UK command from 1946 to 1961. By 1947 psychiatric conditions among 
service personnel had declined, to 7 per 1,000, following the cessation of the Second World 
War. Then, in the opening year of the Malayan Emergency, there was a notable increase to 
10.5 per 1,000 in 1948. While correlation is not causation, it was a correlation which 
questioned the permanence of climate and instead implicated what Rosenbaum had 
described as the ‘accidents of contemporary history’. During the opening years of the 
Emergency, the yearly number of psychiatric conditions in FARELF remained significantly 
higher than in the UK. As Karl Hack has argued, the insurgency reached its peak in 1951. 
Then, in the following years the indices of the insurgency, namely insurgent incidents and 
security forces casualties, began to steadily decline. By 1955 they were a fraction of what 
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they had earlier been.940 The psychiatric statistics broadly correlate with this trend and by 
1955 they were a fraction of what they were in during the opening years. The correlation is 
not a simple one and as explained above the psychiatric conditions recorded were subject to 
managerial decisions. Nevertheless, the Emergency did appear to have an impact on the 
psychiatric conditions being seen in FARELF.  
 
In 1956 the annual reports showed that psychiatric conditions began to rise. As Rosenbaum 
noted, in 1956 the composition of Far East Land Forces changed and the remaining soldiers 
stationed in Korea came under the command.941 Psychiatric casualties from Korea were not 
included in the survey prior to this time which in probability explains the rise in psychiatric 
conditions from 1956.942 Between 1969-1970, a further psychiatric survey took place at the 
British Military Hospital in Singapore, reporting that there were 3.9 per 1,000 Army 
personnel were being treated as in patients.943 The Emergency had been officially declared 
over a decade earlier and British forces were preparing to leave Singapore. The survey offers 
a Far East command comparison to the Emergency years. The 1955 figure was comparable 
to the 1969-70 figure, suggesting by 1955 the Emergency was not having an impact on the 
level of psychiatric conditions in the Far East. By 1970, however, there was a developed 
system of outpatient centres which may have meant less service personnel had to be admitted 
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Figure 7: Comparison of psychiatric morbidity in FARELF and UK commands per 1,000 troops.   
Notes: Figures were not available for UK command in 1946. FARELF was formed in 1947. In 1946 the 
command was known as SEAC. Troops remaining in Korea came under FARELF command midway through 
1956.  
Source: Compiled from a series of War Office reports on the health of the army covering1946 to 1961.945    
 
 
Rosenbaum stated that ‘in Army terms’ morbidity was ‘fairly consistent’ with ‘the criterion 
being a stay of over 48 hours in a medical unit.’946 During the second World War, one 
medical officer stationed in the UK believed that minor psychological disorders were more 
commonly observed in the services than in civilian practice.  He attributed this to ‘an 
increased readiness to seek medical advice’ in service personnel and that they were 
‘subjected to enforced medical supervision.’947 Rosenbaum picked up on the medical 
 
945 The War Office, ‘Report on the Health of the Army 1946-1952’, pp.79-81, pp.85-86, pp.76-77, TNA WO 
279/610; The War Office, ‘Report on the Health of the Army 1953’, p. 84, TNA WO 279/614; The War Office, 
‘Report on the Health of the Army 1954’, p.65, TNA WO 279/615; The War Office, ‘Report on the Health of 
the Army 1955’, p.52 TNA WO 279/617; The War Office, ‘Report on the Health of the Army 1956’, p.41, 
TNA WO 279/627; The War Office, ‘Report on the Health of the Army 1957’, p.12, TNA WO 279/285; The 
War Office, ‘Report on the Health of the Army 1958’, p.7, TNA WO 279/631; The War Office, ‘Report on the 
Health of the Army 1959’, p.7, TNA WO 279/291; The War Office, ‘Report on the Health of the Army 1960’, 
p.7, TNA WO 279/350; The War Office, ‘Report on the Health of the Army 1961’, p.7, TNA WO 279/635.  
946 Rosenbaum, ‘Cross-sectional review’, p.104.       
947 Ian Douglas-Wilson, ‘Minor Psychological Disturbances in the Services’, JRAMC, 81:6, (1943), p.283. 
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supervision, stating: ‘There is no equivalent in the Army to staying at home in bed for a few 
days home nursing, so the soldier has to go to hospital when a civilian with the same 
complaint would not.’948 Firstly, it is worth restating that at the base hospital in Singapore 
the minor psychological disorders that came to the attention of the psychiatrists were not 
given a psychiatric diagnosis, meaning they were not recorded as such. It is also worth 
restating that further service personnel with psychological disorders were kept in their units, 
and either sent to rest areas or reallocated to a support role, so would not appear in the 
statistics. This also raises the question of how psychiatric conditions in the army compare to 
those in civilian life. Back in the UK, rates of psychiatric disorder among the civilian 
population were significantly higher than in the armed forces stationed at home and abroad.  
 
The psychiatrist David Stafford-Clark stated that, the incidence of psychoneurotic illness, 
for example, fell ‘somewhere between eight and eleven per thousand of the population.’949 
As the decade progressed, there was concern among some medical practitioners that the 
incidence of these conditions had become a problem. R.F. Tredgold, the ex-army psychiatrist 
who had taken up civilian practice, warned that neurosis had become a burden on industry 
and the medical services in postwar Britain. While these conditions did not require treatment 
as inpatients, stated Tredgold, they crowded into outpatients’ clinics and the general 
practitioner surgery.950 One General Practitioner, L. M. Franklin, suggested that the creation 
of the National Health Service was to blame for the apparent increase in psychiatric 
conditions being seen in general practice. Franklin thought the NHS had ‘swept aside the 
barrier of a fee between patient and doctor’ and, as a result, ‘released on to GPs a flood of 
major and minor mental illnesses’.951 Another way of looking at the apparent increase in 
psychiatric conditions in the UK was that the democratisation of access to psychiatric care 
provided by the NHS meant that pre-existing conditions had been recognised. This arguably 
goes some way to making the comparison between the incidence of psychiatric conditions 
seen in service personnel and those in seen in civilians a more valid one, in that both service 
personnel and civilians had access to healthcare.  
 
948 Rosenbaum, ‘Cross-sectional review’, p.106.         
949 David Stafford-Clark, Psychiatry To-Day, (Middlesex: Penguin, first published 1952, reprinted 1961), 
p.258.   
950 R.F. Tredgold, (Ed), Bridging the Gap: From Fear to Understanding in Mental Illness, (London: 
Christopher Johnson, 1958), p.252.    
951 L.M. Franklin, ‘Psychiatric Illness in General Practice: The Urgency of the Problem’, Mental Health, 20:4 
(1962), pp.143-144. 




Even at its peak, the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya was less intense than much of 
the fighting conducted during the Second World War. Broadly speaking, the more intense 
opening years of the Emergency did, however, appear to have an impact on the incidence of 
psychiatric conditions. The figures represent an obfuscated aetiological picture, not specific 
to Malaya, but indicate that the Emergency played a causal role in psychiatric morbidity in 
its early years, most notably in 1948 the opening year of the Emergency. It was perhaps 
unsurprising that service personnel, both in the Far East and the UK, were healthier than 
civilians as they were generally young and had been subject to a system of selection which 





The psychiatric history and psychological fitness of service personnel took a prominent 
position within a system of selection that was designed with the defence and administration 
of Britain's overseas territories in mind.952 The discharge rate for psychiatric conditions 
suggests these procedures were used in full.953 While selection could not predict all those 
who would breakdown in extremis, its application meant those deployed to Malaya had been 
selected, and so in theory, were a more resilient group. Indeed, selection was considered to 
be successful in preventing psychiatric casualties among National Servicemen in the Far 
East.954  
 
Once the Emergency was under way the lack of psychiatric causalities at the base hospital 
led to the assertion that the pursuit of a coherent enemy was good for morale. This and the 
fact that the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya was a low-intensity conflict suggested 
psychiatric casualties would not materialise in significant numbers. 955 While later research 
suggested that the intensity of the Malayan Emergency did play a significant role in the 
 
952 ‘The Application of the PULHEEMS System’, p.21.   
953 Bergman and Miller, ‘Unfit for further service: trends in medical discharge from the British army 1861-
1998’, pp.204-11.                    
954 McGhie and McConvell, ‘A Survey of Service Psychiatry in the Far East in 1951’, p.176.  
955 Silverman, ‘Causes of Neurotic Breakdown in British Service Personnel Stationed in the Far East in 
Peacetime’, p.497.         
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psychiatric conditions seen, the figures remained comparatively low throughout.956 This less 
intense form of conflict appeared to be producing a lower incidence of serious psychiatric 
casualties.         
 
It also appeared to be producing milder stress reactions. These were being dealt with by 
medical officers who were directing soldiers with these conditions to rest areas.957  At the 
base hospital in Singapore concern over stigmatising these mild conditions meant service 
personnel were not diagnosed with a psychiatric condition.958 This, in turn, would have 
resulted in fewer serious psychiatric conditions being recorded. While this strategy raised 
questions about whether service personnel were in fact experiencing more serious conditions 
which required prolonged medical care, it arguably negated the significant stigma that came 
with a psychiatric diagnosis at that time.959 The management of psychiatric conditions in this 
way was a departure from Second World War psychiatric thinking and an adaption to 
counterinsurgency.   
 
This chapter has looked at the incidence, conceptualisation and management of soldiers who 
demonstrated symptoms of stress at the time of their service. This next chapter will consider 













956 See figure 7.                         
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On 8th October 2018 it was widely reported that rates of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) in the British Army had increased from 4% in 2004-06, a figure not significantly 
different from the general population, to 6% in 2014-16.960 Within these figures, the 
research, which the media had picked up on, reported that rates of PTSD were significantly 
higher among ex-service personnel (7.4%) than those still serving (4.8%) and higher still 
among ex-service personnel who had been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in a combat role 
(17%) than in a support role (5.7%).961 Despite the figures, Sir Simon Wessely, the senior 
author of the research, stated ‘it would be wrong to say there is a ‘bow wave’, tsunami or 
timebomb of PTSD in the UK military and veteran community.’962 It was a statement made 
in response to earlier press reports which utilised these metaphors to raise fears over a 
coming epidemic of traumatised soldiers.963 While the press have misreported aspects of 
military mental health - a notable example was the ‘misleading sound bite’ that more 
Falklands veterans had committed suicide than had been killed in the war  -  it was also a 
significant departure from the earlier line that ‘Despite the intense tempo of UK military 
operations over the past 9 years, mental health of the UK Armed Forces as a whole seems to 
remain broadly comparable to the UK civilian population.’ 964 The implication was clear, the 
 
960 ‘PTSD rates increase in UK military personnel, research suggests’, The Guardian, Monday 8th Oct 2018. 
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(2018), p.696.  
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long-term impact of participation in recent counterinsurgencies was more serious than 
initially supposed. What then of the long-term psychiatric impact of participation during the 
Malayan Emergency?              
 
As the earlier chapter on psychiatry showed, National Service personnel deployed to Malaya 
underwent a selection process that was believed to have played a role in the relatively low 
level of psychiatric attrition encountered there. A recent study has suggested that selection 
may have also helped to prevent long term psychiatric conditions. The study compared a 
group of ex-servicemen against a group who were not conscripted. It found that ‘National 
[S]ervice veterans were less likely to have any mental health problems compared to non-
veterans.’ The authors suggested this may have been due to the selection procedures in place 
at the time which suggested that the ‘non-veteran group was worse off to start with, and this 
initial difference would then mask any impact of [N]ational [S]ervice in the veteran 
group.’965 This point, and the fact that a relatively small number of personnel served in 
Malaya, also suggests that the long-term psychiatric cost of the Emergency was relatively 
low. Epidemiological research into pension files found that the number of service personnel 
deployed to Malaya represented a small proportion of the armed forces, which created 
difficulties in finding psychiatric pension awards relating to that conflict.966 Further to this 
the authors noted that the prolonged engagements of the Second World War ‘were 
significantly more intense than modern counter-insurgency campaigns’.967  
 
In summary, service personnel were selected in a way that sieved out many potential 
psychiatric issues, served in relatively low numbers, and counterinsurgency was low 
intensity. Together these factors would suggest that the campaign in Malaya generated few 
long-term psychiatric casualties. The earlier psychiatry chapter also introduced a number of 
further salient themes in relation to psychiatric casualties resulting from the Malayan 
Emergency, namely the importance placed on training for and maintaining morale, the use 
of psychiatric nomenclature that reduced the number of people classified as ill in this way, 
and the issue of avoiding stigma by using alternative terms. This chapter will pick up these 
 
965 Charlotte Woodhead, Roberto J. Rona, Amy C. Iversen, et al, ‘Health of National Service Veterans: An 
Analysis of a Community-Based Sample using Data from the 2007 Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey of 
England’, Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 46:7, (2011), p.559.    
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themes suggesting that they also played a key role in the long-term psychological impact of 
participation.  To begin with, this first section will introduce the modern medical formulation 
of traumatic response to stress.                                           
 
 
5.2. Postwar British Military Psychiatry, Counterinsurgency and the Emergence of PTSD 
 
This section will delineate the emergence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder into British 
military medical thinking. It will suggest that PTSD is now the preferred diagnosis for 
veterans of the Malayan Emergency, and military conflicts generally, who are experiencing 
ongoing psychological disturbances as a result of their service. Firstly, however, it will turn 
briefly to the French postwar period of decolonisation and the American experience in 
Vietnam, in order to map out some salient points against which to measure the British 
experience.        
 
The war in Vietnam was thought by some to be uniquely stressful and service there had 
motivated its own term: Post-Vietnam Syndrome. Robert Jay Lifton endorsed the term only 
to the point that it ‘correctly suggests something special about the psychological impact of 
the Vietnam War.’ ‘Other than that’, Lifton argued ‘post-Vietnam syndrome is a dubious, 
easily-abused category, especially in its ready equation of effects of the war with a clinical 
condition (a “syndrome”).’ Instead Lifton suggested the anger and guilt which veterans were 
experiencing was in some cases a constructive response to a wrongful conflict and were 
included in the condition. It was a commentary which signalled the growing politicisation of 
psychological trauma in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. ‘Still,’ writes Lifton ‘the 
evocative quality of the term - its availability as a catchall - makes it widely used by almost 
everyone.’968 Many of the psychiatrists linked to the war in Vietnam would become 
instrumental in the conception of the modern formulation of trauma, PTSD.969   
 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder become available as a diagnosis when it entered into the 
third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980. Its entry into the DSM-III was the result of a highly 
 
968 Robert Jay Lifton, Home from the War, (London: Wildwood House, 1974), p.420n. 
969 Mardi Horowitz, ‘A Life in but Not Under Stress’, Charles R. Figley, (Ed) Mapping Trauma and its Wake: 
Autobiographic Essays by Pioneer Trauma Scholars, (London: Routledge, 2007), p.88. 
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politicised process following the War in Vietnam. For example, two of the leading activists 
for the inclusion of a stress related disorder in the DSM were psychiatrists who had come to 
their position on trauma through their involvement with the group Vietnam Veterans against 
the War. Chaim Shatan and the aforementioned Robert Jay Lifton had pioneered the idea of 
‘rap groups’ - forums in which veterans could discuss moral and psychological concerns 
resulting from their service in Vietnam - as a form of therapy for traumatised veterans and 
later presented research to the committee who would codify PTSD into the DSM-III.970  
 
PTSD is considered unique as a diagnostic category. Where other DSM diagnostic categories 
seek only to codify a set of symptoms as a given disorder, the PTSD diagnosis links its 
symptoms to a stressful event. In this way, the codification of PTSD is making a statement 
about cause and effect. Allan Young has argued that advocates won this concession based 
on ‘historical legitimacy’, meaning the disorder was taken to recur with consistency across 
historical periods, and that it secured the ‘clinical needs and pension rights of a deserving 
patient population, notably American veterans of the Vietnam War.’971 A similar pattern had 
emerged in the aftermath of French involvement in Indochina (1945-54) and Algeria (1954-
62).  
 
In France, nomenclature had emerged which suggested counterinsurgency was uniquely 
stressful. In 1969, a group of French psychiatrists suggested the term ‘guerrilla neurosis’ for 
the psychiatric conditions resulting from low intensity warfare conducted in Indochina and 
Algeria. The term was chosen in order to emphasise the particular stress of 
counterinsurgency there, such as ‘doubt about the presence of the enemy’ and ‘the surprise 
of attack or ambush’.972 The National Federation of North-African Ex-Servicemen 
(FNACA), a group for veterans of the French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria 
commissioned research into psychological disorders resulting from service there. The 
psychiatrists charged with carrying out this research published a report in 1985 which noted 
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that ‘large numbers’ of veterans had been disturbed by their experiences and were left unable 
to cope. These psychological disturbances were attributed to the ‘perpetual state of tension’ 
engendered by the asymmetrical tactics encountered in Algeria which resulted in depression 
on their return home.973    
 
The psychiatrist and critic of French colonialism, Frantz Fanon, had earlier written that the 
‘pitiless atmosphere’ and ‘inhuman practices’ engendered in counterinsurgency in Algeria 
created the same ‘psychiatric phenomenon’ in both the ‘“pacified” population’ and ‘those 
who carry out the “pacification”’. Fanon forwarded the term ‘reactionary psychoses’ to 
describe these phenomena, which emphasised the event over ideas about constitutional 
weakness. In short, for Fanon, colonialism, and the counterinsurgency measures used to 
pacify the people, were inherently pathological and the cause of psychiatric conditions. ‘The 
truth’, writes Fanon, ‘is that colonialism in its essence was already taking on the aspect of a 
fertile purveyor for psychiatric hospitals.’974 In locating the cause of psychiatric illness in 
the political system Fanon politicised mental illness connected with counterinsurgency.    
 
In 1992, the documentary The Undeclared War, directed by Bertrand Tavernier, was 
released to coincide with the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the conflict in Algeria. One 
of the concluding scenes shows interviews with traumatised veterans of the 
counterinsurgency as they take a day away from the Grenoble psychiatric hospital.975 The 
problem of psychiatric illness among veterans was again raised in the press. In the early 
2000s, the French newspaper Le Monde ran the headline ‘350,000 Algerian Veterans 
Suffering from Psychological Distress Related to the War’. The accompanying editorial 
implied that the recovery of these veterans was dependent on France reconciling itself with 
its colonial past. Following the article, the psychoanalyst and colleague of Frantz Fanon, 
Alice Cherki again made the point that the torturers were traumatised along with the 
 
973 Martin Evans, ‘Rehabilitating the Traumatized War Veteran: The Case of French Conscripts from the 
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tortured.976 The psychiatric casualties of the French counterinsurgencies have invariably 
come under the rubric of PTSD.977      
 
In the UK the term PTSD entered the military lexicon after the wars of decolonisation were 
over. The Two World Wars, more specifically the work of the wartime psychiatrists, would 
dominate understandings of psychological trauma throughout most of the postwar period. 
This is typified within Henderson and Gillespie’s Textbook of Psychiatry which contained a 
dedicated chapter on the ‘Psychoses and Neuroses in War’ into its ninth edition (1962).978 
By the tenth edition, however (1969) Sir David Henderson had passed away and the chapter 
on ‘Psychoses and Neuroses in War’ had been replaced by a section on ‘Neuroses following 
Trauma’. The section used language that appeared closer to how trauma is now understood, 
which focuses on a ‘psychologically traumatic event’ not specific to war and its subsequent 
symptoms, for example, ‘terrifying dreams’. It was, however, still a long way from current 
understandings, retaining notions of predisposition and compensation driven symptoms.979  
 
As in Malaya, officers deployed to the Cyprus Emergency (1955-59) were observing that 
participation in the counterinsurgency could have a deleterious effect on morale. Brigadier 
Baker, the Governor's Chief of Staff in Cyprus during 1955-56, thought the unusual, 
sometimes distasteful stresses of an Emergency meant morale was harder to maintain than 
in conventional war.980 A similar observation was made by a Parachute Regiment RMO, 
who noted that: ‘Frustration was the keynote in the battle against EOKA. For the problem 
of Cyprus was a political one, and no amount of soldiers would ever solve it.’981 Despite 
these observations, the military medical conceptualisation that offensive operations were 
good for morale persisted. In one paper, for example, habitual drinking in the Mess was 
noted as a cause of alcohol-induced psychiatric states in Cyprus. ‘The apparent increase of 
 
976 Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp.20-21.       
977 Marc-Antoine Crocq and Louis Crocq, ‘From Shell Shock and War Neurosis to Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder: A History of Psychotraumatology’, Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 2:1, (2000), p. 53.    
978 Henderson and Gillespie’s Textbook of Psychiatry for Students and Practitioners Ninth Edition, Revised 
by Sir David Henderson and Ivor R.C. Batchelor, (London: OUP, 1962), p.466.  
979 Henderson and Gillespie’s Textbook of Psychiatry for Students and Practitioners Tenth Edition, Revised 
by Ivor R.C. Batchelor, (London: OUP, 1969), p.171.   
980 Brigadier G.H. Baker, Cyprus Emergency (Baker Report), 75–6, MSS.Medit.s.28, BLCAS. See also, Simon 
Robbins, ‘The British Counter-insurgency in Cyprus’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23:4-5, (2012), pp.733-34.          
981 Sandy Cavenagh, Airborne to Suez, (London: William Kimber 1965), 60.  
  224 
 
 
the condition from 1958 to 1960’, noted the author, ‘may be related to the reduction of 
alertness consequent on the Cyprus Truce of March, 1959.’982 Total psychiatric admissions, 
however, peaked at 100 in 1958, dropping to 76 in 1959 and 20 in the first quarter of 1960.983 
This was in line with EOKA activity, which again peaked in 1958 and then declined sharply 
into 1959, suggesting a different aetiological picture for overall admissions.984  However, as 
these were total psychiatric admissions, as opposed to admissions per thousand strength, an 
overall decline in troop numbers may also explain fewer psychiatric admissions. More 
generally, a decrease in hospital admissions, was said to halve in the year which the Cyprus 
Emergency was declared. The senior RAMC man on the island, Lieutenant-Colonel F.G. 
Neild, reported that one of the health lessons from Cyprus was that sick rates were lower 
when morale was good, and that morale was good when the troops were deployed in the 
counterterrorism role, as opposed to being used as labour.985 A further counterinsurgency, 
however, would continue to erode this idea.  
 
By the early seventies, as British Army units stationed in Northern Ireland were experiencing 
mounting casualties, medical officers were acknowledging that the stress of participation 
was taking a psychological toll on service personnel. 986 In December 1972 Captain Grieve 
gave a lecture on his ‘Experiences as an RMO in Northern Ireland’, with the 2nd Battalion 
Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, at 201st Northern Field Hospital in the UK. A deployment to 
Northern Ireland required ‘Constant alertness and therefore very little, if any true rest.’ 
‘Although it is not an acknowledged total war situation,’ stated Grieve, ‘many of the stresses 
of war are present, and the lack of a clearly defined enemy who is to be shot on sight, 
compensates for any shortage of other hazards.’987 The stress of counterinsurgency was 
beginning to be seen as different in a way which undermined any simple correlation between 
physical and psychiatric casualties.  
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Major-General Anthony Deane-Drummond, who specialised in public order and riot control 
noted that: ‘Intense - and time-consuming - periods of training are required to prepare troops 
tactically and psychologically for a role which although less lethal in terms of overall 
casualties than conventional war is equally demanding and stressful.’988 ‘In Northern 
Ireland’, wrote Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Belas, ‘casualties are occurring, not on a large scale, 
but at present with some degree of regularity’. In a departure from the established correlation 
between casualties and psychiatric conditions Belas raised the unusual stress of 
counterinsurgency as a cause of breakdowns. He quoted one ‘battle wise’ infantry officer 
who had previously served in Korea and Malaya as saying: ‘I am trained to fight and this is 
acceptable when I know who my enemy is, but when for political reasons, one cannot fight 
back, an impossible situation is created.’ ‘This’, wrote Belas, ‘leads to questioning of 
purpose, indecision and consequent lowering of morale. This, it is suggested, would increase 
the liability to psychiatric casualties, although so far it has not been possible to produce 
figures to support this theory.’989          
 
Peter Abraham, professor of military psychiatry at Millbank, the main place of instruction 
for medical officers, supposed that the army had been ‘lulled into a false sense of security’ 
by the apparently low psychiatric cost of postwar counterinsurgency campaigns and the 
presumption that if another war occurred it would be brief and would not generate the 
psychiatric casualty levels of the Second World War. As an analogue, he looked to research 
conducted by the Israeli Defence Force during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, which 
suggested that breakdowns could occur immediately. ‘Gone is the notion of battle 
‘exhaustion’ developing after protracted exposure to the ordeals and terrors of modern 
warfare. The shock can occur on day one.’ In line with this assertion Abraham adopted the 
term ‘battleshock’ which he defined as an ‘inability to fight which does not result from major 
physical injury or disease.’ The term alluded to ‘battlefield paralysis’ which resulted from 
heavy bombardment. ‘This’ wrote Abraham ‘must have a familiar ring to students of the 
subject of breakdown in battle in the two world wars.’ Abraham thought ‘it is logical to 
describe under one heading conditions which have a common aetiology in the unique 
circumstances of battle; affecting for the most part stable individuals; and which require 
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similar management, namely early intervention, in the battle zone, with the expectation of 
rapid return to duty.’990 In short, the term ‘battleshock’ was intended as catchall to describe 
a normal, but transient, response to an extremely stressful event during conventional war.         
 
Abraham’s concern over the preparedness of British Forces should another war break out, 
turned out to be prescient one. Between April and June 1982, the British fought a brief but 
bloody land campaign to retake the Falkland Islands. One report, published in the January 
1983 edition of the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, suggested that psychiatric 
casualties were non-existent. Captain Steven Hughes, Regimental Medical Officer to the 
Second Battalion Parachute Regiment, stated that there were no psychiatric injuries among 
33 British casualties evacuated from Goose Green.991 Abraham duly sent a letter to the 
journal, published in the following April edition, countering that psychiatric casualties had 
occurred but had not been evacuated at that time. ‘Although the numbers of battleshock cases 
were, like those of the wounded, mercifully small,’ wrote Abraham, ‘the impression is 
unwittingly given by other medical officers as well as by himself, that they did not occur at 
all.’992         
 
A further report comparing the Falklands War with the war in Vietnam indicated that the 
rate of psychiatric combat casualties in the south Atlantic was ‘remarkably low’. ‘During the 
course of the war’ wrote Captain H.H. Price of the US Army Medical Corps ‘the British lost 
237 men killed, 777 wounded with 446 receiving significant hospital treatment. The rate of 
evacuated psychiatric casualties was 2% of all wounded with 16 declared cases evacuated 
from the hospital ship, Uganda.’993 The figure was adjusted by Abraham who countered that 
‘The true figure for incapacity for psychological reasons was approximately four times that 
number’.994 The Geneva Convention had prevented casualties that had been evacuated to the 
hospital ship from being returned to units on land. As Abraham stated, there were no 
specialised medical personnel on the island, which ‘negated the fundamental principles of 
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early forward intervention and a rapid return to duty.’ Abraham understood that the number 
of psychiatric casualties was ‘inexorably linked to the number of wounded’, and if the war 
had continued much longer was sure that psychiatric casualties ‘were about to achieve 
significant proportions’.995 Abraham then had been left with the sense that the taskforce had 
narrowly avoided hitting a crisis point in psychiatric casualties.  
 
Morgan O’Connell, a Royal Navy Surgeon who had gained a diploma in Psychological 
Medicine at the Royal Victoria Hospital in the early 1970s, was deployed with the Task 
Force. On his return home O’Connell would experience symptoms of stress which prompted 
him to research post-traumatic stress among his fellow veterans, if only to reassure himself 
that the casualties were low.996 Writing years after the conflict he still believed the figures 
were low although he also acknowledged that the management of psychiatric casualties on 
the islands may have had an impact on later recognition of stress. O’Connell had requested 
the presence of an Army Mental Health Team on the island in the aftermath of the battle at 
Goose Green. The request was denied, which, he believed, ‘had a long term effect on the 
subsequent failure/unwillingness/difficulty in recognising psychiatric casualties among the 
returned combatants.’997             
 
When the long-term effect of participation in the Falklands conflict began to be examined it 
was done so within the rubric of PTSD. Approximately five years after the conflict, one 
study looked at 64 Falklands veterans who were still serving. ‘Half the veterans reported 
some symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder,’ the final paper stated, ‘and 22% were 
rated as having the complete PTSD syndrome.’ The symptoms were associated with 
‘intensity of combat experience and the retrospective report of emotional difficulties in the 
initial period on return from the war.’998 In response to continuing presentations of 
psychiatric conditions related to the Falklands the first PTSD treatment programme in the 
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country was established at the Royal Naval Hospital, Haslar, in 1987. O’Connell went on to 
become Consulting Psychiatrist to Combat Stress, the Ex-Services Mental Welfare Society, 
and stated that the organisation had approximately 400 Falklands veterans on its books.999 
The Falklands war then was the catalyst for the British military to adopt PTSD as a medical 
term.                    
 
A recent interview with Walter Busuttil, Medical Director at Combat Stress and veteran 
British military psychiatrist, suggested that different branches of the service recognised 
PTSD at different times. Busuttil stated that the Falklands War increased awareness of PTSD 
in the Navy, whereas it was not until the Gulf War in the early nineties that the Army really 
became aware of PTSD.1000 The lessons of forward psychiatry appeared to have been re-
learned by the time of the Gulf War (1990-1991). Battleshock Recovery Units, reminiscent 
of the exhaustion centres of the Second World War, were deployed with the fighting force 
to administer treatment.1001 While the term battleshock was used in the naming of the field 
psychiatric units, the casualties came to be referred to under the nomenclature Combat Stress 
Reaction (CSR).1002 This was in deference to research from Israel which had again 
recognised the intention underlying the exhaustion label and ‘the powerful suggestive 
influence which the prevailing clinical description itself has on the symptomatic expression 
of CSR.’ Like exhaustion, Combat Stress Reaction was considered a ‘“neutral” term’.1003 
Further, CSR was being discussed as a precursor to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. It was 
recognised that a psychiatric presence on the ground would preserve manpower but also help 
to prevent future cases of PTSD.1004      
 
The first edition of the Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, published in 1983, has been credited 
with introducing the term Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder into British psychiatric textbooks. 
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It was during the 1990s, however, that the PTSD concept became universally recognised 
within British psychiatric textbooks. This was in large part due to the inclusion of a PTSD 
category in the 10th revision of the World Health Organisation’s International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) in 1992.1005 In the decade after its inclusion in the 
American DSM-III, PTSD had become a recognised diagnosis in the UK, both in military 
and civilian medical practice. By the 1990s PTSD had become established as the rubric 
through which post conflict psychological distress was being considered in the UK.  
 
Subsequent to these developments, veterans of Malaya who are having ongoing 
psychological problems due to their service are generally come under the rubric of PTSD. 
Roy Brook, a retired Major working as a Welfare Officer for Combat Stress, the Ex-Services 
Mental Welfare Society, emphasised that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder has become the 
main concern among service personnel. One case from Malaya was ‘Albert’:         
 
Albert went to Malaya as a soldier in 1952, straight from basic training. He became 
a dog handler in Singapore and travelled around Malaya, where dogs were used to 
track terrorists in the jungle. He described to me how he shot a terrorist during an 
ambush and how this and other horrific sights had worried him ever since. There was 
thus a possibility that Albert had PTSD.1006     
 
Indeed, Combat Stress has changed the focus of its intervention toward the treatment of 
traumatic psychological reactions to meet the needs of its service users, a significant portion 
of which had seen active service in Malaya. A survey published in 2007 reported 74, or 2%, 
of its active cases had served in Malaya. This was slightly more than the active cases of those 
who had served in the conventional war in Korea, a campaign which ran contemporaneously 
with the Malayan Emergency, at 54 or 1.5%.1007      
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PTSD has become a part of the wider conversation on the experience of veterans of the 
Malayan Emergency and their subsequent issues. In his book on British National Service, 
for example, Tom Hickman has retroactively found evidence of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder in veterans of the Malayan and other postwar Emergencies.1008 PTSD has been 
cited in newspaper articles relating to participation in the Emergency. In April 2009 a 
regional newspaper, the News Shopper, ran a story concerning two Malayan Emergency 
veterans, who, supported by their local veterans’ group, had begun a petition to have a rosette 
attached to the General Service Medal (GSM) awarded for service in Malaya. The Secretary 
of the North Kent and South-East London branch of the National Malaya and Borneo 
Veterans’ Association, Bert Godsiff stated ‘We deserve to be recognised’. The article 
suggested the widespread occurrence of psychological distress among the surviving veterans 
of the Malayan Emergency:        
 
Many of the guys who went out there had little or no knowledge of what they were 
being sent there for, because it was just called an emergency. … But it was a war, 
not an emergency. It was a harrowing war. … Most of the guys who fought out there 
are now dead and most of the ones still alive suffer post-traumatic stress.1009       
 
The conceptualisation of the Malayan Emergency as a war that had traumatised its veterans 
was a significant shift away from an earlier popularised characterisation that had gone 
towards shaping the public perception of national service during the Malayan Emergency.  
 
This came in the shape of a comically sexualised coming of age tale authored by a veteran 
of the Emergency. Leslie Thomas arrived in Singapore in January 1950 as a National Service 
Pay Clerk, and later crossed the causeway into Malaya. His book The Virgin Soldiers (1966), 
had arguably come to represent the young National Servicemen's experience of service 
during the Emergency in Malaya.1010 The Virgin Soldiers went on to become a bestseller 
which Thomas attributed to it being ‘a novel about National Service, as distinct from wartime 
military experience’ and to its mildly salacious title arousing public ‘curiosity’.1011 It was 
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followed by Onward Virgin Soldiers (1971) and then Stand Up Virgin Soldiers (1975). The 
original book was made into a film in 1969. Like the book, the film The Virgin Soldiers was 
‘popular’, although not well received by the critics. 1012 David Pirie, in review for the 
Monthly Film Bulletin wrote ‘The Virgin Soldiers remains firmly rooted in the tradition of 
British Forces comedy. The jokes, which make up most of the script, revolve round the 
obvious bawdy themes of service life, and the sexual encounters are presented in what is 
almost a Carry On fashion, … one isn't at all impressed by the script’s sentimental 
suggestion that the various chaotic episodes which make up the story have somehow made 
the ‘virgins’ into men.’1013 The film was followed a sequel Stand Up Virgin Soldiers, 
released eight years later in 1977. The second film was in the same style as the first. One 
reviewer noted that it ‘guarantees the action of Leslie Thomas’ nostalgic novel is lowered to 
the level of banal trousers-down antics in the barracks’.1014 Its portrayal of less than 
professional soldiers certainly did not meet the model of resilience instilled at the Jungle 
Warfare School. John Baynes, a platoon and later company commander in Malaya from 
1950 to 1953, for example, thought the book and film had perpetuated the idea that National 
Service personnel were poorly trained.1015 There was, however, some truth to the 
characterisation of service in the Far East. In a public debate about sex and marriage, Thomas 
later admitted that he did indeed lose his virginity to a prostitute while in Singapore. He was 
by his own account ‘the original virgin soldier.’1016 The high rate of venereal disease among 
service personnel in the Far East, presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis, suggested this 
experience was not atypical.    
 
In contrast to the American and French experience of counterinsurgency then, the British 
postwar counterinsurgencies did not generate any specific medical terminology which 
described the stress of participation. This was in part due to there being no British equivalent 
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to the American and French psychiatrists who protested their respective counterinsurgencies 
from direct experience of these conflicts. The prosecution of the Malayan Emergency was 
protested by some who were there, notably Victor Purcell, mentioned above. Again, in 
contrast to the French and American experiences of counterinsurgency however, the 
Malayan Emergency was presented as a success by those who participated and wrote about 
it critically. Richard Clutterbuck, for example, a senior British officer and veteran of the 
Malayan Emergency, later described it as a one of the ‘classic’ examples of how to defeat a 
rural guerrilla insurgency.1017  
 
Instead, the idea that the offensive operations engendered within counterinsurgency were 
good for morale persisted among medical officers into the Cyprus Emergency. While this 
idea was being questioned by other officers, it was not until the Troubles in Northern Ireland 
that medical personnel began to report that counterinsurgency engendered stress that could 
cause psychiatric problems. The effects of stress had been marginalised during Britain's 
postwar period of decolonisation. Then, the Falklands War led to the adoption of PTSD and 
ultimately to a re-conceptualisation of stress among veterans of the Malayan Emergency. 
This was a significant shift away from popular imaginings of what participation in the 
Emergency entailed. This next section will suggest that there has also been a shift in the 
conceptualisation of stress within the interviews and memoirs held at the IWM and beyond.    
 
 
5.3. The Conceptualisation of Stress in Malayan Emergency Memoirs   
 
The jungle operations did prove stressful for service personnel as later memoirs would 
reveal. As John Scurr, a rifleman during the Emergency, wrote in his 1998 memoir: ‘I did 
observe men who seemed to be close to breaking point and eventually I appeared to approach 
that vicinity myself.’1018 Where breakdowns were reported they were reports of others who 
had broken down. Len Ives, a further rifleman in Malaya, for example, reported that an 
officer broke down prior to a large-scale operation. The officer was a veteran of the Second 
World War and it was his prior service which Ives used to explain the breakdown: ‘Who 
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knows what this man endured in WW2? The thought of heavy casualties in what was 
(allegedly) peacetime was probably more than he could bear!’1019 While Malaya during the 
Emergency was the eventual site of the officer’s breakdown Ives emphasised the unknown 
wartime history of the officer as its ultimate cause. History would again be important where 
medical language was found in the memoirs.  
 
Where psychiatric terminology had crept into the published memoirs, it had previously done 
so in a form that emphasised predisposition toward psychiatric illness as opposed to the 
stress of participation in the counterinsurgency. After days in the jungle, Oliver Crawford 
noted in his published memoir The Door Marked Malaya (1958) that: ‘It was a shock to 
exchange the claustrophobic jungle for the paddy now stretching all around us’.1020 
Returning to Arthur Campbell’s semi-fictionalised account Jungle Green, predisposition 
toward breakdowns was brought about by a precipitating factor – the jungle. Campbell wrote 
of the soldier who he reassigned that ‘His fear of the great wilderness was deep-seated; 
nothing would shift it.’1021 This pattern is repeated as Campbell recounts the fears of a further 
soldier who struggles to cope: 
 
He had often told me that he wished he could master his fear of it but always, when 
those immense trees closed over his head and the stifling heat and silence pressed in 
on him, claustrophobia took hold of his nerves. He told me that he used to feel the 
same in the London Underground, and that he had to fight against it all the time.1022    
 
Claustrophobia had long been considered a symptom of predisposition toward neurosis 
which showed itself during war. T.A. Ross defined phobias more generally as ‘a specific 
fear which the patient himself knows is ridiculous but which he cannot overcome.’ ‘Fancy 
Greek names have been given to them’ writes Ross. ‘They are of no value, for they tell us 
nothing of why the patient has the fear and the important thing about a phobia is to find out 
why it arose. The real fear is never about the circumstance to which it has become attached 
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in consciousness.’1023 For military psychiatrists, this meant the cause of the condition was 
inevitably located outside of military service. W.H.R. Rivers, in his influential post First 
World War study for example, used the claustrophobia of one medical officer as a case study 
in his book Instinct and the Unconscious. Rivers traced the medical officer’s fear of being 
in the enclosed trenches of the First World War back to traumatic events in the officer’s 
childhood.1024  
 
A further example comes from Abram Kardiner. In his book The Traumatic Neurosis of War 
Kardiner recounted the case of a veteran who had on several occasions witnessed the death 
of his companions while he was buried in a trench. On his return home, the soldier 
experienced ‘uncontrollable anxiety’ while riding the subway. Despite the apparent 
importance of the soldier’s wartime experiences in the genesis of his postwar claustrophobia, 
Kardiner looked past these events into the soldiers more distant past to excavate earlier 
symptoms from which he established a neurotic personality.1025 Culpin thought that service 
personnel were reluctant to report symptoms as they may be ashamed to admit to the fear or 
be unconscious of it.1026 The idea that origins of claustrophobia were to be found in 
childhood persisted into the 1950s.1027 
 
Given the insistence within military-medical thinking that psychiatric symptomology was a 
sign of a constitutional weakness, where service personnel did broach the subject of their 
own stress, they did so euphemistically. John P. Cross, a veteran of British wartime and 
postwar jungle campaigns, described being perceived as different following a sustained 
period of operations and that this perception would remain on his record: 
 
After I emerged from a three-month stint on the Malay-Thai border - one of three 
such in a year - with nine Gurkhas, I was told I was awkward with friends and that 
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there was a strangeness about me which an unsympathetic commanding officer wrote 
up, for ever to remain in that confidential report, as weakness of character.1028  
 
Cross, however, described the impact of these operations as becoming ‘jungle happy’.1029 
This was a term that had been used in Burma during the Second World War. It was a variant 
of ‘bomb happy’ which was used to describe psychiatric casualties.1030 The use of ‘happy’ 
as a suffix to a cause of stress was a common device during the Second World War. It lent 
irony to the terminology used to describe stress. Taking a humorous approach perhaps 
lessened the effects of psychiatric conditions within the group. Importantly, it was a 
euphemism that de-medicalised stress and in so doing lessened the stigma that came with a 
psychiatric label.  
 
It continued in common use during the Emergency, particularly in relation to the stress of an 
approaching return to the UK. Perhaps counter-intuitively, an impending return home 
heightened the dangers of active service in the minds of service personnel. J. Beasley, a 
National Serviceman with the RASC in Malaya, wrote, ‘As one nears the time of discharge 
one becomes very conscious of anything happening which might delay ones [sic] departure, 
like accidental death.’1031 Walter Schwarz, the subaltern who had regularly led soldiers on 
jungle patrols noted this change of psychological state with some humour. ‘Dear Folks’, 
writes Schwarz, in May 1953, ‘I have contracted a disease that all soldiers out here get sooner 
or later. It has no medical name that I know of, but among soldiers it is known as ‘boat-
happy.’1032 A further, more serious example, comes from N.A. Martin, the National 
Servicemen who had been traumatised by his post-ambush experience in Malaya. In his 
memoir, he mentioned that his platoon were getting ‘demob happy’ when they had months 
left in Malaya and then, as their embarkation home approached, stated that ‘we that are left 
of out platoon, are getting boat happy now’.1033   
 
Turning to a selection of interviews recorded as part of the Imperial War Museum’s ongoing 
oral history project, however, suggests the growing awareness of PTSD among veterans of 
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the Malayan Emergency. In 1983, Charles Allen interviewed William Hewlett, who had 
served as an infantryman in Malaya, between 1954 and 1956. He described the experience 
of counterinsurgency operations as ‘a war of nerves’ and emphasised that his time in the 
jungle had taken a psychological toll. ‘My nerves were completely shattered; I was 
completely washed out. I was physically exhausted and mentally I was a wreck.’ 
Interestingly, the jungle was both a source of anxiety and safety for Hewlett. He described 
becoming habituated to the jungle, conceptualising it as a ‘suit of armour’, then, upon leaving 
he instead felt ‘naked’. He cited this as a cause of his later developing agoraphobia. He was 
also careful to point out that others fared much worse than him and mentioned unspecified 
cases of suicides among officers and senior NCOs.1034 Like claustrophobia, the origins of 
agoraphobia were believed to be found in childhood.1035 In this earlier interview stress was 
conceptualised using psychiatric terminology that implied predisposition.     
 
Further interviews and memoirs make clear that until more recently there was little 
awareness of modern psychiatric nomenclature among veterans of the Emergency. As John 
Poole, a veteran of the Second World War, who re-joined the army and was deployed to 
Malaya and the Emergency, wrote: ‘After the first world war [sic], … it was called 
shellshock. In the second world war it was called combat fatigue. I don’t know what it will 
be called in the future, if it is called anything.’1036 William Bye served as a trooper with the 
8th Hussars in Korea. He went on to serve with the Army Air Corps in Malaya after the 
Emergency had officially ended (though in fact counterinsurgency continued at a very low 
level until 1989), taking part in the later operations along the Malay-Thai border. Conrad 
Wood asked Bye, in an interview for the IWM sound archive in 2000, if his service in Korea 
had ‘left any after effect’ to which Bye responded ‘I’m not quite sure what you're getting at’ 
and then went on to say that he would not want to go again and that it was a much tougher 
experience than his later experience in Malaya or Aden. Then as the interview was drawing 
to a close Bye returned to the subject unprovoked:  
 
We’re now in the television age and we get stories of post-traumatic stress. … I’m 
just trying to find out where post-traumatic stress came from because we never had 
it. Nobody ever gave us medicine or tablets or pills or whatever for post-traumatic 
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stress. … As long as you didn't have a physical injury the mental stress didn't come 
into it. There was no post-traumatic stress as such.1037     
 
While William Bye remained sceptical about the emergence of post-traumatic stress another 
veteran used the diagnosis to give an incisive social commentary on the codification and 
treatment of trauma during the Emergency. Stephen Hurst, a British NCO who served with 
Federal Police in Malaya between 1954 and 1955, was interviewed by Toby Brooks in June 
2009. He stated: ‘Nobody knew the word PTSD, you know post-traumatic shock. … So they 
didn't have a word for it so since they didn't have a word it officially didn't exist.’1038        
 
In line with growing awareness, the more recent memoirs mention symptoms of PTSD such 
as flashbacks and nightmares, which are both examples of re-experiencing a traumatic event. 
Using the modern formulation of trauma, Eric Dean has presented evidence of flashbacks in 
veterans of the American Civil War.1039 Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely contend, from their 
study of war pension files, that the incidence of descriptions of flashbacks have risen sharply 
in recent wars. This, they suggest, means that ‘cinema and video technology have exercised 
an important influence on the organisation of memory by providing new templates for 
expressing distress.’1040 Whether a timeless response to stressful events which has only 
recently been recognised, or a modern psychological phenomenon, the visibility of the 
flashback, and further evidence of trauma, in the memoirs is dependent upon its being 
reported. These reports are present in the more recent memoirs.  
 
John Chynoweth, for example, was commissioned into a county regiment during his 
National Service and then seconded to the Malay Regiment. In the epilogue to his memoir 
Hunting Terrorists in the Jungle (2005) he describes an intrusive memory on his return 
home:                                               
 
My first job was with an international oil company in London, and some unwelcome 
memories soon resurfaced. While walking down Oxford Street one lunchtime, a 
terrorist fired at me which caused me to dive behind the bushes. As I raised my 
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carbine to shoot at him, I saw that he was a backfiring car, that my carbine was an 
umbrella, and that the bushes were planted in tubs outside the entrance to 
Selfridges.1041   
 
A further example comes from Anthony Coote, a National Serviceman with the Suffolk 
Regiment in Malaya, who wrote that on his return back to the UK ‘A friend and I went into 
Lowestoft one day, and a car back-fired. We both shot off down an alley and kept running 
for quite a time until we realised what it was. Talk about jumpy.’1042 Neither Chynoweth or 
Coote were prompted to report these flashbacks by questionnaire or interview. Instead the 
inclusion of this phenomena in their own narratives can be attributed to a wider awareness 
of an experience which is no longer in the domain of madness but rather an accepted, if not 
understood, facet of memory. 
 
Anthony Coote, a National Serviceman with the Suffolk Regiment, wrote ‘There are a great 
many things that I still find difficult to deal with from my time in Malaya.’ One troubling 
memory was of an operation, west of Kajang, in which a sweep was made of the swamp and 
rubber with stops put in place to intercept the exfiltrating Communist insurgents. In this 
operation, writes Coote, ‘one of the bandits shot one of our lads at point blank range and he 
died instantly.’ The event had a lasting impact: ‘I think this was probably the most harrowing 
time for me, and it certainly left its mark. It is a time that I have never forgotten.’1043 Anthony 
Coote, also went on to describe nightmares relating to his time in Malaya:  
 
My Father said that for quite a long time, when I came home, he would hear me 
shouting out in my sleep, and he would come into my room and I would be thrashing 
about and sweating. The nightmares went on for quite a while and some of them were 
pretty horrendous, but they eventually passed, as most things do, given time.1044    
 
Norman Martin also experienced nightmares as a result of witnessing the aftermath of the 
worst ambush the British faced in Malaya, notably including dealing with the bodies and 
 
1041 John Chynoweth, Hunting Terrorists in the Jungle: The experiences of a National Service Subaltern in 
Malaya in the 1950s, (Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2005), pp.150-151.      
1042 Pte. Anthony J. Coote, ‘National Service 1951-1953 Malayan Jungle’, p.6, (undated), Suffolk County 
Archives, GB 554/Y1/496 (part).     
1043 Ibid, p.3.   
1044 Ibid, p.7.     
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body parts of dead comrades. ‘That day has stuck in my mind until this very day.’ wrote 
Martin, ‘I still have nightmares seeing all that carnage.’1045                                     
  
While symptoms of PTSD were clearly present for some, two points are important to make 
here. Firstly, the most stressful or distasteful of these experiences - being ambushed or 
dealing with dead bodies for example - were somewhat atypical experiences. Although the 
threat of insurgent incident was ever-present it remained probable, even in the chaotic 
opening years, that many service personnel would complete their tours of Malaya without 
involvement in a serious incident. Secondly, while involvement in stressful or distasteful 
events may have been a sufficient cause of subsequent mental ill health, it was not a 
necessary one.  As Erin Finley has shown in her study of veterans of modern 
counterinsurgency, ‘an event that is pathologically traumatic for one individual may not be 
so for the next’.1046 This is evident within the accounts of participation.      
 
Kevin O’Sullivan, the National Service officer mentioned previously, was interrupted in the 
mess to go in pursuit of insurgents, one of whom he would shoot and wound.1047 O’Sullivan’s 
narrative made use of cinematic devices, ‘high-definition’ and ‘slow motion’, which 
indicated derealisation and de-temporalisation respectively. Both of which have come to be 
conceptualised as symptomatic of peritraumatic dissociation, a common response to acute 
stress. Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) was introduced into the fourth edition of the DSM in 
1994 to describe the symptoms of post-traumatic stress in the more immediate aftermath of 
the traumatic event, and to predict PTSD. Dissociative symptoms, depersonalisation and 
derealisation for example, were taken to be an indicator of ASD, and by extension PTSD. 
The fifth edition of the DSM, however, removed the predictive function of ASD as only 
around half of those experiencing the symptoms of ASD went on to be diagnosed with 
PTSD.1048 In short, ASD is now considered to be a largely transient condition. So, while 
O’Sullivan may have experienced the perceptual distortions common in moments of extreme 
stress, his memoir gives little indication of ongoing effects. Indeed, his narrative suggests 
the incident did not adversely affect him, instead, the experience appeared to be 
anticlimactic, ‘So that was it, really. That’s what I had come to Malaya to do. … I went on 
 
1045 Martin, ‘The Day The Sun Stopped Shining’, pp.66-68.              
1046 Erin P. Finley, Fields of Combat: Understanding PTSD among Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2012), p.49.  
1047 Lieutenant K.P. O’Sullivan, Memoir: Loyal Regiment 1956-1958, p.22, IWM 09/46/1.    
1048 Richard A Bryant, ‘Acute Stress Disorder’, Current Opinion in Psychology, 14, (2017), pp.127–131 
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patrolling.’1049 On returning to England and university, his encounters with the Iban trackers 
motivated a change in plan, from studying English to Anthropology.1050 He went on to take 
a further degree in Southeast Asian Studies and to develop business interests in the area, his 
‘NS experience in Malaya having given him a life-long interest in that part of the world.’1051 
Far from being traumatic then, Kevin O’Sullivan’s National Service in Malaya appears to 
have been a formative experience.        
 
A further example comes from Lieutenant Walter Schwarz, the National Service officer 
whose skin condition was thought to be psychological in origin.1052 In his memoir, Schwarz 
writes that his boyhood ambition was ‘a life of travel, excitement, freedom’, he wanted the 
life of a journalist.1053 His time as subaltern in Malaya became a step toward achieving that 
ambition. On 10th September 1953, Walter published an unauthorised article in the 
Manchester Guardian ‘under the pseudonym Blake Walker.’ It recounted a jungle operation 
which was what John Newsinger might term a product of the imperial imagination. It told 
of trackers ‘who seemed to coax the undergrowth into silence’, a fatally wounded ‘bandit’ 
who was ‘tied to a pole like a boar’ and the retrieval of the body by helicopter, which hovered 
with an ‘orgy of noise and science’ over ‘that hushed and primitive theatre of war.’1054 Later, 
after leaving the army, Schwarz went on to become the Guardian’s correspondent in Nigeria, 
Israel, India and France. It was a career that led him back to war zones and even a brief spell 
in an African prison. As well as being a noted foreign correspondent he was also one of the 
first journalists to take note of the emerging Green movement. Walter married and had six 
children.1055 His was a successful life in which his participation in the Malayan Emergency 






1049 O’Sullivan, Memoir: Loyal Regiment, p.25.  
1050 Ibid, p.27-28.   
1051 Ibid, p.33.  
1052 Lieutenant W. Schwarz, ‘Walter Schwarz Malaya Diary, 1952’, 4th September 1952, IWM 08/118/1.   
1053 Schwarz, The Ideal Occupation, p.6. 
1054 Ibid, pp.66-67. 
1055 Schwarz, The Ideal Occupation, p.6-7. See also, Stephen Bates, ‘Obituaries - Walter Schwarz’, The 
Guardian, (12th September 2018), p.8.    
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5.4. Morale, Stigma and Veterans of the Malayan Emergency 
 
In his recent history of PTSD, Allan Horwitz has argued that military psychiatrists have 
historically been reluctant to award a psychiatric diagnosis. This was primarily due to the 
expectation that symptoms would subside once the soldier was removed from battle. When 
symptoms endured the explanation moved to a predisposition toward mental illness or 
compensation seeking. The application of a diagnostic label, it was thought, ‘could reinforce, 
stabilize, and perpetuate symptoms’. There was then a significant stigma attached to the 
psychiatric afterlife of participation in war. Horowitz goes on to argue that widespread 
acceptance of a therapeutic culture during the twenty first century, which sought to recognise 
and address trauma, ‘meant that no stigma accrued to veterans … who received PTSD 
diagnoses.’1056 While the stigma attached to a psychiatric diagnosis resulting from recent 
conflicts may have lessened, veterans of the Malayan Emergency were bound by different 
ideas which surrounded help-seeking for mental health issues.  
 
Social changes during the postwar period led some within the military to argue that British 
morale was being undermined. F.A.E. Crew's voluminous medical history of the Second 
World War emphasised access to amenities, as well as rest and recreation, as being 
fundamental to troop morale in the Middle East during 1942-1943.1057 For Field Marshal 
Montgomery, who became commander of the Eighth Army in the Western Desert in August 
1942, morale was not maintained by meeting welfare needs but by inculcating a sense of 
purpose in soldiers. Montgomery mobilised his position on welfare into a criticism of 
political changes in the postwar era: ‘The creation of the Welfare State in Britain after the 
Second World War’, wrote Montgomery, ‘led too many to think that social security and 
individual prosperity were the only things worth while. But this is not so. If man wants 
prosperity he must work for it or else go without it. He won’t get it merely by voting for it. 
The British soldier when properly led responds to a challenge and not welfare benefits. Man 
does not live by bread alone. The soldier has to be kept active, alert, and purposeful all the 
time.’1058 Montgomery’s criticism was essentially that welfare created a culture of 
dependence, both inside and outside of the army.  
 
1056 Alan V. Horwitz, PTSD: A Short History, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), pp.157-158.      
1057 F.A.E. Crew, The Army Medical Services: Campaigns Volume II: Hong Kong, Malaya, Iceland and he 
Faroes, Libya, 1942-1943, North-West Africa, (London: HMSO, 1957), p.406.             
1058 Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, (London: 
Collins, 1958), p.84.        
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While Montgomery thought welfare created dependence as opposed to resilience Field 
Marshal Lord Carver, formerly Chief of the Defence Staff, suggested that morale had been 
undermined by a cultural shift which made it more permissible to display one's emotions. In 
his address to the Royal Army Medical College in June 1988, Carver stated ‘most of those 
who took part [in the Second World War] had been brought up to think that fear was 
something one must not admit to, and, indeed, that one should not give way to, nor openly 
express any of one's emotions, … With that went the concept that one was capable of 
controlling one's emotions if one exercised the will-power to do so, and that that was the 
right thing to do.’ Instead, Carver complained that this stoicism had been eroded and singled 
out an Irish poet playwright as being the architect of this erosion. ‘The current social ethos 
is almost exactly the opposite,’ Carver went on to state, ‘although fortunately it is limited in 
practice. The tenets of the aesthetic movement, of which Oscar Wilde was one of the leaders 
at the end of the 19th century, that it is wrong to repress one's instincts or emotions, and that 
life should be lived to the full by giving full rein to them, have taken hold.’1059 Carver’s 
concern, that stoicism had given way to displays of emotion did not appear to be true for 
veterans of the Malayan Emergency.  
 
Dr John Blair, who served in the RAMC for his National Service, collated the memoirs of 
his fellow National Service doctors. ‘The age that they described as theirs belongs to a half 
century ago; national characteristics of loyalty, patriotism, caritas [charity], were present 
then without doubt, and disrespect, narrow nationalism, the need for finding scapegoats and 
the constant urge for litigation, were absent.’ This, wrote Blair, meant, ‘Sad events and 
accidents were overcome without ‘counselling’ by eager enthusiasts, and those involved 
recovered more quickly with comrade compassion.’1060 As one RAMC Corporal seconded 
‘We never heard of ‘counselling’, and it was not offered or expected.’1061 Some, however, 
were questioning the apparent aversion toward help-seeking. Anthony Coote, mentioned 
above, also stated: ‘There was no counselling in those days.’1062 Coote however, expressed 
 
1059 Field Marshal Lord Carver, ‘Morale in battle - the medical and the military’, Journal of the Royal Society 
of Medicine, 82:2, (1989), pp.68-69.     
1060 John S.G. Blair (ed), The Conscript Doctors: Memories of National Service, (Edinburgh: Pentland Press, 
2001), p.xiv. See also J.S.G. Blair, ‘Liked it or Loathed it, we all Served: The Conscript Doctors.’, JRAMC, 
156:4, (2010), p.272.            
1061 Corporal Rowland Owen, ‘The National Service Reminisces Project’, IWM Miscellaneous 4071.  
1062 Coote, ‘National Service 1951-1953 Malayan Jungle’, (further draft), p.6.        
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some doubt over the silence, or stoicism, that typified his response: ‘I have, over the years, 
kept a lot of my thoughts and feelings to myself, instead of talking about them, and this may 
not be a good thing to do.’1063 Roy Brook, a retired Major and Welfare Officer for Combat 
Stress, the Ex-Services Mental Welfare Society, mirrored Montgomery’s concern stating 
that some veterans have been affected by the ‘cult of the welfare state’ and were driven by 
reports of compensation gained by some veterans. Conversely, however, Brook also stated 
that others who needed help, would not seek or accept it. He accounted for this through the 
‘stigma of shame’ and an unwillingness to accept that they were ill.1064 Stigma then, 
continued to be a factor in whether veterans of the Emergency sought help for mental health 





In the years following Britain's postwar period of decolonisation the conceptualisation of 
trauma shifted significantly. In contrast to the American and French experience of 
counterinsurgency, the British postwar counterinsurgencies did not generate any specific 
medical terminology which described the stress of participation. Instead, the idea that the 
offensive operations that took place within counterinsurgency were good for morale 
persisted among medical officers into the Cyprus Emergency. While this idea was being 
eroded, it was not until the Troubles in Northern Ireland that medical personnel began to 
report that counterinsurgency contained a level of stress which undermined the correlation 
between physical and psychological casualties. The recognition of stress had been 
marginalised during Britain's postwar period of decolonisation. The Falklands War led to 
the adoption of PTSD as a diagnostic term and ultimately to the wider recognition and re-
conceptualisation of stress among veterans of the Malayan Emergency.  While the PTSD 
diagnosis may have to some extent destigmatised psychological problems resulting from 
participation in counterinsurgency, this chapter has suggested that veterans of the Malayan 
Emergency were in large part bound by earlier social expectations.  As Richard Vinen states, 
in his book on National Service, cultural expectations in the 1950s meant that psychological 
effects were difficult to measure.1065 As this chapter has argued, these cultural expectations 
 
1063 Ibid, p.5.     
1064 Brook, The Stress of Combat The Combat of Stress, pp.1-2.       
1065 Richard Vinen, National Service: Conscription in Britain, 1945-1963, (London: Penguin, 2015), p.306.  
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could persist long after National Service had ended. While a cultural shift, including the re-
conceptualisation of trauma, meant symptoms were more recognisable and reportable to 
some, others were bound by earlier cultural expectations and reluctant to seek help. The 
long-term psychological impact of participation in the Malayan Emergency remains, at least 






































This thesis has been the result of an Arts and Humanities Research Council funded project 
to utilise the Imperial War Museum’s archive to examine the impact of participation in 
Britain’s postwar counterinsurgency campaigns on British service personnel. The IWM 
archive holds an extensive collection of personal papers authored by those who served in 
these campaigns. The Malayan Emergency (1948-60), which was the longest campaign of 
the postwar era and took place over hostile terrain and against a determined opposition, has 
generated a diverse range of letters, diaries and memoirs from officers and other ranks who 
served with a range of regiments.      
 
The nature of the insurgency, along with the rich archival material, has made the Malayan 
Emergency an ideal case-study through which to understand the impact of participation on 
service personnel. This thesis has, therefore, utilised these materials to understand the reality 
of participation on the ground as the insurgency was ongoing as well as the aftermath of 
participation. In following service personnel, from selection and training, through the 
Emergency and into later life, this thesis has sought to delineate the lifecycle of participation. 
In this way it offers a model to study impact by breaking participation down into a series of 
stages and seeing how these interrelate. This thesis has also made use of a range of 
governmental and regimental documents to delineate the management of the 
counterinsurgency campaign and contextualise the experiences of service personnel.  
 
In this way, this thesis has investigated the impact of participation using three overarching 
research questions. Firstly, what were the range and natures of stresses in 
counterinsurgency? Secondly, how did the military attempt to instil resilience, understood 
as morale, in service personnel? Thirdly, how many service personnel experienced 
debilitating symptoms of stress? How were these symptoms and conditions conceptualised 
and managed, both during and after the campaign?     
 
The first question this thesis has sought to answer was, what was the nature and range of 
stress caused by participation in the Malayan Emergency? Chapter 1 suggested that 
participation in counterinsurgency might engender a different set of stresses than the 
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previous World Wars. The contacts with insurgents, when they came, were fleeting and less 
frequent than the engagements during conventional war. As such, they did not generally 
generate the same intensity, although certain units did take clusters of casualties. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has showed that intensity was still a factor in participation during 
the Emergency. From 1948 to 1952 the indices by which the Emergency was measured were 
significantly higher than in the later years. This meant there was a higher exposure to 
stressful events throughout that time. By 1953 the indices of the Emergency were all in 
steady decline, although as one serviceman stated, ‘… there was still much hard Jungle 
Bashing to be done before the final curtain came down.’1066 While the stress of participation 
was generally greater through the more intense years, the counterinsurgency in Malaya 
produced a form of situational stress which persisted into later years. Service personnel had 
to maintain a constant state of vigilance while on gruelling jungle patrols and when operating 
in areas where civilians were present. The transition between these terrains introduced the 
further stress of when to use force. As the historian and veteran of the Emergency, Anthony 
Short has intimated, not using force could result in taking casualties, while using force could 
result in the death of innocent civilians.1067 The physical, psychological and moral 
consequences of a lapse in concentration or the improper use of force were great.  
 
The next question asked, what was the resilience, or morale, of the service personnel who 
participated in the Malayan Emergency? Answering this question meant looking at how 
service personnel were selected and prepared to conduct operations in Malaya. As this thesis 
has shown, a system of physical and psychological selection was implemented to remove 
those considered to be the weak from service abroad. Chapter 2 has argued that, once in 
Malaya, soldiers were encouraged to emulate hunters to overcome indiscipline and increase 
vigilance. These qualities were summed up as the ‘offensive spirit’ required to close with 
and kill the insurgents. Offensive spirit had become shorthand for high morale during the 
Second World War and training a way to inculcate morale, an earlier analogue of resilience, 
in service personnel. Underlying this offensive spirit was a system of behavioural training 
which drilled the skills and actions required to prosecute a jungle war into service personnel. 
Conversely, there was little or no reference to the delimitation of force in training. In short, 
 
1066 H. Atkins, ‘Final Instalment, Post War Service 1950-1959. (Tommy Atkins).’, p.130, IWM 92/28/1.      
1067 Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960, (London: Frederick Muller, 1975), 
pp.160-161.       
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training did not fully prepare service personnel to operate over the complex system of areas 
and regulations which evolved over the course of the Emergency.     
 
Britain’s postwar counterinsurgency campaigns have recently been revisited by a set of 
histories which have challenged earlier works written by practitioner-scholars seeking to 
codify the prosecution of counterinsurgency into doctrine for future use. In the case of 
Malaya, these histories have suggested that the success of British counterinsurgency was not 
mainly due to a benign ‘hearts and minds’ campaign but instead the result of clinical 
population control measures and the use of force. As such, these histories have generally 
focused on overarching policy, the strategy and the legal framework that was used to 
prosecute counterinsurgency and govern the use of force. The journalist and veteran of the 
Malayan Emergency, Neal Ascherson has recently stated that instincts, adrenaline and 
emotions all compete with the rules under which conflict should take place.1068 This thesis 
has shown that training should be added to this list. As research emanating from the 
counterinsurgency in Palestine had suggested, fear could impair judgement, exaggerate 
dangers and lead to erratic behaviour, instead of considered action. The behavioural training 
in Malaya, and its overarching narrative, sought to overcome fear and indecision by creating 
a conditioned response, or a pattern of behaviour to defer to, while under the stress of contact.  
 
Out on operations, senior officers were concerned that insurgents might escape because 
service personnel were not using force quickly and decisively enough. Hence, for instance, 
the use of moving targets and instructions to fire instantly and from the hip, and instructions 
that emphasised the responsibility to open fire if one or more members of the group were 
reasonably believed to be armed. This concern, particularly in the early years, took priority 
over inhibiting the use of force. Chapter 3 also suggested that regimental culture built on the 
themes introduced in training and maintained the morale of soldiers. It also resulted in inter-
regimental competition which manifested itself in keeping a scoreboard of kills. Indeed, the 
counterinsurgency operations and contact with insurgents was thought to be good for morale. 
While framing operations as a hunt may have lent resilience to service personnel, it did so 
at the cost of dehumanising the insurgents.  
 
 
1068 Neal Ascherson, ‘“They were horribly wounded; I shot them both dead”: Neal Ascherson tries to make 
sense of a traumatic wartime memory’, Sunday Herald, 29th January 2017.   
http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion. Accessed 34/07/18.  
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The focus on resilience, in turn, led this research to consider breakdowns and the 
concomitant questions. What was the number of service personnel who experienced 
symptoms of stress and breakdowns? How were these symptoms and conditions 
conceptualised and managed, both during and after the campaign? Histories of trauma and 
military psychiatry have largely passed over Britain’s postwar counterinsurgency 
campaigns. The two World Wars consolidated an orthodox conceptualisation of 
psychopathology, in relation to psychological trauma, that was not challenged until the 
emergence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder following the Vietnam War. Further to this, 
the World Wars and Vietnam generated a significant number of psychiatric breakdowns, 
both during and after participation respectively. As discussed in Chapter 4, an initial report 
from the Far East appeared to have justified the omission of Britain’s postwar 
counterinsurgencies from these histories. This thesis, however, has suggested that the threat 
of attack and the need to maintain a heightened state of vigilance was sufficiently stressful 
to cause symptoms of stress and that involvement in serious incidents, such as ambushes, 
could be the cause of serious and ongoing conditions. It has also suggested the 
conceptualisation and management of these conditions was adapted to the Malayan 
Emergency.    
 
By the end of 1948, the psychiatric cost of participation in the Emergency appeared to be 
non-existent, as none of the psychiatric patients at the base hospital in Singapore were 
attributed to the operations across the causeway. The World Wars had brought the realisation 
that even the most psychologically stable of soldiers would break down given a long enough 
exposure to stress. The small-scale engagements were not considered to be sufficiently 
intense to generate psychiatric casualties, but over time it became clear that was not the case. 
Regimental Officers were assigning soldiers considered nervous to support roles while 
Regimental Medical Officers were treating service personnel exhibiting symptoms of stress 
with rest. Many cases, therefore, were managed by the officers and RMOs without ever being 
referred to a psychiatrist.    
 
Further to this, psychiatric conditions were being recorded at the military hospitals across 
FARELF command. Figures recorded throughout the Emergency years suggested that the 
incidence of psychiatric morbidity among service personnel stationed in the Far East was at 
its peak in 1948. By 1952, these figures were similar to those of troops stationed in the UK, 
and lower than the general population. This suggested that service in the Far East during the 
Malayan Emergency was not a significant cause of psychiatric conditions during the middle 
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and later years of the Emergency. Given National Service personnel had undergone a process 
of selection which sent the fittest abroad this was perhaps unsurprising. Psychiatric 
conditions in the Far East were, however, significantly higher during the opening years of 
the Emergency, when it was more intense. This in turn suggested that the higher rate of 
contacts and casualties did cause an increase in psychiatric conditions. 
 
A more detailed survey of psychiatry gave insight into how these conditions were being 
managed by Far East Land Forces lead psychiatrists and suggested that the recording of 
incidence of psychiatric conditions was being kept artificially low. In 1951, when the 
insurgency was at its height, a survey of service psychiatry was carried out at the base 
hospital in Singapore. The milder cases seen at the hospital were not recorded as a psychiatric 
illness and instead as having ‘No Gross Psychiatric Disability’. These cases were returned 
to full combat duty with limited medical intervention in the form of simple psychotherapy.  
 
This plan of management was justified through the need to avoid the stigma of a psychiatric 
label. As relapse rates were not presented in the survey the efficacy of the strategy remains 
unknown. A psychiatric label, however, did carry a significant stigma during the Malayan 
Emergency, perhaps most saliently for this research, as service personnel exhibiting the 
symptoms of neurosis were effectively the antithesis of the hunter. Psychiatric textbooks in 
the 1950s retained the notion that antipathy towards aggression or an aversion to blood sports 
signified a predisposition toward ‘lifelong neurotic anxiety’.1069 It was a model of resilience 
which reflected a society that was engaged in developing martial tendencies within its 
population to fight big wars and the small wars of empire.  Becoming a hunter then, signified 
the ability to adapt to the jungle, while an aversion to hunting was considered an inability to 
adapt due to character weakness. Ultimately, within military medicine the army is the patient 
and as such psychiatric casualties become a concern once they begin to threaten its combat 
effectiveness. Conceptualising these conditions as non-conditions enabled the service 
psychiatrists to return these personnel to duty and conserve the fighting strength.  
 
The thesis that participation in counterinsurgency is uniquely stressful was raised in the wake 
of the recent military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was also a thesis that had been 
raised earlier by vehemently anti-imperialist, anti-interventionist psychiatrists as a result of 
 
1069 David Henderson and R. D. Gillespie, Henderson and Gillespie’s Textbook of Psychiatry for Students and  
Practitioners, (London: OUP, 1950), p.596.   
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the highly divisive French and American counterinsurgencies. Their politicisation of mental 
illness remains questionable. For these psychiatrists, to show these conflicts caused psychic 
harm proved that they were morally wrong. While the early years of the Malayan Emergency 
were demonstrably more intense than the later years, more generally Britain’s postwar 
counterinsurgency campaigns never reached the intensity of the World Wars, or raised the 
level of public discontent, that the French campaign in Algeria and the American campaign 
in Vietnam did. As such, participation in the British counterinsurgencies was never 
medicalised in the same way. While these dissenting voices may not be impartial, they do 
act as a valuable counterbalance to the agenda driven military-medical voices and their 
concern with preserving manpower.  
 
While the simple correlation between battle intensity and psychiatric casualties is reliable in 
terms of incidence, it arguably negates the significant stress that is often a feature of 
participation in low-intensity conflict. Ambushes, or more general action if intensity 
increases, does of course cause breakdowns. Many counterinsurgencies, however, are 
characterised by demands for long periods of intense alertness, dispersed threats, and 
difficulty of decision-taking both when operating in areas where civilians are present, and in 
fleeting encounters that may require instant reaction.  These strains could be sufficiently 
stressful to cause ongoing, serious psychological concerns for significant numbers of service 
personnel, if not diagnosable psychiatric conditions. Participation in the Malayan 
Emergency resulted in a range of symptoms of stress, including more serious symptoms and 
long-term conditions among some of its participants.     
 
The conceptualisation of psychiatric conditions at the time of the Malayan Emergency, raises 
a further issue. It is important to make the point that many service personnel who experienced 
the gruelling jungle patrols and operations in areas where insurgents could be confused with 
civilians, ultimately found their service during the Malayan Emergency to be formative. A 
salient example is that of Lieutenant Walter Schwarz, whose experience confounded the 
psychiatric orthodoxy of the time. Schwarz overcame adverse early life experience, moving 
to England as a child to escape the rise of Nazism, and then, concerns about his psychological 
robustness when he became a National Service Officer. In Malaya, Schwarz managed to 
convert his experiences in the jungle into a newspaper article, a first step toward his 
successful career as a journalist. It is worth considering whether Schwarz would have 
achieved his ambition had he been labelled as neurotic and prevented from deploying to 
Malaya. Similarly, it is worth considering whether deferring a psychiatric diagnosis and 
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returning service personnel to duty instead of stigmatising them as neurotic may have had 
less of an impact in the long term. They would have carried the highly stigmatising neurotic 
label into their civilian lives where the chances of a relapse were reduced as the stress of 
counterinsurgency was not present.  
 
Chapter 5 showed that those veterans of the Malayan Emergency who have experienced 
ongoing psychological distress as a result of their service, for example those referred to the 
ex-services charity Combat Stress, now generally fall under the rubric of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. The creation of PTSD as a diagnosis in the US in 1980, eventually accepted 
in the British Army in the 1990s, has represented a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation 
of reactions to trauma. During much of the twentieth century those who broke down were 
thought to be constitutionally weak. PTSD, however, shifted the emphasis onto the traumatic 
event which absolved the individual from blame. As such, the diagnosis did not elicit the 
suspicion of malingering or cowardice that the earlier psychoneuroses had engendered. 
Consequently, the PTSD diagnosis awarded to veterans of recent conflicts, such as the 
counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, is considered to be free from stigma. In turn, 
the de-stigmatisation of mental health issues resulting from conflict has arguably led to ex-
service personnel seeking help, increasing the number of conditions recorded and making 
them more visible.    
 
Conversely, veterans of the Emergency have noted that psychological problems were 
generally not recognised or spoken about, and help was generally neither offered nor sought. 
There are veterans who having experienced traumatic events have subsequently questioned 
the culture of silence around mental health issues and expressed regret about not having 
sought help. Some veterans, who consider the Malayan Emergency to have been a war as 
opposed to acting in aid of the civil power, have insisted that PTSD has had an impact on 
their post-service lives. While this could be considered a symptom of the politicisation of 
trauma, that PTSD has become a language through which to express discontent, it may also 
be the case that veterans have recognised symptoms of the highly publicised disorder in 
themselves and their former comrades. Others who served in the Far East during the post-
war period have remained sceptical of the concept, suggesting the disorder is a consequence 
of culture, spread by the media. While the stigma attached to a psychiatric diagnosis resulting 
from recent conflicts may have lessened, veterans of earlier conflicts were bound by a 
different code of conduct. It was a different age in which cultural expectations dictated that 
psychological problems were to be overcome independently of medical intervention. As 
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such, it was a time when ideas about stoicism could prevail over the recognition and 
investigation of mental health issues. These cultural expectations could persist long after 
National Service had ended, with veterans unwilling to seek or accept help due to the stigma 
of mental disorder. In short, cultural expectations in the 1950s have continued to obfuscate 
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